新闻来源：the strategist《战略家》；作者：Alex Joske；发布时间：20 Aug 2020 / 2020年8月20日

翻译/简评：Cathy r；校对：leftgun；审核：海阔天空；Page：拱卒

简评：

中共国除了“千人计划”还有“猎凤计划”，就是瞄准了外国高端人才，以将研究商业化来吸引他们来中共国发展，同时让他们脚踩两条船，方便他们继续从原所在国进行知识产权盗窃。实际上这一切都源于中共国失败的教育体系，培养不出具有真知灼见的人才，只好从外国进行盗窃，填补其创新缺口和人才空洞。

原文翻译：

Turning the spotlight on China’s global effort to recruit scientists

聚焦中共国在全球招募科学家的努力 (千人计划)

Attention on the Chinese government’s recruitment of overseas scientists reached a crescendo when renowned Harvard nanotechnology expert Charles Lieber was arrested and charged with hiding his participation in China’s Thousand Talents Plan in January.

当著名的哈佛大学纳米技术专家查尔斯·利伯(Charles Lieber)于今年1月被捕，并被指控隐瞒了他参与中共国千人计划（Thousand Talents Plan）时，人们对中共国政府对海外科学家招募的关注达到了高潮。

As ASPI’s new report, Hunting the phoenix: The Chinese Communist Party’s search for technology and talent, explains, he is likely only one among more than 60,000 scientists recruited through over 200 talent recruitment programs run by the Chinese government in an effort to gain technology and talent from abroad since 2008.

正如澳大利亚战略政策研究（ASPI）的新报告《凤凰猎头：中国共产党寻找技术和人才》所解释的那样，自2008年以来，为了从国外获得技术和人才，查尔斯·利伯可能仅仅是通过中共国政府管理的200多个人才招募项目招募的6万多名科学家之一。

The scale of these recruitment activities appears to be immense, as are the security risks for targeted countries. For example, uncontrolled technology transfers to China could end up in weapon programs and enable human rights abuses. The economic costs are also high, as valuable intellectual property bleeds out of taxpayer-funded universities and into China, potentially costing revenue and jobs. Yet countries and institutions outside of the United States are only now beginning to forge responses to this problem.

这些招募活动的规模似乎很大，对目标国家的安全风险也是巨大的。例如，不受控制的向中共国的技术转让最终可能导致（将技术应用于）武器项目，并导致侵犯人权。经济成本也很高，因为宝贵的知识产权从纳税人资助的大学流出，进入中共国，可能会导致丧失收入和工作岗位。然而，美国以外的国家和机构现在才开始对这一问题作出反应。

But rather than focusing on the individuals who have joined talent-recruitment programs, Hunting the phoenix describes their structure and recruitment mechanisms, which until now have been poorly understood. These programs are much broader than the Thousand Talents Plan. For example, more than 80% of talent-recruitment programs are run at the subnational level and may attract as many as seven times more scientists than the national programs.

但是，“猎凤”计划并没有专注那些加入人才招募计划的人，而是描述了这计划的结构和招募机制，到目前为止，这些机制还没有得到很好的理解。这些计划比千人计划要广泛得多。例如，80%以上的人才招募方案是在国家以下各级开展的，吸引的科学家可能是国家方案的七倍多。

One of the key findings is that the Chinese government has established more than 600 ‘talent-recruitment stations’ around the world. These stations are essentially contractual arrangements between parts of the Chinese government and overseas organisations and companies. The overseas organisations receive up to A$30,000 for general operating costs each year, and large bonuses for each individual they recruit. And numbers are growing. The report identifies 146 in the United States, 57 each in Germany and Australia, and more than 40 each in the UK, Canada, Japan and France.

其中一个关键发现是，中共国政府在世界各地建立了600多个“人才招募站”。这些招募站基本上是中共国政府中的一些部门与海外组织和公司之间的合同安排。海外机构每年收到的一般业务费用可达30,000澳元，每个被招募的人都可获得高额奖金。招募站数量也在增长。报告指出，美国有146个，德国和澳大利亚各有57个，英国、加拿大、日本和法国各有40多个。

All countries seek to attract talent from abroad, but there are important and concerning features of how the Chinese state does so. The recruitment programs aim to make deals with individual researchers rather than institutions, which makes it easier for partnerships to fly under the radar. The programs also allow researchers to keep their original job while taking up a second job in China, which can contravene the employment and IP regulations of target universities unless properly managed. Taken together with the quick path China can offer to commercialising research, the incentives for academics are clear.

所有国家都寻求从国外吸引人才，但中共国这样做有着重要和相关的特点。招募计划的目的是与研究人员个人达成协议，而不是与机构达成协议，这使得合作伙伴关系更容易避开监察下进行。这些项目还允许研究人员保留原来的工作，同时在中共国从事第二份工作，除非管理得当，这可能违反目标大学的就业和知识产权规定。再加上中共国可以为研究商业化提供的快速途径，对学者的激励是显而易见的。

It’s important to note that many who join the Chinese government’s talent recruitment programs don’t break any rules. They sign a contract to work at a university in China, leave their job and move to China. The flow of talent between countries is a normal feature of the international research community.

重要的是要注意，许多加入中共国政府人才招募计划的人并没有违反任何规则。他们签了一份合同，在中共国的一所大学工作，辞职搬到中共国。国与国之间人才流动是国际研究界的一个正常特征。

However, cases like that of Charles Lieber and others analysed in the report highlight how some recruits are attempting to juggle their original job with multiple positions in China.

然而，像查尔斯·利伯和报告中分析的其它案例突出表明，一些被招募者试图同时兼顾中共国的多个职位和他们原来的工作。

Large numbers of recruits may be failing to accurately disclose conflicts of interest and external employment, raising concerns about potential foreign interference and misuse of public funds. In the United States, 54 scientists lost their jobs after the National Institutes of Health raised concerns about potential failures to disclose foreign funding. China was the source of funding in nearly all cases. An investigation by Texas A&M University found that more than 100 of its staff or visiting scholars were linked to Chinese government recruitment programs and only five had disclosed those ties. More than 20 scientists have been charged by the US government for crimes related to talent-recruitment activity, including visa fraud, grant fraud and economic espionage. Entrepreneurship is also an important component of China’s talent-recruitment efforts, and some participants seek to commercialise research in China without disclosing it.

大批被招募者可能无法准确披露利益冲突和外部就业情况，从而引起人们对外国可能干预和滥用公共资金的关切。在美国，54名科学家在美国国家卫生院(National Institutes of Health)对可能无法披露外国资金表示担忧后失业。在几乎所有情况下，中共国都是资金来源。

德州农工大学(TexasA&MUniversity)的一项调查发现，其100多名员工或访问学者与中共国政府招募计划有关，只5人披露了这些关系。美国政府指控20多名科学家犯有与招募人才活动有关的罪行，包括签证欺诈、赠款欺诈和经济间谍活动。创业精神也是中共国人才招募计划的重要组成部分，一些参与者试图在中共国将研究商业化而不披露。

Hunting the phoenix shows that misconduct and hidden technology transfers are a feature of Chinese government recruitment efforts, rather than a problem it’s trying to stamp out. Chinese government agencies that oversee talent recruitment, such as the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs, have themselves been implicated in espionage. The recruitment programs incentivise and enable economic espionage. In one case, Chinese intelligence officers used a Thousand Talents Plan scholar to steal aviation technology from the United States.

“猎凤”计划表明，不当行为和隐藏的技术转移是中共国政府招募计划的一个特点，而不是它试图消除的问题。监督人才招募的中共国政府机构，如国家外国专家事务管理局（ State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs ），本身也牵涉了间谍活动。这些招募计划激励和促成经济间谍活动。 在一个案例中，中共国情报官员利用千人计划学者从美国窃取航空技术。

The Chinese government has failed to acknowledge the concerning activities associated with its talent programs. In fact, its recruitment programs have only become more secretive and covert in recent years.

中共国政府没有承认与其人才计划有关的活动。事实上，其招募计划近年来才变得更加秘密和隐蔽。

The Chinese government’s talent-recruitment efforts are global, raising similar concerns in all developed nations. It’s likely that thousands of scientists and engineers have been recruited from the UK, Germany, Singapore, Canada, Japan, France and Australia since 2008. The lack of public prosecutions or misconduct cases linked to talent-recruitment activity in those countries is likely due to the early stage of their awareness of the implications of these recruitment programs.

中共国政府招募人才的努力是全球性的，引起了所有发达国家的类似关注。自2008年以来，中共国可能已经从英国、德国、新加坡、加拿大、日本、法国和澳大利亚招募了数千名科学家和工程师。这些国家缺乏与人才招募活动有关的公共起诉或不当行为案件，很可能是因为它们对这些招募方案的影响认识还处在早期阶段。

The good news is that the host-country risks for China’s recruitment programs can often be addressed by better enforcement of existing regulations, backed up by stronger analytical capabilities. Much of the misconduct associated with talent-recruitment programs that has been uncovered to date breaches existing laws, contracts and institutional policies.

好消息是，中共国招募计划对东道国的风险通常可以通过更好地执行现有法规来解决，并辅之以更强的分析能力。迄今发现的与人才招募方案有关的许多不当行为违反了现行法律、合同和机构政策。

But the fact that it still occurs at high levels points to a failure of compliance and enforcement mechanisms across research institutions and relevant government agencies. Governments and research institutions must work together to build both awareness of CCP talent-recruitment work and the capabilities to investigate and respond to it.

但这一现象仍然屡屡发生的事实表明研究机构以及相关政府机构的遵守和执行机制的失败。各国政府和研究机构必须共同努力，提高对中共人才招募计划的认识以及调查和应对这一计划的能力。

The report recommends measures such as increasing resourcing to agencies responsible for compliance and enforcement, integrating public disclosure requirements for foreign funding into all research grant and funding processes, and setting up national research integrity offices to link the efforts of the government and tertiary sectors.

报告建议采取措施，如增加对负责遵守和执行的机构的资源配置，将外国资金的公开披露要求纳入所有研究赠款和资助程序，并设立国家研究诚信办公室，将政府和第三产业部门的努力联系起来。

This kind of institutional transparency building is critical to disrupting uncontrolled technology transfers to China and to helping science and technology researchers understand the national-security risks that can lie beneath the surface of China’s talent-recruitment programs.

这种制度透明度的建立对于阻止对中共国不受控制的技术转让以及帮助科技研究人员了解中共国人才招募计划表面之下的国家安全风险至关重要。

编辑：【喜马拉雅战鹰团】Edited by：【Himalaya Hawk Squad】