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印度捍卫网络主权,下架五十九款中共国APP 【中英对照翻译】

新闻来源:The diplomat《外交家》;作者:Chauncey Jung 7-2-2020

翻译/简评:cathy;校对:理工男文峰;Page:拱卒

简评:

网络空间主权的提法是中共习近平最先提出来,用来为保持中共的防火墙审查免遭国际社会谴责服务的。中共宣称任何国家都不应该谋求网络霸权,但是却通过微信、抖音等应用把内容过滤和审查延伸到世界各国,这正是事实上的网络霸权, 不仅挑战着西方的言论自由等宪法赋予民众的权利,更是传播虚假信息、影响选举等等。现在印度作为民主国家率先通过禁止59个中共手机应用来捍卫自己的网络空间主权,为民主自由世界起到了很好的示范带头作用。 民主国家必须采取行动和措施保护自己国家的网络空间主权不受独裁国家的侵略和侵蚀

原文:

India Shows the World How to Use ‘Cyberspace Sovereignty’ Against China

印度向世界展示如何对中共国行使“网络空间主权”

It’s time for liberal democracies to embrace the term — with a new definition –to defend against China’s predatory cyber practices.

现在是自由民主国家接受这个词的时候了--用一个新的定义--来抵御中共国的网络掠夺性行为。

On Monday, the government of India announced its decision to ban 59 Chinese mobile applications within its borders. In a statement from the country’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, governing authorities from India accuse these Chinese mobile applications, including TikTok, WeChat, and Weibo, of mining user data and transferring data to servers outside of the country.

星期一,印度政府宣布禁止59个中共手机应用程序在印度境内使用。在印度的电子信息技术部的声明中说,印度执政当局指责这些种中共手机应用程序,包括抖音,微信,微博存储用户数据,并把数据传出到印度以外的服务器。

The ban on Chinese mobile applications was not appreciated by the Chinese government. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concerns over the decisions and urged India to “uphold the legitimate rights of international investors.”

中共政府不欢迎对中共手机应用程序的禁止令。中共外交部对决议表示关切,敦促印度政府“支持国际投资者的合法权利。”

Despite showing concerns about another country restricting the use of certain mobile applications within its domestic network, China has consistently blocked foreign apps, websites, and other internet services using its “Great Firewall,” which stops internet users in China from accessing websites such as Google, the New York Times, and The Diplomat. Smartphone users are also not allowed to use mobile applications such as Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook.

尽管关注其他国家在它们国内网络上限制某些手机应用,中共持续用“防火墙”阻止外国应用程序,网址和其他互联网服务,阻止中国境内的互联网用户浏览网址,如谷歌,纽约时报,外交家。智能手机用户也不被允许使用手机应用如Instagram, 推特和脸书。

The Chinese regime also has strict restrictions on the distribution of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), which can be used to get around the restrictions. In 2018, a software engineer faced criminal charges and received a suspended prison sentence for selling software that helped internet users to bypass the Chinese government’s Great Firewall to visit prohibited websites.

中共政权也严格限制VPN(虚拟专用网络)的使用,因为VPN可用来突破防火墙。在2018年,一位软件工程师因出售销售可帮助互联网用户绕过中共国政府的长防火墙访问禁止网站的软件而面临刑事指控,并被判处缓刑。

While Chinese apps and technology services often face criticism and scrutiny over data security and privacy concerns, it is worth noting that the government of India also brought up the argument of protecting India’s national sovereignty and integrity. It is a rare move for democratic countries to use the term “cyberspace sovereignty,” as this idea has been utilized by authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia to justify controlling their respective cyberspaces and introducing legislation to enhance censorship on the internet.

尽管中共国应用程序和技术服务在数据安全和隐私问题上经常面临批评和审查,但值得注意的是印度政府也提出关于保护印度国家主权和完整的论点。对于民主国家而言,使用“网络空间主权”一词是罕见的举动,因为这个想法已被独裁国家政权如中共和俄罗斯用来控制它们各自的网络空间并出台立法以加强对互联网的审查。

The term, thanks to its association with nondemocratic countries, is often mistaken as equivalent to imposing internet censorship. Yet as we enter a new digital era with greater dependence on internet technologies and cyberspace, it would be naive for democratic nations to ignore the importance of protecting cyberspace from predatory attacks and unregulated erosions.

该术语与非民主国家相关联,因此常常被误认为等同于加强互联网审查。但随着我们进入一个更依赖于互联网技术和网络空间新的数字时代,对于民主国家来说, 保护网络空间免受掠夺性攻击和无约束的侵蚀是重要的,如果忽略这些重要性将是幼稚的。

The concept of cyberspace sovereignty started to make a greater impact on international politics in 2015, when Chinese President Xi Jinping made a speech calling all countries to respect cyberspace sovereignty. By that, Xi meant respecting all countries in their choices to develop and manage their own internet. According to China’s formulation, countries should not attempt to interfere with other countries’ domestic affairs and jeopardize other countries’ cybersecurity, nor should any countries attempt to become an internet hegemon.

网络空间主权在2015年对国际政治产生了更大的影响,当时中共领导人习近平发表讲话,呼吁所有国家尊重网络空间主权。习近平表示,尊重所有国家发展和管理它们自己互联网方面的选择。根据中共的表述,各国不应试图去干涉别国的内政及危害别国的网络安全,同时任何国家不应试图谋求互联网霸权。

But it is clear that Chinese government messaging is not consistent with its actual policies and aggression in the international cyberspace. China is banning websites and mobile applications from the United States within its cyberspace while protesting against India imposing similar measures Chinese app. China has also been accused of engaging in cyberattacks against countries such as the United States and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with the goal to acquire sensitive information such as coronavirus vaccine data and gather geopolitical intelligence.

但很明显中共政府发出的信息和它的实际政策和在国际网络空间上的侵略行为相背离的。中共在它自己的网络空间封锁美国网址和手机应用,但却抗议印度实行同样的措施封锁中共应用。中共还被指控对美国和亚太地区其他国家进行网络攻击,目的是获取如冠状病毒疫苗数据之类的敏感信息并收集地缘政治情报。

Through protectionism and self-interest directed policies, China is not only utilizing its controls over the domestic cyberspace to remain in power, but also offering internet companies monitored and controlled by the regime the chance to develop in a domestic market with little or no competitors from other countries. The move helped the Chinese internet giants such as Tencent, Alibaba, and Bytedance to secure their initial successes in China, and thereby facilitated their path to expanding into markets beyond Chinese borders. In recent years, these companies have been having greater impacts in the domestic politics of liberal democracies around the world.

通过贸易保护主义和以个人利益为导向的政策,中共不仅在利用对国内网络空间的控制权来维持其政权,而且还为被其监控和控制的互联网公司提供了在国内市场发展的机会,而该市场很少或几乎没有其他国家的竞争对手。此举帮助腾讯、阿里巴巴和字节跳动等互联网巨头在中共国取得了初步成功,从而为他们向中共国以外的市场拓展道路提供了便利。最近几年,这些公司在世界自由民主国家的国内政治上产生了更大的影响。

With mobile applications such as TikTok and WeChat landing in democratic countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, they also extended the coverage of China’s political censorships in regions beyond China’s actual borders. TikTok, for example, has been found to censor content that challenges the Chinese government, and was caught censoring short videos calling for justice for ethnic minority Uyghurs detained in re-education camps in Xinjiang.

随着手机应用如抖音,微信在民主国家如美国,加拿大和澳大利亚落地,它们也把中共的政治审查扩大到中共实际边境以外。比如发现抖音审查挑战中共政府的内容,它审查呼吁为在新疆再教育营关押的维吾尔少数民族寻求正义的短视频。

As for WeChat, the application was reported to use data on users outside of China to develop a censorship apparatus. It has became a social media platform that propagates fake news, misinformation, and censored content – all in line with Beijing’s preferred narratives — to citizens in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Those contents promoted greater division, fear, and bias, and potentially impacted election outcomes in liberal democratic countries.

至于微信,据报道该应用程序使用中共境外的用户数据发展审查机制。它已经成为一个社交媒体平台,向美国、加拿大和澳大利亚的公民传播假新闻、虚假信息和审查内容,这些都符合北京偏爱的叙述方式。 这些内容促进了更大的分裂,恐惧和偏见,并有可能影响自由民主国家的选举结果。

Nonstate actors such as TikTok and WeChat play a role in democratic elections, but these Chinese-owned mobile applications are not held to the same standards as Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram when it comes to combating misinformation, documenting political content and advertisements, and more importantly, respecting and upholding freedom of expressions. Both Bytedance and Tencent have attempted to defend themselves by denying any censorship, despite clear and numerous evidence. When questioned by Canadian media outlet CBC, WeChat, and its parent company Tencent, underplayed the app’s stake in Canadian politics by stating that the Chinese-controlled social media platform does not accept or support political ads.

抖音和微信等非政府组织在民主选举中产生作用,但这些中共所有的手机应用在打击误导信息、记录政治内容和广告等方面,及更重要的是在尊重和维护言论自由方面并没有像脸书、推特、Instagram那样的标准。尽管有大量明确的证据,字节跳动和腾讯试图否认任何审查。当被加拿大媒体CBC质疑时,微信和它的母公司腾讯,淡化此应用参与加拿大政治的角色,声称中共控制的社交媒体平台不接受或不支持政治广告。

Products from Chinese companies such as Bytedance and Tencent have played critical roles in influencing election outcomes and public policy discussions in liberal democracies. But unlike other notable social media outlets, these China-originated social media platforms are not facing the same level of scrutiny and regulations needed to uphold election integrity and fairness. Regardless of their intentions, the fact is that they have become the latest tools for the Chinese state to continue its censorship beyond its own border, including the regime’s attempt to change the narratives on issues such as the anti-extradition bill in Hong Kong and the notorious re-education camps in Xinjiang.

中共公司如字节跳动和腾讯的产品在影响选举结果和公共政策讨论上发挥了关键作用。但是,与其它著名的社交媒体平台不同,这些源自中共国的社交媒体平台所面临的审查和监管水平并不能够维持选举完整性和公正性。不管它们的意图是什么,事实是它们已成为中共政府越境继续进行审查的最新工具,包括该政权试图改变有关诸如香港的反送中法案和臭名昭著的新疆再教育营之类的叙述。

These applications target vulnerable user groups, such as those who face significant language barriers to read news stories from local media outlets or youth populations who may lack media literacy. Without actions to protect the vulnerable, liberal democracies are at constant threat from disinformation and foreign interference.

这些应用以脆弱用户群为目标人群,如从当地媒体平台获取新闻信息面临重要语言障碍的用户或缺少媒体知识的年轻群体。如果没有行动保护脆弱人群,自由民主政体会受到持续的假信息和外国(政治)干预的威胁。

While the internet should be free and open, it is a reality that authoritarian state actors such as China and Russia have drastically different approaches. The idea of cyberspace sovereignty is no longer just an excuse for authoritarian states to uphold their censorship apparatus, but rather a concrete gap that liberal democracies need to fill in to protect democratic values and institution integrities.

虽然互联网应该自由和开放,现实是威权国家如中共和俄罗斯采取了截然不同的方法。网络空间主权的说法不再仅仅是威权国家坚持其审查制度的借口,更是一个具体的需要自由民主制度填补的空白,以保护民主价值观和机构诚信。

Maintaining and upholding cyberspace sovereignty does not mean limiting or undermining key constitutional rights such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly. By adopting the idea of treating domestic cyberspace as part of the nation’s sovereignty, countries can better protect these rights from predatory actions from countries such as China. Social media platforms that are operating within democratic countries should be held accountable for protecting the constitutional rights of citizens in those countries, regardless of the app’s place of origin, or the parent company’s affiliations. It is time for all countries to recognize the urgency to protect their respective integrity and sovereignty against aggression.

维护和保持网络空间主权并不意味着限制或削弱关键的宪法权利, 如言论自由和集会自由。把国内网络空间当作国家主权的一部分,各国能更好的从中共等国的侵略性行为下保护这些权利。社交媒体平台在民主国家运行应为保护这些国家公民的宪法权利承担责任,不论这些应用的来源地,或母公司的隶属关系如何。现在是所有国家认识到保护各自的完整性和主权免遭侵略的紧迫性的时候了。

FULL LIST OF CHINESE APPS BANNED BY GOVT:

被政府禁止的中国APP完整列表:

  1. TikTok
  2. Shareit
  3. Kwai
  4. UC Browser
  5. Baidu map
  6. Shein
  7. Clash of Kings
  8. DU battery saver
  9. Helo
  10. Likee
  11. YouCam makeup
  12. Mi Community
  13. CM Browers
  14. Virus Cleaner
  15. APUS Browser
  16. ROMWE
  17. Club Factory
  18. Newsdog
  19. Beutry Plus
  20. WeChat
  21. UC News
  22. QQ Mail
  23. Weibo
  24. Xender
  25. QQ Music
  26. QQ Newsfeed
  27. Bigo Live
  28. SelfieCity
  29. Mail Master
  30. Parallel Space
  31. Mi Video Call – Xiaomi
  32. WeSync
  33. ES File Explorer
  34. Viva Video – QU Video Inc
  35. Meitu
  36. Vigo Video
  37. New Video Status
  38. DU Recorder
  39. Vault- Hide
  40. Cache Cleaner DU App studio
  41. DU Cleaner
  42. DU Browser
  43. Hago Play With New Friends
  44. Cam Scanner
  45. Clean Master – Cheetah Mobile
  46. Wonder Camera
  47. Photo Wonder
  48. QQ Player
  49. We Meet
  50. Sweet Selfie
  51. Baidu Translate
  52. Vmate
  53. QQ International
  54. QQ Security Center
  55. QQ Launcher
  56. U Video
  57. V fly Status Video
  58. Mobile Legends
  59. DU Privacy

编辑:【喜马拉雅战鹰团】Edited by:【Himalaya Hawk Squad】