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中美关系之死 (1-2) 【中英对照翻译】

新闻来源:The Wire China;作者:ORVILLE SCHELL

简评:InAHurry/草根文人;PR: 海阔天空;Page:拱卒

简评:

人类文明由于工业革命的产生跟发展将人类社会不断的像更繁荣,更理性,更人性化的方向推进。从一战,二战各国争抢土地资源,到世界两极核武军备竞赛,再到以美国为主导的世界格局,无不是民主和现代文明带领世界秩序的不断重建的过程。如今,借助西方资本壮大后的中共国也跃跃欲试地想要重新改写世界秩序,他在非洲,拉美的布局和扩张以及所谓的一带一路和中国制造2025都是对以美国为首的西方民主制度的挑战。川普16年竞选以中美贸易上的不平衡为主要议题从而赢得了美国中下阶层的支持最终获选。但他上任后,却发现想要推动华盛顿的对华政策的转变却阻力重重。因此,非常有必要来梳理一下近半个世纪以来美国的对华政策,从而更有利于理解错误在哪里。

本文回顾了从1972年美国尼克松总统访华,中美关系破冰并正式建交,到如今的川普总统因对一直以来两国贸易关系的不平衡的不满,宣布中国为美国的战略对手以及中美关系脱钩在即的整个过程。其间经历了1979年邓小平访美,1989年天安门事件,2001年美国允许中国加入世界贸易组织,和2008年在北京举行奥林匹克运动会等标志性事件。但是,直到川普总统2017年入驻白宫之前,“接触政策”,甚至可以说“绥靖政策”一直是华盛顿对华政策的主旋律。其结果是中共国的经济以前所未有的速度大幅的增长,两国的经济,科技,教育等方方面面达到了有史以来最多的交流与互通。与此同时,华盛顿所期望看到的,中共国会在经济与西方接轨后开始在体制上向西方民主靠拢却没有发生。事实上,中共正在一党集权专政的路上越走越远。如果说,89.64的天安门大屠杀还不足以证明中共和民主完全是两个对立面上的体制,那么今天中共对香港民主诉求的残酷镇压和单方面撕毁对香港“一国两制”的承诺应该让民主社会明白中共从不曾想也绝不会向民主社会靠拢。并且中共的魔抓已经开始伸向美国,中共病毒COVID-19只是预演。

当年尼克松总统一针见血地指出,“我们不能让十几亿潜在的最有能力的(中国)人生活在愤怒的孤立中…,中共国不改变,世界就不可能安全。”不得不承认,尼克松总统很有远见,但讽刺的是这位以反共产主义闻名的美国总统和他的国家安全顾问基辛格却选择了对中国人民和世界和平都是致命打击的对华政策:近半个世纪过去了,以基辛格主义为基础的“接触政策”养壮了中共,但中国人民却还在被中共的防火墙孤立与普世价值之外,而且中共扶持下的朝鲜和伊朗时时都可能会威胁世界和平。

因此我们应该为川普政府顶着阻力从“接触政策”中掉头并再次把中共定义为“敌人”拍手叫好。因为全世界都应该意识到中美两国的较量与其说是国家之间的较量,不如说是民主和极权之间的较量,正义与邪恶之间的较量。而对待邪恶,我们不能向他伸出橄榄枝,寄希望于其改邪归正。消灭邪恶,伸张正义是唯一可行的办法。

翻译:海阔天空;PR: Julia Win;Page:拱卒

The Death of Engagement / 中美接触终止

Part I / 第一部

The policy of "engagement" has defined U.S.-China relations for almost a half century. It didn't have to end this way.

“接触”政策定义了美国美中关系持续了近半个世纪。这种关系本不必这样结束。

President Nixon holds his chopsticks in the ready position as Premier Zhou Enlai (left) and Shanghai Communist Party leader Zhang Chunqiao reach in front of him for some tidbits at the beginning of the farewell banquet on Feb. 27, 1972. Credit: Bettmann/Contributor 1972年2月27日,在告别宴会开始的时候,时任美国总统尼克松(Nixon)手握筷子,周恩来总理(左)和上海市委书记张春桥(Zhang Chunqiao)把手伸向尼克松面前,准备吃点小点心。

In 1967, as race riots spread across the United States and as the Vietnam War raged on, an astounding 70 percent of Americans agreed on one thing: the greatest threat to U.S. security was the People’s Republic of China. At the time, China was in the throes of one of the most violent, anti-democratic upheavals of the century, The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and Americans feared that the contagion of Mao’s “people’s war” would spread from Indochina around the world.

1967年,种族骚乱在美国蔓延,越南战争愈演愈烈,令人震惊的是,70%的美国人同意一件事:对美国安全的最大威胁是中华人民共和国。当时,中共国正处于本世纪最暴力、最反民主的剧变之一——文化大革命的阵痛中,美国人担心毛的“人民战争”会从中印半岛蔓延到世界各地。

So, it was surprising when, against this backdrop, then-presidential candidate Richard Nixon issued a call for amity in the pages of Foreign Affairs. Still famed for his anti-Communism, he warned Americans that they needed to come to grips with “the reality of China.”

因此,在这样的背景下,当时的总统候选人理查德·尼克松在《外交事务》(Foreign Affairs)上发出了友好的呼吁,令人感到惊讶。以反共产主义著称的他警告美国人,他们需要面对“中国的现实”。

“Taking the long view,” he wrote, “we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside of the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.”

“从长远来看,”他写道,“我们不能永远把中国排除在国际大家庭之外,让中国滋生幻想,满怀仇恨,威胁邻国。”在这个小小的星球上,没有任何地方可以让10亿潜在能力最强的人生活在愤怒的孤立之中。”

Then, he touched on a theme that would only gain relevance two decades later. “The world cannot be safe until China changes,” he continued. “Thus, our aim — to the extent that we influence events — should be to induce change.”

然后,他谈到了一个只有在20年后才会有意义的主题。“除非中国改变,否则世界就不会安全,”他继续说。“因此,我们的目标——就我们影响事件的程度而言——应该是诱导改变。”

These were the seeds of “engagement,” a policy that has defined U.S.-China relations for almost a half century. It has been embraced by seven presidential administrations — Republican and Democrat — and survived various national emergencies, including the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the Belgrade Chinese embassy bombing in 1999, and the aftershocks of the 2008 financial crisis. I myself have been in Tiananmen Square many times over my almost half a century visiting the PRC and, until recently, have always been filled with some measure of engagement’s hope of “putting aside differences to seek common ground” (求同存异). On my very first trip in 1975 to work on a model agricultural brigade and in a factory, slogans such as “Down With American Imperialism and Its Running Dogs” were still scrawled on walls even as Americans were welcomed with banners extolling “the friendship between our two great peoples” that suggested a common way forward. This was my first experience being confronted by the submerged contradiction of U.S.-China relations; that despite all of the talk of “friendship” and diplomacy, we Americans remained insoluble in the Chinese Communist Party’s social, political and economic autarky.

这些都是美中关系持续了近半个世纪的“接触”政策的种子。七届总统——共和党和民主党——都支持它,即便中国面临各种各种的国家紧急情况,包括1989年的天安门大屠杀事件、1999年贝尔格莱德中国大使馆爆炸案,以及2008年金融危机的余波,这种关系依然存在。近半个世纪以来,访问中华人民共和国的我多次去往天安门广场。直到最近,我仍然充满了某种程度的求同存异的“接触”期望。在1975年我第一次去参观模范农业旅行团和工厂,“打倒美帝国主义及其走狗”等口号仍涂写在墙上,即使欢迎美国人的赞美“我们两国伟大人民之间的友谊”的旌旗意味着两国的关系共同向前迈进了一步。这是我第一次面对中美关系的潜在矛盾,尽管大家都在谈论“友谊”和外交,但我们美国人对中国共产党的社会、政治和经济的自给自足依然无能为力。

If engagement has failed as a policy, was it fallacious from the outset?

如果“接触”作为一项政策失败了,那么它从一开始就是错误的吗?

Today, as the U.S. faces its most adversarial state with the People’s Republic of China in years, the always fragile policy framework of engagement feels like a burnt-out case. Even before the Covid-19 pandemic hit, the relationship was already “decoupling” and the demonstrations in Hong Kong and Beijing’s assault on the “one country, two systems” formula was a coup de grace. A recent Pew poll shows that only 26 percent of Americans view China favorably, the lowest percentage since its surveys began in 2005. Once again, it seems the only thing Americans can agree on is that China is a threat.

如今,在美国与中华人民共和国面临多年来最具对抗性的局面时,一贯脆弱的接触政策框架感觉已经耗尽。即使在新冠肺炎爆发之前,这种关系就已经“脱钩”了,香港和北京对“一国两制”模式的攻击是致命的一击。最近的皮尤民意调查显示,只有26%的美国人对中共国持好感,这是自2005年开始这项调查以来的最低比例。再一次,美国人唯一能达成共识的就是中共国是一个威胁。

All of which begs the question: if engagement has failed as a policy, was it fallacious from the outset? To answer this question and understand how we ended up where we are, we must turn back to the policy’s genesis and follow its evolution through a slice of Sino-U.S. history that has curiously paralleled my own odyssey as a student of China’s often tortured progress to the present.

所有这些都引出一个问题:如果接触作为一项政策失败了,那么它从一开始就是错误的吗?要回答这个问题并理解我们是如何走到今天这一步的,我们必须回顾一下这项政策的起源,并通过中美关系的一小部分来了解它的演变过程。这段历史与我作为一名研究中共国被扭曲历史的学生的经历有着惊人的相似之处。

翻译:Ignoreme;校对:孙行者;Page: 椰子哦耶

The Death of Engagement / 中美接触终止

Part II / 第二部

On February 21, 1972, after more than two decades of Cold War hostility, The Spirit of 76 taxied up to the small stone building that then served as Capitol Airport’s Beijing terminal. As Richard and Pat Nixon were enthusiastically greeted by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, America’s policy of engagement was born.

1972年2月21,经历20多年冷战敌对之后,空军一号“76精神”朝着那个石头建造的小楼房--当时的北京首都机场航站楼滑行。当理查德和帕特尼克松受到中共国总理周恩来的热情迎接时,美国的结盟政策诞生了。

Both sides had strategic reasons for this historic trip. The Sino-Soviet rift had deepened in 1969 when Russian and Chinese troops clashed along their 4,000-mile border and as Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi declared, “It is necessary for us to utilize the contradiction between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in a strategic sense and to pursue Sino-U.S. relations.” Zhou believed that, trapped in the quagmire of Vietnam, “the American imperialists have no choice but to improve their relations with China in order to counteract the Soviet imperialists.”

对于这个历史之旅,双方都有各自的战略原因。在1969年,当中俄军队在4000英里的边界线发生冲突时,中苏关系裂痕加深,并且像中共国外交部长陈毅宣称的那样:“在战略意义上,利用美苏之间的矛盾并奉行中美关系对我们很有必要”,周恩来认为,美帝国主义陷入越南泥沼,除了加强中美关系来抵制苏联,他们别无选择。

During the visit, Nixon thanked Zhou for his “incomparable hospitality.”Credit: Byron Schumaker/White House 访问期间,尼克松感谢周的无与伦比的款待 图片来源:Byron Schumaker/白宫

Sensing a game-changing opportunity, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, began cultivating Beijing. He declared that the U.S. has “no permanent enemies” and promised to judge countries like China “on the basis of their actions and not on the basis of their domestic ideology.” In his quest to end U.S.-China estrangement, he insisted “geopolitics trumped other considerations.”

嗅到游戏规则改变的机会,亨利基辛格--尼克松的国家安全顾问,开始扶植北京。他宣称,美国“没有永远的敌人”并承诺判断像中共国这样的国家是“以他们的行动为基础,而不是国内意识形态”。在他终结中美之间的隔阂探求中,他坚持认为“地缘政治胜过其他考量”

Those other considerations, however, were not lost on the American people — who were hardly ready to accept China’s Maoist system — or Zhou. While Zhou welcomed Nixon to the Great Hall of the People saying that “the gates to friendly contact have finally been opened,” he also reminded his American guests that “the social systems of China and the U.S. are fundamentally different and there exists great differences between the Chinese government and the U.S. government.”

然而,那些其他考量,美国人民还是在乎,他们几乎没准备好接纳中共国的毛泽东(或周恩来)主义。当周在人民大会堂欢迎尼克松时说:“友好联系的大门终于打开了”,他还提醒他的美国客人,中共国和美国的社会体系在根本上是截然不同的,且两国政府间存在巨大差异。”

While Zhou stressed that those differences shouldn’t stand in the way of normal state relations, Nixon went a beat further, noting that “If our two people are enemies, the future is dark indeed.” The two countries have, he said, “common interests that transcend those differences.”

但是周也强调,这些差异不应该阻挡正常的国家关系,尼克松也进一步解释说:“如果两国人民相互为敌,未来将会是黑暗的。”他说,两国拥有“共同利益可以超越这些差异”。

In 1954, John Foster Dulles had refused to shake Premier Zhou Enlai’s hand. But during his secret trips to China, Henry Kissinger found Zhou to be “urbane, infinitely patient, extraordinarily intelligent, [and] subtle.” Credit: Bettmann/Contributor 在1954年,约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯(美国国务卿)曾拒绝与周恩来握手。但是在这次来中共国的秘密行程中,亨利·基辛格发现周变得“彬彬有礼,有着极大的耐心,极其有头脑,并且不露声色” 图片来源:Bettmann

“While we cannot close the gulf between us,” Nixon rejoined, “we can try and bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it.”

“虽然不能弥合我们之间的鸿沟”,尼克松答道,“我们能尝试架设桥梁,以便可以对话沟通。”

Nixon’s new China policy sought to transcend America’s long-standing American antipathy toward Mao and the evils of Communism to recast U.S.-China relations, even the global order. It was a tough sell, but Nixon’s intuitive understanding of how to use the power of television as political theater helped him carry the day.

尼克松的新中共国政策寻求超越在美国人民中长期存在的对毛和邪恶共产主义的反感,来重铸中美关系,甚至全球关系。这是十分艰难的,但是尼克松直觉上明白如何利用电视的力量作为政治舞台,这帮他取得胜利。

He was not only the first U.S. president to visit China, but he’d also arranged to have the trip televised live around the world via satellite links. As he boasted in his opening toast in Beijing, “more people are seeing and hearing what we say here than on any other occasion in the whole history of the world.”1

“If we can find common ground to work together,” Nixon hopefully continued, “the chance of world peace is immeasurably increased.” Then he dramatically declared, “This is the hour, this is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and better world.”

他不仅是第个一到访中共国的美国总统,还安排了通过卫星向全球直播此次行程。像他在北京的敬酒辞中吹嘘的那样,“在观看和倾听我们在这里说什么的人的,超过整个世界历史上的任何一个场合”。 “如果我们能找到共同点并一起合作,”尼克松憧憬道,“世界和平的机会会无限提高”。然后,他戏剧性的宣布,“就是此时此刻,对于两国人民来说,都到达了一个伟大的建设新的更好的世界的顶点。”

On the Great Wall, Nixon said he hoped one result of his trip would be that “the walls that are erected, whether they are walls of ideology or philosophy, will not divide the peoples of the world.”Credit: Byron Schumaker/White House 在长城上,尼克松说,他希望他此次行程的成果是“无论是两国间意识形态或哲学领域的墙,不会将世界人民分开。” 图片来源:Byron Schumaker/白宫

By using TV to take viewers along with him into the enigma of Mao’s Communism, Nixon helped them accept the starkness of his policy reversal. And being able to share the pomp, ceremony, and excitement of his path-breaking trip did more to enable Americans to accept “Red China” than all the high-sounding policy explications and diplomatic communiques put together.

通过电视,尼克松让观众和他一起领略不可思议的毛共产主义,帮他们接受他政策明显的反转。分享的盛况,庆典,和他开创性的访问的兴奋比所有夸张的政策解读和外交公报更能使美国人民接受“红色中共国”。

Proudly calling his summit “the week that changed the world,” Nixon proclaimed, “We have demonstrated that nations with deep and fundamental differences can learn to discuss those differences calmly, rationally and frankly without compromising their principles.” But, he cautioned, “our work will require years of patient effort.”

尼克松自豪的称他的首脑会议为“改变世界的一周”,“我们已经表明,两个存在深层、根本差异的国家,可以学会冷静、理性和坦诚地讨论这些差异,而不必做出原则性的妥协让步。并”。但是,他也提醒,“我们的需要多年耐心的努力。”

It was not lost on anyone that what had greatly eased the way to this rapprochement was the U.S. side’s willingness to excuse China’s “fundamental differences” in ideology and values as a purely “internal affair,” as Kissinger put it. As the two American leaders assured Mao on a subsequent visit, “what is important is not a nation’s internal philosophy” but “its policy towards the rest of the world and toward us.”

像基辛格说的,谁都知道,美方愿意把中共国在意识形态和价值观上的“根本差异”单纯看作其内部事务是是双方能以如此轻松的方式达成和解的原因。正如两位美国领导人在接下来的会见中对毛保证的,“重要的不是一个国家内部的哲学”而是“它对世界和我们的政策”。

It was a pledge that would lead to dissent both from the U.S. Congress and the American people, but there was no denying that this new beginning had also started to transform the PRC from an implacable enemy and rebel disruptor into a seemingly more digestible, if not yet fully collaborative, partner. Quickly, a whole host of blurry unspoken assumptions and inchoate hopes began to grow out of Nixon’s magical mystery tour. Who knew what wonderous things might follow, especially if the US and China actually began trading, allowing tourism, and engaging in educational exchanges?

该承诺可能会引起美国国会和美国人民的不同意见,但是不可否认的是,这个新的开始已经让中共国从一个不共戴天的敌人和造反分裂者变得看上去更容易理解--即使还不能成为完全意义的合作伙伴。很快,大量隐晦的不可言喻的假设和不成熟的希望从尼克松神秘之旅开始萌芽。谁知道什么奇妙的事情会发生?特别是,如果中美真的开始贸易,允许旅游,还有教育交流?

No one could deny that something momentous had been set in motion — so momentous, in fact, that Kissinger later boasted that the U.S. and China “have now become tacit allies.” Credit: Byron Schumaker/White House 没人能否认,一些重大的事情已经开始行动 – 如此重大,实际上基辛格随后吹嘘说,中美“已经成为默契的盟友” 图片来源:Byron Schumaker/白宫

Nixon and Mao both walked away feeling like winners, the former for his dramatic diplomatic breakthrough and the latter for relieving China of its main adversary. But the euphoria masked myriad unresolved issues — such as the status of Taiwan (which China only grudgingly agreed to set aside after Kissinger made some important compromises) and the stark differences between the political systems and values of the two countries.

尼克松和毛都像胜利者一样离开,前者因为外交上的戏剧性突破,后者因为使中共国从主要对手中解脱。极度兴奋掩盖了无数未解决的问题 – 比如台湾的现状(在基辛格做出一些重大妥协后中共国勉强同意搁置这个问题)还有两国政体和价值观上的严重分歧。

编辑:【喜马拉雅战鹰团】Edited by:【Himalaya Hawk Squad】