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澳洲智库:中共国可能在2021年迫使台湾陷入危机 【中英对照翻译】

新闻来源:《澳洲战略政策研究所(Australian Strategic Policy Institute)》| 作者:Brendan Nicholson | 发布时间:JANUARY , 2021 /2021年1月日

翻译/简评:MikeHua | 校对:SilverSpurs7 | 审核:万人往 | Page:Daoiii

简评:

2020年,澳大利亚在疫情和香港问题上都选择直面和中共对抗,是受到中共打压最多的国家之一。中共从禁止贸易到网络造谣诬陷,对澳大利亚百般侮辱。报道中倡导美国联合太平洋诸国共同对抗中共、支持台湾,这就是美国接下来要做的,或者说必须做的。否则美国将会失去在亚洲的盟友,对美国全世界盟友的信心都是严重打击。

美国对香港、台湾都有法案支持。但在香港问题上,美国缺少行动,最终让法案形如一纸空文。如果接下来让中共成功制造台海危机,美国会陷入更加被动的境地。中共内部的政治、经济压力剧增,迫使中共铤而走险,对外寻求一个突破口,这个突破口很可能就是台湾。中共从来都是内斗内行,口口声声说中国人不打中国人,却对台湾频频施加小动作。习日思夜想统一台湾,青史留名。台海危机一触即发,最终习是名垂青史还是遗臭万年,我们拭目以待。

原文翻译:

US congressional commission hears China may force Taiwan crisis in 2021

美国国会委员会获悉中共国可能在2021年制造台湾危机

ASPI’s executive director, Peter Jennings, has warned a United States congressional inquiry that China may trigger a major military crisis over Taiwan in the coming year as the Chinese Communist Party’s centenary looms and the US faces a terrible domestic health situation due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

澳洲战略政策研究所(ASPI)执行主席彼得·詹宁斯 (Peter Jennings) 警告美国国会的一项调查称,在未来几年中共国可能会在台湾附近主动挑起一次大规模军事危机,因为中共的百年诞辰将近,而且美国正面临可怕的国内冠状病毒带来的公共健康危机。

In a series of written responses to questions from the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission today, Jennings says he believes the CCP will continue to test the boundaries of international patience in its operations against Taiwan and in the first island chain until the US and its allies feel compelled to attempt to limit Beijing’s behaviour.

在今天对“美中经济和安全审查委员会”(US–China Economic and Security Review Commission)提出的一系列问题的书面回答中,詹宁斯称他认为中国共产党会继续测试国际社会耐心的极限,特别是在对台湾和第一岛链的行动上,直到美国及其盟友感到必须要限制北京的行为为止。

A failure of the US to respond would challenge its credibility as a security partner.

如果美国没有反应,美国作为国家安全合作伙伴的国际信用将会受到挑战。

At any time, Chinese President Xi Jinping could reduce the rhetorical tone and limit the People’s Liberation Army’s military exercises and air incursions, Jennings says, but Xi stands to lose nothing if he keeps testing the limits.

在任何时候,中共国领导人习近平都可以减少措辞,限制解放军的军事演习和空中入侵,詹宁斯称,但如果习继续试探这些限制,他不会有任何损失。

‘This gives rise, in my view, to a possible major crisis on Taiwan or the East China Sea in 2021.’ Jennings says Beijing will have developed a menu of options to pressure concessions from Taipei related to its political autonomy. ‘This does not have to involve a PLA amphibious assault of Taiwan’s northern beaches, but it could involve maritime blockades, closing airspace, cyber assaults, missile launchings around (and over) Taiwan, use of fifth column assets inside Taiwan, use of PLA force in a range of deniable grey-zone activities and potentially seizing offshore territory—Quemoy and Matsu, Pratas, and Kinmen Islands. Beijing will continue to probe with military actions, test international reactions and probe again.’

“在我的眼里,这使得2021年在台湾或者中国东海可能出现一次大危机。”詹宁斯称北京早就已经制定好了一系列的选项,迫使台北在政治自主权上进行妥协。“这不一定会包含中共国解放军对台湾北部海滩发动两栖打击,但是可能会包含海上封锁、空中封锁、网络攻击、在台湾附近发射导弹(或越过台湾)、使用第五纵队力量在台湾发动叛乱、利用解放军发动一系列可以否认的黑色活动进而占领台湾外岛——金门、妈祖、东沙群岛等。北京会继续利用军事行动进行试探,测试国际反应,然后继续试探。”

This threat must be seen against the background of China’s efforts to build soft power globally through its own foreign-language media outlets, Confucius Institutes, local organisations linked to the United Front Work Department and, above all, financial relationships, Jennings says.

詹宁斯称,必须看到这种威胁,尤其是中共国通过自己的外语媒体、孔子学院、与统战部门有联系的地方组织,以及最重要的金融关系尝试在全球范围建立软实力的大背景下。

He notes that, for many countries around the world, China’s global appeal is calibrated against the global attractiveness and effectiveness of the US. ‘Key Southeast Asian countries will make judgements about the need to hedge their relations with Beijing based on the level of confidence they have that the United States is engaged with the region and committed (for reasons of its own interests) to Asian security. A Southeast Asia that doubts the longevity of American interest will get closer to the PRC regardless of the appeal of doing so.’

詹宁斯指出,对于世界上许多的国家而言,中共国的国际野心和美国的国际吸引力与影响力针锋相对。“重要的东南亚国家会评估他们和北京保持距离的需要,基于他们对美国在该地区活动和(基于美国自身的利益)保证亚洲安全承诺的信心。一个怀疑美国长远利益的东南亚会和中共国走得更近,不管中共想不想这么干。”

In response to the commission’s request for recommendations to deal with this situation, Jennings says the CCP presents a profound threat to democratic systems and the international rule of law everywhere. To counter malign CCP activities, like-minded democracies must align and commit to a shared sense of purpose.

针对委员会要求对处理这个情况的建议的回应,詹宁斯称中共对全世界各地的民主系统和国际法治秩序造成严重威胁。为了对抗中共的活动,志同道合的民主国家必须联合起来并承诺达成共同的目标。

‘As Australia saw over 2020, Beijing works hard to split democracies apart from each other and to weaken their resolve through bilateral pressure. My view is that the Commission can play an international role by cooperating more closely with like-minded democratic legislatures including, of course, the Australian Parliament; sharing information and generally emphasizing that we must work together to address a global threat. The Commission might consider establishing a regular dialogue on the PRC for legislatures from the Five Eyes countries.’

“正如澳洲在2020所经历的,北京非常努力地把民主国家撕裂,让他们在双边压力下变得虚弱。我的观点是委员会可以在国际上有很大作为,通过更加紧密地联合志同道合的民主立法机构,当然包括澳洲国会;分享信息并且强调我们必须共同协作以对抗国际威胁。委员会应该考虑建立一项针对中共国的常态对话机制,让五眼联盟国家的立法机构参与。”

The commission could engage with Australia’s parliament through the House speaker and the Senate president on a shared research agenda. That would use parliament’s high-quality and relatively well-resourced committee system, which operates in a largely bipartisan way on national security matters, says Jennings.

委员会可以和通过澳洲众议院主席和参议员主席在共同研究日程上进行合作。这可以利用澳洲国会的高质量和相对资源丰富的委员会系统,这些系统大部分是跨党派方式运作的,主要考虑国家安全问题,詹宁斯继续说。

He says Southeast Asia is emerging as one of the most critical zones of global competition for influence between the US and the CCP. ‘Beijing sees the region as key to its security, which is why it made such an audacious move to annex the vast bulk of the South China Sea. For Japan and Australia, the free passage of trade through and over the South China Sea is an existential strategic interest.’

詹宁斯称,东南亚正在成为介于美国和中共全球影响力竞争中的一个关键区域。“北京把该区域视为他们安全的关键,这是为什么中共如此大胆地吞并南中国海大部分区域。对于日本和澳洲,南中国海的自由航行是他们战略利益生死攸关的问题。”

印度、日本、美国和澳大利亚外长在东京举行的'四国'会议

If the US is denied access to the region (which also includes treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines), America’s capacity to shape positive security outcomes in the western Pacific is deeply eroded. Beijing knows this and is actively engaged in trying to tilt the region away from the US, says Jennings.

如果美国被拒绝进入该区域(同时包括美国盟友泰国和菲律宾被拒),美国在西太平洋建立一个积极的国际安全结果将会被严重侵蚀。北京知道这一点,他们在积极地尝试将该区域利益向美国外倾斜,詹宁斯称。

The next two years will shape US success or failure in Asia, he says, and the commission should focus on building deeper knowledge about Beijing’s efforts in the region and a deeper appreciation of the strategic outlooks from the 10 Southeast Asian capitals.

接下来的两年会决定美国在亚洲的成功或失败,詹宁斯说,委员会应该聚焦于更深层次的北京在该区域行动的认识,以及10个东南亚国家更深的战略认识。

‘America’s challenge is to give the Southeast Asian countries a sense that they have a realistic alternative to accepting Beijing’s dominance and that the democracies will continue to support … their sovereignty and security.’

“美国的挑战是,要让东南亚国家认识到他们除了接受北京的统治之外还有另外一个选择,民主国家会持续支持…他们的主权和安全。”

Jennings suggests that the commission work with Australia to develop a plan to help vulnerable Pacific island countries (PICs) resist CCP pressure.

詹宁斯提议委员会和澳大利亚合作共同发展一项计划,以帮助脆弱的太平洋岛国对抗中共的压力。

As in World War II, these nations remain strategically important in shaping how US forces can access and operate in the western Pacific. Beijing understands this too, which helps to explain why it has invested so quickly and substantially into building relations with PIC political elites, Jennings says.

就像在二战时期,这些国家在战略上对美军能够进入并且在西太平洋展开行动极其重要。北京对此也非常了解,这解释了为什么北京在很短时间内大量投资建设与太平洋岛国政治精英的关系,詹宁斯称。

Through its Pacific step-up policy, Australia is re-energising its own PIC engagement strategy, but all like-minded democracies can play a role. US Indo-Pacific Command and other US agencies have lifted their interest and activity with the PICs, and that engagement could be enhanced with more congressional help and support.

通过太平洋提升政策,澳大利亚正在重新恢复本国的太平洋岛国合作战略,但是所有志同道合的民主国家都能参与。美国印太司令部和其他美国部门已经把他们的兴趣和活动脱离了太平洋岛国,这些合作可以得到澳洲国会的帮助和支持。

Jennings says the PICs are fragile societies, often with limited infrastructure, economic and social opportunities. ‘On the plus side, the region overwhelmingly shares our values and has (mostly) stuck to democratic systems.’

詹宁斯继续说,太平洋岛国是很脆弱的社会,通常他们的基础设施不完善,经济和社会机会都倍受限制。“积极的一面是,该地区绝大多数国家的价值观都和民主国家相同。”

Dealing with China’s financial power is one of the biggest challenges the region faces. ‘It would be valuable to consider a joint study with the Australian Parliament on how best democracies can assist the PICs in strengthening their own systems and reducing their vulnerability to coercion and co-option’, Jennings says.

对付中共的经济实力是这个地区最大的挑战之一。“考虑与澳洲国会联合研究,找到如何更好地支持太平洋岛国强化他们的系统,减少他们对压迫和渗透的脆弱性,这将是很重要的。”

There’s a need to explain to the citizens of all democracies the nature of the challenges they face in dealing with an increasingly aggressive, nationalistic PRC. ‘There is a significant gap between what executive government and security and policy specialists understand on the one hand (which is often based on classified material), and what back-bench politicians and their electors know’, says Jennings.

有必要向所有公民解释他们所面临的更加咄咄逼人挑战的本质,那就是民粹主义的中共国。“一方面,在当政政府和安全与政策专家的理解方面有很大区别(这通常是因为加密材料),冷板凳政客和他们的选民很多什么都不知道。”詹宁斯称。

‘The Commission could play an important role here by distilling its very deep strategic understanding of the issue into a “tool-kit” for elected representatives designed to help them explain the strategic challenge we face to our citizens.’

“委员会可以在这里扮演重要角色,通过将他们很深的战略理解提纯成‘工具箱’,以帮助被选上的国会代表向选民们解释我们面临的战略挑战。”

It seems clear, says Jennings, that Taiwan will face yet more pressure from the PRC in 2021 and later, and we should not be surprised if Beijing confects a cross-strait crisis.

看起来很明确,詹宁斯称,台湾会在2021年面临更多来自中共国的挑战,之后会越来越多,如果北京制造一次台海危机我们并不应该感到奇怪。

‘It may be that President Xi calculates that a short-term window of opportunity is closing for the PRC to pressure Taiwan to make concessions on its future political status.’

“可能习主席计算得出的结果是,现在有一个短窗口期让中共国施压台湾,迫使他们让出未来的政治地位,但这一窗口正在关闭。”

The commission should help provide greater clarity on what the US would do if Taiwan were attacked, Jennings says. ‘My view is that clarity is what is most needed at a time when the PRC might fail to correctly read American policy signals.’

委员会应帮助提供更加明确的表态,美国会在台湾被攻击时做什么,詹宁斯称。“我的观点是,明确表态是现在中共国可能误判美国的政策信号时最需要的东西。”

The CCP’s ‘one China’ policy has resulted in such limited Australian engagement with Taiwan that Canberra’s policy thinking about the country and its capacity to make public statements about Taiwan’s security have become stunted. A commission dialogue with Australian counterparts on options for engagement with Taiwan would be valuable, Jennings says.

中共的“一个中国”政策导致了澳大利亚和台湾的合作受限制,堪培拉的政策思维和对台安全的公开声明都发育不良。委员会和澳大利亚的同行就与台湾接触的选择进行对话将是有价值的,詹宁斯称。

‘I would expect the United States to stand by its long-held policy disposition to support Taiwan’, Jennings says. ‘On that expectation hangs the credibility of America’s alliance network in the Pacific. To put it bluntly, if the US chose not to vigorously support Taiwan in the face of PRC coercion, this will do immense damage to the credibility of US engagement as viewed in Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra. That could weaken resolve in these capitals to resist PRC coercion.’

詹宁斯说:“我预计美国将坚持其长期以来支持台湾的政策立场。美国在太平洋地区联盟网络的可信度取决于这种预期。坦率地说,如果美国在面对中共国的胁迫时不选择大力支持台湾,这将对东京、首尔和堪培拉所认为的美国参与的信誉造成巨大损害。这可能会削弱这些国家抵制中共国胁迫的决心。”

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编辑:【英国伦敦喜庄园编辑部】Edited by:【Himalaya London Club UK】