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中共国在台湾周围不断增加的军事活动背后意味着什么? 【中英对照翻译】

作者:J. Michael Cole J.迈克尔·科尔

消息来源:The national interest 《国家利益》

翻译/简评:雅典娜

PR:海阔天空

简评:

中共对台湾用尽了伎俩和花招,又打又拉,或通过军事威胁,或通过台湾的亲共力量,试图瓦解台湾,将台湾置于其掌控之中。殊不料,机关算尽的中共,仍然敌不过台湾的民意,蔡英文总统的成功连任,韩国瑜在任上被罢免,都是台湾人民对中共统一台湾的企图说不。中共在世界上越来越不得人心,其对世界的祸害在此次疫情中已经暴露无遗。中共灭亡的趋势已成定局。

What’s Behind China’s Growing Military Activity Around Taiwan?

中共国在台湾周围不断增加的军事活动背后意味着什么?

A worrying spike in Chinese military activity near Taiwan since the beginning of 2020 has led some analysts to conclude that Beijing is exploiting a moment of distraction within the international system due to the COVID-19 pandemic to intimidate Taiwan and create a fait accompli in the Taiwan Strait. Closer analysis of trends that predate the outbreak, however, suggests that Beijing would have adopted the same escalatory strategy regardless of the international situation.

自2020年初以来,中国在台湾附近的军事活动急剧增加,令人担忧,这导致一些分析人士得出结论,北京正在利用国际系统中专注于疫情防控的时刻,恐吓台湾,在台湾海峡造成既成事实。然而,对疫情爆发前的趋势进行更深入的分析表明,无论国际局势如何,北京都会选择同样的升级战略。

Well before the outbreak of COVID-19 in late December 2019, Beijing had steadily increased the frequency of People’s Liberation Army Navy and Air Force transits across the Taiwan Strait as well as through the Strait of Miyako between Japan and Taiwan, and the Bashi Channel that separates the democratic island-nation and the Philippines. Brief intrusions by PLAAF aircraft near or into Taiwan’s Air Defense and Identification Zone (ADIZ), added to penetrations by Chinese military aircraft across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, were already more frequent prior to the global pandemic.

早在2019年12月底中共病毒爆发之前,北京已经持续增加了人民解放军海军和空军穿越台湾海峡、日本和台湾之间的宫古海峡以及分离民主岛国和菲律宾的巴什海峡的频率。解放军空军飞机在台湾附近或进入台湾的空防和识别区(ADIZ),加上中共国军用飞机穿过台湾海峡中线的渗透,已经在全球疫情大流行之前就已经愈演愈烈了。

The motives for this gradual increase in PLA activity near and around Taiwan are instead related to two key factors. First, higher traffic has been the natural outcome of China’s attempt to expand and consolidate its presence beyond the first island chain into the West Pacific and the South China Sea. This expansion is also related to Beijing’s ongoing effort to push the U.S. military out of what it regards as its avowed sphere of influence. Due to the vagaries of geography, Taiwan happens to stand in the middle of all that activity. Thus, while every sortie, passage, transit and exercise causes alarm in Taiwan and compels its military to scramble interceptors, it would be mistaken to regard the Beijing’s more assertive military activity in its totality as a javelin aimed at Taiwan.

解放军在台湾附近和周围活动逐渐增加的动机与两个关键因素有关。首先,更频繁的活动是中共国扩张并巩固其存在的自然结果,试图超越第一岛链,进入西太平洋和南中国海。这一扩张也与中共政府正在进行的将美国军队赶出它宣称为是它的势力范围之外有关。由于地理位置的变化,台湾恰好处于所有这些活动的中间。因此,虽然每一个出击,通道,过境以及演习,都敲响了在台湾的警报,并迫使其军队突击拦截器,但将北京更强势的军事活动视为针对台湾的一枚标枪并不Chinese Fighter Jets Did Briefly Enter Taiwan's Airspace 是的,中国战斗机确实曾短暂进入台湾领空。

Chinese Fighter Jets Did Briefly Enter Taiwan's Airspace 中国战斗机确实曾短暂进入台湾领空。

Nevertheless — and this leads us to the second factor — the Chinese leadership has no compunction with the psychological effects that its military escalation may have on the Taiwanese public, even if, in some instances, such considerations may be secondary. Be that as it may, a substantial component of PLA activity in recent years has indeed been directed at Taiwan. This activity stems from the need for an increasingly expeditionary Chinese military to familiarize itself with, as well as collect intelligence about, Taiwan and its surroundings; to challenge an uptick in passages by U.S. and foreign military air and naval platforms in the region; as well as to wage, as we saw, a psychological war against the Tsai Ing-wen administration in Taipei.

尽管如此——这也引出了第二个因素——中共领导层对其军事升级可能对台湾民众造成的心理影响并不感到内疚,即使如此,在某些情况下,这种考虑可能还是次要的。然而,近年来解放军的大部分活动确实是针对台湾的。这种活动源于为了一支越来越远征的中共军队,他们为了熟悉并收集关于台湾及其周围地区的情报;挑战该地区的美国和外国的空中军事和海军平台;以及正如我们所看到的,这是对台北蔡英文政府发动的一场心理战。

The latter is of particular importance in explaining recent PLA activity around Taiwan, and is the direct result of a failed Taiwan policy in Beijing by two successive regimes. China’s increasingly belligerent stance on Taiwan is the result of eight years of “rapprochement” during the Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008-16) which nevertheless failed to take Taiwan anywhere near closer to what Beijing has long described as “peaceful unification.” In fact, while officials from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and their counterparts in Ma’s Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) wined and dined and signed a number of cross-Strait agreements, public opinion in the young democracy moved in the opposite direction: rather than win hearts and minds, closer interactions with the Chinese side sparked a counter-reaction. And when, in 2014, the Ma administration was seen to be getting too cozy with Beijing, Taiwan’s monitory democracy stepped in, resulting in the Sunflower Movement’s occupation of the Legislative Yuan. Two years later, and despite an unprecedented, albeit mostly symbolic, meeting between Ma and Xi Jinping in Singapore, Taiwanese voters elected a new leader who promised to be more skeptical of Beijing’s intentions. Early on in her administration, President Tsai, whose Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) also secured a majority of seats in parliament in the same elections, extended an olive branch to Beijing by making a number of concessions — among them a commitment to upholding the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait. Despite this gambit, Beijing almost immediately shifted gear and embarked on a punitive strategy that sought to isolate Taiwan internationally. At the same time, it also ramped up the various elements of its United Front activities against Taiwan to assail the Tsai administration, undermine the good functioning of and support for Taiwan’s democratic institutions, while using disinformation and co-optation to balkanize Taiwan — in other words, to erode state cohesion and complicate relations between the central government in Taipei and local municipalities. Through this, Beijing hoped to turn Tsai into a one-term president and to increase the Taiwanese public’s sense of isolation as official diplomatic allies shifted sides by recognizing Beijing, and Taiwanese officials once again found themselves unable to participate in various international fora.

后者对于解释解放军最近在台湾的活动特别重要,这是北京在台湾先后两个政权政策上失败的直接结果。中共国对台湾越来越好战的立场,是马英九政府(2008-16年)八年“和解”的结果,然而马英九政府却未能将台湾带到北京一直在描述的“和平统一”上来。事实上,来自中共的官员和他们在马英九的中国国民党(KMT)的同僚们在用过餐和签了名,签署了一些跨海峡协议后,舆论在年轻的民主国家里却朝着相反的方向发展: 与中方的密切互动非但没有赢得人心,反而引发了反作用。2014年,马政府被认为与北京关系过于融洽。台湾短暂的民主介入了进来,导致了太阳花学运,发生了占领立法院事件。两年后,尽管马英九和习近平在新加坡举行了一次前所未有的、尽管大多是象征性的会议,但台湾选民选出了一位新领导人,她承诺将对北京的意图持更加怀疑的态度。蔡英文在执政初期,其民进党(DPP)曾在同一次选举中获得了议会的多数席位,通过作出一些让步对北京伸出了橄榄枝,其中一项承诺是维护台湾海峡的“现状”。尽管如此,北京几乎立即采取了行动,并以惩罚性的战略,开始试图在国际上孤立台湾。与此同时,它还加强了联合阵线来进行反对台湾的各种活动,以攻击蔡英文政权,破坏台湾的良好运作和民主制度,同时利用虚假信息和纵容来巴尔干化台湾。换句话说,削弱国家凝聚力,使位于台北的中央政府和地方市政当局之间的关系复杂化。由此,北京希望使蔡英文只能做一届总统,增加台湾公众的孤立感。随着北京官方外交盟友承认北京而改变了态度,台湾的官员再次发现自己无法参加各种国际论坛。

Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen visits the Sixth Army Command, ahead of Lunar New Year, in Taoyuan, Taiwan, January 25, 2019. 2019年1月25日,在台湾桃园,台湾总统蔡英文在农历新年前参观六军司令部。

Not entirely satisfied with punishing Taiwan, Xi on January 2, 2019, upped the ante and emphasized that “one country, two systems” remained the only formula for unification while stating that force remained an option. In the same address and subsequent ones, Xi also dropped longstanding references to taking the desires of “Taiwanese compatriots” into account and protecting their way of life. A crisis in Hong Kong later that year drove the final nail in the coffin of “one country, two systems” for Taiwan, although even before that, both the ruling DPP and opposition KMT had already stated that the offer was unacceptable. More and more, it was becoming difficult for the KMT to even get away with formulations such as “one China, different interpretations.” Under Xi, it had become clear that there are no “different interpretations,” no wiggle room: there was only one China, and that was the People’s Republic of China: the Republic of China had ceased to exist in 1949, and Taiwan was a mere province of the PRC.

习近平对惩罚台湾并不完全满意,他于2019年1月2日提高了赌注,强调“一国两制”仍然是统一的唯一公式,同时保留武力统一的选择。习近平在同一次讲话和随后的讲话中,也放弃了长期以来一直提到的考虑“台湾同胞”的愿望和保护他们的生活方式。那一年晚些时候的香港危机,为台湾“一国两制”的棺材上钉上了最后一颗钉子。尽管在此之前,执政的民进党和反对党国民党都已经声明,这个提议是不能接受的。越来越多的时候,国民党甚至很难摆脱“一个中国,各自表述”等提法。在习近平时代,显然并没有什么“各自表述”,没有回旋的余地:只有一个中共国,那就是中华人民共和国:中华民国已经在1949年就不复存在了,台湾只是中华人民共和国的一个省份而已。

By then, the CCP showed it had lost all hopes of being able to collaborate with the KMT on “peaceful unification” and lamented that KMT officials only ate their food and drank their wine without lifting a finger to realize the dream of “national unification.” Unable to regain its footing and yet understanding that democracy compels it to adopt a more indigenous stance in the Taiwan Strait if it ever hopes of winning future elections, the KMT had lost much of its luster in Beijing’s eyes, forcing the latter to instead work with smaller pro-unification parties like the New Party, the China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP), the Taiwan Red Party as well as non-state organizations within Taiwan and co-opted business people.

彼时,中共已经失去了与国民党在“和平统一”问题上合作的一切希望,并对国民党官员只是吃他们的食物,喝他们的酒,却没有努力实现“国家统一”的梦想表示遗憾。国民党虽然无法重新站稳脚跟,但它知道,如果它希望赢得未来大选的话,民主迫使它在台湾海峡采取更加本地化的立场,这使中共不再对国民党刮目相看,促进中共去与小型的拥护统一的新成立的政党合作,与中华统一促进党(CUPP)、台湾红党以及台湾境内的非国家组织和愿意合作的商人合作。

Beijing then completely misread the outcome of municipal elections in November 2018, in which the DPP lost control of a number of municipalities. Those elections also saw the emergence, in Kaohsiung, of Han Kuo-yu, a populist firebrand who seemed to be exactly the man Beijing needed. Han, along with other KMT mayors who had just been elected, also vowed to embrace the so-called “1992 consensus,” a precondition set by Beijing for the resumption of negotiations whose existence the Tsai administration rightly refused to acknowledge. Besides fragmenting Taiwan, this also yielded the impression — which CCP outlets worldwide broadcast with unbridled enthusiasm — that the Taiwanese public had grown weary with Tsai’s DPP and was once again embracing “peaceful unification.” No sooner had Han defeated his opponent from the DPP than Mr. Han traveled across the Taiwan Strait and held meetings with Chinese officials in Hong Kong, Xiamen, Macau and Shenzhen. Three months later, and riding on a wave of popularity, the seemingly unstoppable Han announced that he was seeking the KMT’s nomination for the presidential election in January 2020.

然后,北京完全误解了2018年11月市政选举的结果,在选举中,民进党失去了对一些城市的控制。在高雄的选举中还出现了韩国瑜,一个民粹主义的煽动者,似乎正是北京所需要的人。韩与其他刚当选的国民党市长也发誓要接受所谓的“92共识”,这是中共政府为恢复谈判设定的一个前提条件,蔡英文政府明智地拒绝加以承认。除了分裂台湾之外,这也给人一种印象,——中共在世界各地的媒体都肆无忌惮地大肆播出,声称台湾公众对蔡英文的民进党感到厌倦,再次期望“和平统一”。韩刚击败他的民进党对手,旋即穿越台湾海峡,在香港、厦门、澳门和深圳与中共官员举行会晤。三个月后,看似势不可挡的韩凭借人气,宣布他正在寻求国民党提名,准备2020年一月的总统大选。

Beijing’s hopes were quickly dashed, however, and its enthusiasm over the November 2018 elections had been misplaced. Local factors had weighed much more heavily in voters’ decision on that day than cross-Strait relations, views on the latter which, for the most part, are instead expressed in presidential and legislative elections. Thus, after nearly four years of punishing Taiwan and a sustained political warfare campaign to atomize its government, Taiwanese voters not only elected Ms. Tsai to a second term, but did so with a record-breaking 8.2 million votes and still gave the DPP a majority (though reduced somewhat) in the legislature. In the same elections, pro-CCP candidates nationwide failed to garner sufficient votes to be elected. Beijing’s top candidate, Han had to put his larger ambitions back in his locker and returned to Kaohsiung — only to be removed, five months later, in the first successful recall action, and the first such attempt against a sitting mayor, in Taiwan’s history.

然而,北京的希望很快就破灭了,其对2018年11月选举的热情被错置。本土化的因素在选民当天的决定中所占的比重要比两岸关系大得多,对两岸关系的看法在很大程度上是在总统和立法选举中表达的。因此,中共经过对台湾近四年的惩罚,以及一场持续的政治战争运动来消解其政府的企图完全归于失败。台湾选民不仅选举了蔡英文连任,以破纪录的820万张选票选举了蔡英文,而且仍然让民进党在立法委占多数席位(虽然有所减少)。在同一次选举中,全台湾范围内亲中共的候选人未能获得足够的选票当选。北京的头号候选人韩国瑜不得不把他更大的野心收回到他的储物柜中,回到高雄——结果在五个月后,他被罢免,这是台湾历史上第一次成功罢免市长的行动,也是第一次针对在任市长的此类行动。

2020年1月11日台湾总统大选:蔡英文高票连任

For Beijing, the twin defeats of rapprochement (2008-16) and coercion (2016-2020) must have been hard to swallow and put Xi, who has staked his legacy on China’s so-called “rejuvenation,” in an unenvious position within the CCP. After seven years in office, Xi had completely failed to bring Taiwan to heel; in fact, Taiwan was more distant than ever, more firmly opposed to unification than it ever had been in the past. And President Tsai, Xi’s nemesis, had been re-elected with a strong public mandate. Since 2016, her administration had more than compensated for the loss of official diplomatic allies — seven at this writing — by deepening Taiwan’s ties with significant democracies worldwide, chief among them the U.S. After her re-election, her administration’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and success in providing medical assistance to countries worldwide, boosted Taiwan’s visibility at a time when browbeating by Chinese representatives abroad soured perceptions of China in many capitals. By June, when Mr. Han was removed from office, President Tsai’s approval had reached unprecedented levels (73%) in Taiwan’s democratic history.

对于北京来说,和解(2008-16年)和胁迫(2016-2020年)的双重失败一定让习近平很难咽下这口气,习近平把他的遗产押在了在所谓的中国“复兴”上,这在中共内部处于不显眼的位置。在执政七年后,习近平完全没有让台湾跟上;事实上,台湾比以往任何时候都更加遥远,比以往任何时候都更加坚决反对统一。而习近平的死对头蔡英文总统则以强有力的公众授权再次当选。自2016年以来,她的政府已经对官方外交损失进行了超额补偿--在写这篇文章中,已经有了七位盟友--深化了台湾与世界各地重要民主国家的关系,其中主要是美国。在她再次当选后,她的政府成功地处理了疫情,并向世界各国提供医疗援助,提高了台湾的知名度。于此同时,台湾还遭到中共代表在海外的恐吓,使许多国家的人们对中共国的看法变得越来越糟。到了今年6月韩国瑜被免职时,蔡英文总统的支持率已达到台湾民主史上前所未有的高度(73%)。

编辑:【喜马拉雅战鹰团】Edited by:【Himalaya Hawk Squad】