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21世纪的芯片之战 【中英对照翻译】

新闻来源:War On The Rocks

作者:STEVE BLANK

翻译/简评:Johnwallis

校对:Julia Win

Page: 椰子哦耶

简评:

在21世纪,芯片就是一个国家经济、社会活动能够正常运转的中枢神经,就像20世纪的石油一样重要。控制这种高端芯片制造业的国家可以扼制其它国家的军事和经济力量。美国最近限制中共国华为将其内部芯片设计外包给台积电制造。作为回应,中共国可能会通过战争之外灵活的战略,胁迫台积电停止为美国公司生产芯片。甚至中共国可能会对美采取更激烈措施,也可能会对台湾发起某种类型的贸易战,或者让这些台湾芯片代工企业遭受蓄意破坏。本文同时也探讨了台积电在限制令下的选择、中共国半导体产业的现况和雄心、及美国该如何应对中共。

原文

The Chip Wars of the 21st Century

21世纪的芯片之战

Controlling advanced chip manufacturing in the 21st century may well prove to be like controlling the oil supply in the 20th. The country that controls this manufacturing can throttle the military and economic power of others. The United States recently did this to China by limiting Huawei’s ability to outsource its in-house chip designs for manufacture by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), a Taiwanese chip foundry. China may respond and escalate via one of its many agile strategic options short of war, perhaps succeeding in coercing the foundry to stop making chips for American companies. If negotiations fail, China might take drastic measures, turning the tables on the United States. On the more modest end of the spectrum, China might start some type of trade war with Taiwan to ensure access, following the playbook Beijing used to coerce Korea over Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) or Australia over its recent decision to lead a call for investigating the origins of the novel coronavirus. On the more extreme end, these Taiwanese chip foundries might be subject to an aggressive campaign of sabotage. And even though observers of the region might downplay the risk, it is not impossible that this could be used as a part of a casus belli for China’s long-held desire to reunify by force. Such is the importance of chips in this era.

21世纪控制先进芯片的制造,很可能被证明就像20世纪控制石油供应一样。控制这种制造业的国家可以扼制其他国家的军事和经济力量。美国最近对中共国的做法是,限制华为将其内部芯片设计外包给台湾芯片代工企业台湾积体电路制造公司(Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company,TSMC)(台积电)制造。中共国可能会通过战争之外灵活的战略作出回应,也许会成功胁迫代工厂停止为美国公司生产芯片。如果谈判失败,中共国可能会采取激烈措施,将矛头指向美国。在最温和的一端,中共国可能会与台湾发起某种类型的贸易战以确保准入,北京曾在终端高空区域防御(THAAD)上胁迫韩国,或威胁澳大利亚,因其最近决定领导调查新型冠状病毒起源的呼吁。在更极端的情况下,这些台湾芯片代工企业可能会遭受蓄意破坏。尽管该地区的观察家们可能会淡化风险,但这也不是不可能的,因为这可能会被中共国用作长期以来以武力统一愿望的部分理由。这就是芯片在这个时代的重要性。

Either way, Washington should be worried. If the United States were to be deprived of access to these foundries, the U.S. defense and consumer electronics industries would be set back for at least five years. Moreover, because China is investing in its own chip foundries, it could become the world leader in technology for the next decade or more. That’s why it was encouraging to see Republicans and Democrats in the House and Senate propose $25 billion to help America’s semiconductor industry. But this should only be the start.

无论如何,华盛顿都应该感到担心。如果美国被剥夺了对这些代工厂的使用权,美国的国防和消费电子产业将倒退至少5年。此外,由于中共国正在投资自己的芯片代工厂,中共国可能会在未来十年或更长时间内成为世界技术的领导者。这就是为什么看到参众两院的共和党人和民主党人提出250亿美元来帮助美国的半导体产业是令人鼓舞的。但这应该只是一个开始。

There are two types of semiconductor manufacturing companies in the chip industry. Some (like Intel, Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron) design and make their own products in factories that they own. There are also foundries, which fabricate chips designed by consumer and military customers; TSMC is the largest of these in the world. The chips that TSMC makes are found in almost everything: smartphones, high-performance computing platforms, PCs, tablets, servers, base stations, game consoles, internet-connected devices like smart wearables, digital consumer electronics, cars, and almost every weapon system built in the 21st century. About 60 percent of the chips TSMC makes are for American companies.

芯片行业的半导体制造企业有两种类型。有些(如英特尔、三星、SK海力士和美光)在自己的工厂里设计和制造自己的产品。此外,还有一些代工厂,制造由消费和军事客户设计的芯片;台积电是世界上最大的代工厂。台积电制造的芯片几乎出现在所有的产品中:智能手机、高性能计算平台、个人电脑、平板电脑、服务器、基站、游戏机、互联网连接设备,比如智能可穿戴、数字消费电子、汽车,以及21世纪制造的几乎所有武器系统。台积电生产的芯片中,约有60%是为美国公司生产的。

In 2012, a bipartisan committee of the U.S. House of Representatives investigated whether the Chinese company Huawei had put backdoors into its equipment that enabled it to spy on data therein. The committee found that Huawei could not or would not explain its relationship with the Chinese government and did not comply with U.S. laws, but it did not reach a conclusion as to whether such backdoors exist. Still, most observers agree that the company is not careful with security. The report recommended that no government or contractor systems include Huawei systems. In 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security added Huawei to its Entity List, effectively limiting the sale or transfer of American technology to the company, though a series of licenses have been granted to waive the restrictions in some cases.

2012年,美国众议院(U.S. House of Representatives)的一个两党委员会调查了中共国公司华为是否在其设备中安装了后门,使其能够监视设备中的数据。委员会认为,华为不能或不愿解释其与中共政府的关系,也没有遵守美国法律,但也没有得出是否存在这种后门的结论。不过,大多数观察家还是认为,该公司在安全方面并不谨慎。报告建议,任何政府或承包商的系统中都不应包括华为系统。2019年,美国商务部工业和安全局(U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security )将华为列入实体名单,有效地限制了向该公司出售或转让美国技术的行为,不过在某些情况下,该公司已经获得了一系列豁免限制的许可。

This month, the Commerce Department required overseas semiconductor firms that use American technology and equipment to apply for a license before selling to Huawei. The order was targeted at TSMC, which is Huawei’s main supplier of advanced chips; without these, Huawei will be at a competitive disadvantage against Apple or Samsung in the smartphone industry, and against Cisco and others in the market for network equipment. (Some analysts have pointed out the order has potential loopholes.) Next up, it’s likely Washington will prohibit sales to China of the equipment used to make chips, which comes from companies like Applied Materials, KLA Corporation, and Lam.

本月,商务部要求使用美国技术和设备的海外半导体企业在向华为销售前必须申请许可证。该命令针对的是台积电,而台积电是华为先进芯片的主要供应商;如果没有这些芯片,华为在智能手机行业与苹果或三星的竞争中,以及在网络设备市场与思科等公司的竞争中,将处于劣势。(有分析人士指出,该命令存在潜在的漏洞。)接下来,华盛顿很可能会禁止向中共国销售用于制造芯片的设备,这些设备来自应用材料公司(Applied Materials)、科磊(KLA Corporation)和泛林集团(Lam)。

TSMC Chose America’s Side, For Now

台积电暂时站在了美国一边

In May 2020, TSMC announced it was going to build a $12 billion foundry in Arizona to make some of its most advanced chips. Foundries take at least three years to build and are the most expensive factories on earth. Construction on TSMC’s facility is planned to start in 2021, but actual chip production will not start until 2024.

2020年5月,台积电宣布要在亚利桑那州(Arizona)建立一个价值120亿美元的晶圆代工厂,生产一些最先进的芯片。代工厂建立起来至少需三年时间,这是世界上最贵的工厂。台积电的工厂计划于2021年开始建设,但实际的芯片生产要到2024年才会开始。

While the announcement is welcomed, if and when the Arizona foundry is built it will only be able to process about a quarter of the chip productions of TSMC’s largest semiconductor fabrication plants and would amount to just 3 percent of the manufacturing capability that TSMC currently operates in Taiwan. There they have four major manufacturing sites, each of which have six or seven foundries producing 13 million wafers — thin slices of semiconductors — a year. Compare that to the quarter of a million wafers they intend to process in the United States in 2024. If the United States lost TSMC to China, one new American plant would not make up the difference in capacity.

虽然这个消息值得欢迎,如果亚利桑那州的晶圆代工厂建成后,它只能加工台积电最大的半导体制造厂约1/4的芯片产品,而且仅相当于台积电目前在台湾经营的制造能力的3%。在台湾,他们有四个主要的生产基地,每个基地都有六七家代工厂,每年生产1300万片晶圆--半导体薄片。相比下,他们打算在2024年在美国生产25万片晶圆。如果美国失去了台积电,输给了中共国,一家美国新厂并不能弥补产能上的差距。

China’s Semiconductor Industry

中共国的半导体产业

A decade ago, China recognized that its initial success as the world’s low-cost factory was going to run its course. As the cost of Chinese labor increased, other countries like Vietnam could fill that role. As a result, China needed to build more advanced and sophisticated products on par with the United States. However, most of these products required custom chips — and China lacked the domestic manufacturing capability to make them. China uses 61 percent of the world’s chips in products for both its domestic and export markets, importing around $310 billion worth in 2018. China recognized that its inability to manufacture the most advanced chips was a strategic Achilles heel.

十年前,中共国就认识到,作为世界低成本工厂的初步成功,即将走到尽头。随着中共国劳动力成本的增加,越南等其他国家可以填补这一角色。因此,中共国需要打造更先进、更复杂的产品,向美国看齐。然而,这些产品大多需要定制芯片--而中共国国内缺乏制造这些产品的能力。中共国在国内和出口市场的产品中使用了全球61%的芯片,2018年进口价值约3100亿美元芯片。中共国认识到,无法制造最先进的芯片是其战略上的致命弱点。

China devised two plans to solve these problems. The first, the Made in China 2025 plan, was the country’s roadmap and financing vehicle to update China’s manufacturing base from making low-tech products to rapidly developing ten high-tech industries, including electric cars, next-generation computing, telecommunications, robotics, artificial intelligence, and advanced chips. The goal is to reduce China’s dependence on foreign technology and promote Chinese high-tech companies globally. In addition, to encourage Chinese high-tech companies to go public in China rather than in the United States, the Chinese government set up its own version of the Nasdaq called the STAR market (Shanghai Stock Exchange Science and Technology Innovation Board).

中共国制定了两个计划来解决这些问题。第一个是《中国制造2025》计划,是国家更新中共国制造业基础的路线图和融资工具,从制造低技术产品到快速发展十大高科技产业,包括电动汽车、下一代计算、电信、机器人、人工智能和先进芯片。其目标是减少中共国对国外技术的依赖,在全球范围内推动中共国高科技企业的发展。此外,为了鼓励中共国高科技公司在中共国而不是在美国上市,中共国政府建立了自己的纳斯达克版本市场,称为上海证券交易所科技创新板(Shanghai Stock Exchange Science and Technology Innovation Board,STAR)。

China’s second plan is the National Integrated Circuit Plan, a roadmap for building an indigenous semiconductor industry and accelerating chip manufacturing. The goal is to meet its local chip demand by 2030.

中共国的第二个计划是 "国家集成电路计划",这是一个建设本土半导体产业和加快芯片制造的路线图。目标是到2030年满足其本土芯片需求。

Make no mistake: These are not the kind of government announcements that don’t end up going anywhere. This is a massive national effort. China is spending over a hundred billion dollars to become a world leader in developing their semiconductor industry. The China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, or “Big Fund,” raised $51 billion — $22 billion in 2014 and another $29 billion in 2019. China has used the capital to start over 70 projects in the semiconductor industry (such as building foundries, acquiring foreign companies, and starting joint ventures) and has gone from making zero to 16 percent of the world’s chips, though today their quality is low. Going forward, China plans to start investing in chip design software, advanced materials, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

别搞错了:这些都不是那种最终不会有什么结果的政府公告。这是一项大规模的国家努力。中共国为了成为世界上发展半导体产业的领头羊,花费了一千多亿美元。中共国集成电路产业投资基金(The China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund),即 "大基金",募集了510亿美元--2014年募集了220亿美元,2019年再募集290亿美元。中共国利用资本启动了70多个半导体产业项目(如建设晶圆厂、收购外国公司、开办合资企业),中共国的芯片产量从零到16%,虽然目前芯片的质量很低。展望未来,中共国计划开始投资芯片设计软件、先进材料和半导体制造设备。

China’s leaders believe that this is their century and see American actions as designed to hold China back from its proper place in the world. Given the importance of controlling the supply of advanced chip manufacturing, China would be forced to respond if the United States cut off their access to this supply. The question is whether China will view the action against Huawei as sanctions against a single company, or as a portent of further action against China’s access to advanced chips.

中共国领导人认为,这是他们的世纪,并认为美国的行动是为了阻碍中共国在世界的适当位置。鉴于控制先进芯片制造供应的重要性,如果美国切断他们的供应渠道,中共国将被迫做出反应。问题是,中共国是否会将对华为制裁行动视为对单一公司的制裁,还是对中共国获得先进芯片的进一步行动的征兆。

What Has China Learned from America’s Prior Actions?

中共国从美国先前的行动中学到了什么?

In the 21st century, the United States has blinked when its own interests were at stake. From the perspective of some Chinese policymakers, America is exhausted from endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and unlikely to fight again. They see that the United States is divided politically, distracted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and unlikely to risk American lives for something as abstract as a chip factory.

在21世纪,美国已经忽视了自身利益受到威胁。在一些中共国决策者看来,美国已经从无休止的伊拉克和阿富汗战争中筋疲力尽,不太可能再打仗。他们看到,美国在政治上是分裂的,被COVID-19大流行病分散了注意力,不可能为了一个芯片工厂这样抽象的东西去冒美国人的生命危险。

When China has acted aggressively over the past couple of decades, it has seen that the American response has largely been paper protests. In 2012, China occupied the Scarborough Shoal and took control of it from the Philippines. As China was not ready to militarily confront the United States at the time, what if the Americans had parked a carrier strike group near those shoals? Could that have prevented China’s plans for military construction in the area? Instead, Washington blinked and limited itself to strong words. Today, the nearby Spratly Islands have new Chinese bases bristling with surface to air missiles and fighter jets, which has changed the calculus for a war in the western Pacific. Any attempt by the United States at controlling the air space in the area will face serious opposition and heavy losses.

过去几十年来,当中共国采取咄咄逼人的行动时,美国的反应大多是纸上谈兵的抗议。2012年,中共国占领了黄岩岛(Scarborough Shoal),并从菲律宾手中夺取了它的控制权。由于当时中共国还没有做好军事对抗美国的准备,如果美国人把航母打击群停在那些岛附近呢?这是否能阻止中共国在该地区的军事建设计划?华盛顿却选择了忽视,仅限于严正厉词。如今,附近的南沙群岛上,中共国的新基地布满了地对空导弹和战斗机,这改变了西太平洋战争的格局。美国控制该地区领空的任何企图都将面临严重的反对和重大的损失。

Up until recently, Hong Kong, while part of China, had guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly, and the press. China is preparing to impose the same draconian limits on speech, assembly, and the press that muzzle the rest of China. There is not much the United States can do other than express concerns and perhaps remove the city’s special trade status. But China doesn’t care. It has already factored the American response into this move and decided it was worth it, with the cynical calculation that any response would make Hong Kong poorer, and that any business the city loses will mostly end up in other parts of China — or that business lost to other countries is the cost of asserting control over Hong Kong, and one it can bear. And a poorer Hong Kong will be punishment to its citizens for standing up for the rights that they had been promised.

直到最近,香港虽然是中共国的一部分,但言论自由、集会自由和新闻自由都得到了保障。中共国正准备对言论、集会和新闻界实施与中共国其它地区同样的严厉限制。除了表达关注,或许取消香港的特殊贸易地位外,美国能做的并不多。但中共国并不在意。它已经将美国的反应考虑在内,并决定值得这么做,它狡猾地算计出,任何反应都会使香港变得更穷,而香港失去的任何生意大多会流向中共国的其它地方--或者说,失去其它国家的生意是对香港实行控制的代价,它可以承受。而一个更贫穷的香港,将是对其公民站出来争取他们所承诺的权利的惩罚。

The day after China moved on Hong Kong, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang left out the word “peaceful” in referring to Beijing’s desire to “reunify” with Taiwan, an apparent policy change.

在中共国对香港动武的第二天,中共国总理李克强在提到北京希望与台湾 "统一 "时,就把 "和平 "二字给省略了,这显然是政策上的变化。

The lack of an effective American response to these events has shown Chinese leadership that the United States is unwilling to forcefully engage in Asian affairs. This will embolden China’s next move.

美国对这些事件缺乏有效的回应,这让中共国领导人看到,美国不愿意强行介入亚洲事务。这将使中共国的下一步行动有恃无恐。

China’s Goals and Options

中共国的目标和选择

China’s goal in the immediate term is to secure a steady supply of chips. To respond to the United States cutting off Huawei’s access to Taiwan’s most advanced chip foundries, the Chinese Communist Party is likely thinking through its next moves. China may wish to avoid any escalation by talking to the United States and either accepting the restrictions as they currently are, with a promise that they will go no further, or negotiating to restore Huawei’s access to TSMC by accepting other restrictions elsewhere. Alternatively, Beijing may seek to negotiate with or coerce Taipei (or both) in order to allow China sole access to TSMC and block chip exports to the United States, thereby securing China’s own supply while crippling American industry. Or China might kick over the table entirely by working to ensure that TSMC foundries cannot be used by either Huawei or the United States through some sort of concerted sabotage campaign, or even a direct attack. While these more aggressive scenarios might seem implausible, China’s behavior has become more aggressive and more risk-tolerant as the COVID-19 pandemic, which began in Wuhan, roils the world.

中共国近期的目标是保证芯片的稳定供应。为了应对美国切断华为进入台湾最先进的芯片代工厂,中共很可能正在思考下一步的动作。中共国可能希望通过与美国对话来避免任何升级,要么接受目前的限制,并承诺不会再进一步,要么通过谈判接受其他的限制,恢复华为与台积电的合作。或者,北京可能会寻求与台北谈判或胁迫台北(或两者兼而有之),以便让中共国独占台积电,阻止对美国的芯片出口,从而确保中共国自己的供应,同时削弱美国工业。或者中共国可能会完全踢翻桌子,通过某种协同的蓄意破坏活动,甚至直接攻击,努力确保台积电的代工厂不能被华为或美国使用。虽然这些更激进的场景看起来似乎不靠谱,但随着始于武汉的COVID-19疫情席卷全球,中共国的行为也变得更加激进,承受更强的风险。

A return to the status quo, with a restoration of Huawei’s access to TSMC’s foundry, may simply require negotiating some form of trade deal or agreeing to restrictions on the sale of Huawei networking gear (34 percent of its revenue). If achievable, this kind of deal would let the Huawei consumer and enterprise businesses (66 percent of its revenue) survive and thrive. However, it requires the Chinese to back down. And China may have decided that the Rubicon has been crossed.

要恢复现状,修复华为与台积电的联系,可能只需要某种形式的贸易协议谈判,或者同意华为网络装备的销售限制(占其收入的34%)。如果能够实现,这种交易将让华为消费者和企业业务(占其收入的66%)生存和发展。然而,这需要中共国的退让。而中共国可能已经决定,跨越卢比孔河(即迈出了不可回头的一步)。

If China does not negotiate, the danger is that the United States ups the ante further by prohibiting TSMC from working with more Chinese firms or bans the sale of the equipment used to build chips to any company in China. Such escalation may lead China to perceive that U.S. actions are not a dispute about Huawei, but in fact a salvo in a wider economic war. The Chinese Communist Party would then need to work out how to force TSMC to do its bidding.

如果中共国不谈判,危险的是美国进一步加大赌注,禁止台积电与更多的中共国企业合作,或者禁止向中共国任何公司出售用于制造芯片的设备。这种升级可能会让中共国认为,美国的行动不是关于华为的争端,实际上是一场更广泛的经济战争的炮火。中共就需要想办法迫使台积电听话。

The least likely option is to carry out the threat that the Chinese government has made since 1949: There is only one China, Taiwan is a rebellious province, and China will reunify by force if necessary. This option has the highest risk of provoking an American military response, and while possible, it is extremely unlikely. China can achieve its immediate goals and weaken Taiwan without an outright invasion or blockade.

最不可能的选择是执行中共国政府自1949年以来的威胁:只有一个中国,台湾是一个叛乱的省份,必要时中共国会武力统一。这种方案引发美国军事反应的风险最高,虽然有可能,但可能性极小。中共国可以在不直接入侵或封锁的情况下,达到眼前的目的,削弱台湾。

The second and perhaps more likely path is a trade war combined with a major disinformation campaign against TSMC and the United States that would make current influence campaigns emanating from China pale in comparison. This would emphasize that the United States is the aggressor and is illegally waging economic war against China. Beijing could announce that since Taiwan is a province of China, China has the right to restrict TSMC sales to the United States and enforce an embargo of any chip sales to American-affiliated companies. This could be coupled with an equally massive disinformation campaign to the Taiwanese people, pointing out that the United States won’t go to war over a semiconductor company, and that China’s requests are fair and reasonable. How effective a disinformation campaign would be is up for debate, given that Chinese campaigns in Taiwan’s January elections did not result in the election of China’s preferred candidate. China could offer a no-invasion pledge in exchange, while reminding the Taiwanese government of what they already know: Regardless of promises, the United States can’t defend them. Even if the United States attempted to intervene, there is a serious debate unfolding about how useful legacy American platforms – especially carriers – would be in a shooting war with China.

第二条或许更有可能的道路是贸易战,再加上针对台积电和美国的大规模虚假宣传,这将使目前来自中共国的影响活动变得苍白无力。这样可以强调美国是侵略者,是在非法对中共国发动经济战争。北京可以宣布,由于台湾是中共国的一个省,中共国有权限制台积电对美国的销售,并对任何向美国关联公司销售芯片的行为实施禁运。这可以配合对台湾人民进行同样大规模的造谣,指出美国不会为了一家半导体公司而战,中共国的要求是公平合理的。鉴于中共国对台湾1月选举中并没有让其心仪的候选人当选,虚假信息活动的效果如何有待商榷。中共国可以提出不入侵的承诺作为交换,同时提醒台湾政府他们已经知道的事情:即无论承诺如何,美国都无法捍卫他们。即使美国试图干预,在与中共国的枪战中,老式的美国平台--尤其是航母--会有多大用处,有一场严肃的辩论。

There is a high probability that Taiwan will still refuse despite all of this, so China would then ratchet up the pressure. First, it could nationalize TSMC’s two less-advanced foundries in mainland China. Next, China could launch a precision-guided missile strike against one of the older TSMC foundries in Taiwan to send a message. China could announce it will destroy one foundry each week until TSMC agrees to sell only to China. Even destroying all the TSMC foundries in Taiwan would still be net win for China: American military and consumer technology would no longer have advanced foundries, but China would.

尽管如此,台湾很有可能仍然会拒绝,所以中共国就会加大压力。首先,它可以将台积电在中共国大陆的两家不太先进的代工厂国有化。接下来,中共国可能会对台积电在台湾的一家老代工厂进行精确制导导弹攻击,以传递信号。 中共国可能会宣布每周摧毁一家代工厂,直到台积电同意只卖给中共国。即使把台湾的台积电代工厂全部摧毁,对中共国来说也是净胜。美国的军事和消费技术将不再有先进的代工厂,但中共国会有。

What Should the United States Do?

美国应该怎么做?

Would the United States go to war with China over chips? The loss of TSMC would leave the United States scrambling to find alternate sources. America could turn to Intel to restart its foundry business or to Samsung or even Global Foundries. But the transition and recovery would take at least three years, if not more, and tens of billions of dollars. In the meantime, the United States would have second-tier status in technology.

美国会不会为了芯片与中共国开战?失去台积电,美国将仓促寻找替代来源。美国可以转向英特尔重启代工业务,也可以转向三星甚至全球代工厂。但过渡和恢复至少需要三年,甚至更长的时间,以及数百亿美元的资金。与此同时,美国在技术方面将处于二线地位。

The outcome could depend on the timing of Chinese actions: The current U.S. administration may not want to start a war before the presidential election, but it is unpredictable enough that a campaign season focused on China could change the calculus. If the presidency changes hands, the incoming administration may de-escalate and reverse the original restrictions, but a lot can happen between now and January 2021.

其结果可能取决于中共国行动的时机。现任美国政府可能不想在总统大选前发动战争,但这是不可预知的,一个以中共国为重点的竞选季可能会改变这一布局。如果总统职位易手,新一届政府可能会缓和并扭转原有的限制,但从现在到2021年1月之间可能会发生很多事情。

The dispute over Huawei’s access to TSMC has highlighted how vulnerable American industry is to the loss of its sole supply of advanced chips. If the matter cannot be solved by negotiation, China may perceive the restrictions as economic warfare and rapidly escalate, potentially threatening Taiwan. It is not at all clear that Washington has thought through the consequences of its actions here, nor that the current administration has considered chip supply as part of a wider supply chain security and national industrial policy. Given that China has more positive options than the United States, it is surely time for those in charge to consider where this might lead.

关于华为进入台积电的争议,凸显了美国工业在失去其唯一的先进芯片供应方面是多么脆弱。如果不能通过谈判解决,中共国可能会将限制视为经济战,并迅速升级,有可能威胁到台湾。完全不清楚华盛顿是否考虑过其在此行动的后果,也不清楚本届政府是否将芯片供应作为更广泛的供应链安全和国家产业政策的一部分。鉴于中共国比美国有更多乐观的选择,现在肯定是负责人考虑这可能导致的结果的时候了。

编辑:【喜马拉雅战鹰团】