原文來源：THE JAPANTIMES, JUN 2, 2020

原文作者：TETSUO KOTANI

翻譯、引言: TCC

PR: Julia Win

引言：

這篇文章雖然是由日本的立場為出發點，討論釣魚台列島的主權問題。在文章中可以得知，釣魚台列島重要性，不只是在單純的魚穫經濟價值，也一直是地緣政治上重要的兵家必爭之地。中共國近年來，一帶一路的布局，以及對南中國海島礁的軍事化的結果，釣魚台列島的主權爭奪成了一個重頭戲，這不只是對日本的挑戰，也是對該地區國家的一種申明-我是東中國海的老大!

以往雖有類似衝突對峙出現，但至此篇指出最近中共國不尋常的舉動，除了派正式的海軍人員駐防，也加強了出現的頻率及強硬的態度。這促使日本海岸警衛隊也增加巡邏艦和飛機的數量，同時增強其對入侵領海的反應能力。在這種情形下，擦槍走火的可能性也加劇了。日本需要與在南海面臨同樣挑戰的菲律賓，越南和其他友好國家合作，在多邊框架內堅決面對中共國的舉動。

原文：

COMMENTARY / WORLD

中共把釣魚台當“武”台

China steps up its offensive against the Senkaku Islands

中共國加強對釣魚台列島的進攻

An armed China Coast Guard vessel is seen sailing near the Senkaku Islands for the first time on Dec. 22, 2015. The activities of CCG ships around the Senkaku islets have increased markedly in recent years. | JAPAN COAST GUARD / VIA REUTERS

(圖) 2015年12月22日，一艘武裝的中共國海岸警衛隊船隻首次在釣魚台列島附近航行。近年來，釣魚台列島周圍，中共國海岸警衛隊船隻的活動明顯增加。 |日本海岸警衛隊/路透社

On May 8, two China Coast Guard (CCG) ships intruded into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands and pursued a Japanese fishing boat that was operating in the area. Several Japan Coast Guard (JCG) ships patrolling nearby warned the CCG ships, and took steps to protect the fishing boat that reportedly led to a tense face-off. The CCG ships remained near the fishing boat within the territorial waters, not leaving until May 10.

5月8日，中共國海岸警衛隊（CCG）的兩艘船闖入釣魚台列島的領海，並追逐了一艘在該地區運營的日本漁船。幾艘在附近巡邏的日本海岸警衛隊（JCG）警告中共國海岸警衛隊船隻，並對這艘漁船採取了保護措施，據說這導致了緊張的對峙。 CCG船隻一直留在領海內的漁船附近，直到5月10日才離開。

The Japanese government immediately lodged a protest, pointing out that the incursion into territorial waters was an infringement of the nation's sovereignty. Beijing responded that the CCG ships were simply regulating the illegal operations by the Japanese fishing boat in Chinese territorial waters, and demanded that the JCG refrain from obstruction in the future.

日本政府立即提出抗議，指出入侵領海是對國家主權的侵犯。北京回應說，中共國海岸警衛隊船隻只是在規管日本漁船在中國領海的非法活動，並要求JCG今後避免阻撓。

What prompted Beijing to do this? The general observation would be that China took advantage of Japan dealing with the rising COVID-19 infections, by stepping up its offensive against the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing claims as Chinese territory. Alternatively, we could analyze it as the Xi Jinping administration adopting a more hardline stance on Japan as a diversion at a time of growing domestic dissatisfaction while the COVID-19 pandemic slows the Chinese economy. Based on available objective information, however, it appears likely that this incident was the result of a CCG policy of cracking down on foreign fishing vessels in East Asia generally.

是什麼促使北京這樣做的？一般觀察認為，這是中共國利用日本應對日益增加的COVID-19感染，來加強對北京宣稱為中國領土的釣魚台列島的進攻。另外，我們可以分析認為，這是使用對日本採取更強硬立場來轉移其國內因COVID-19大瘟疫減緩的中國經濟，而對習近平政府日益的不滿。但是，根據現有的客觀信息，該事件很可能是中共國海岸警衛隊鎮壓整個東亞外國漁船的政策的結果。

This was not the first time that Chinese coast guard vessels had pursued Japanese fishing boats in the territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. The JCG counts it as the fifth case after the establishment of the current CCG in July 2013, but public information shows that there were at least four such cases before that.

這並不是中共國海岸警衛隊首次在釣魚台列島附近的領海中追捕日本漁船。 日本海岸警衛隊，將其視為自當前中共國海岸警衛隊於2013年7月成立以來的第五起案件，但公開信息顯示，在此之前至少有四起此類案件。

In most cases, the pursuit was likely prompted by the presence of media reporters or political activists aboard the fishing boats. In one incident, in April 2013, a Japanese activist group made a prior announcement of its plan to land on the Senkaku Islands, so a fleet of eight Chinese vessels attempted to intercept the group. In other cases, the Chinese probably made visual identification at sea, or somehow acquired information before the fishing boats set out.

在大多數情況下，追捕行動可能是因漁船上的媒體記者或政治激進分子在場引起的。在2013年4月的一次事件中，一個日本激進組織事先宣布了其在釣魚台列島的登陸計劃，因此有八艘中共國船隻組成的船隊試圖攔截該組織。在其他情況下，中共國可能會在海上進行視覺辨識，或者以某種方式在漁船出發之前獲得了信息。

By contrast, there was nothing out of the ordinary with the most recent case. To understand it, we need to look at CCG activities in a much wider area. The Chinese authority institutes an annual fishing ban in the East and South China Seas as well as in the Yellow Sea from early May to mid-August to “preserve fisheries resources and the marine environment.” Previously, the CCG only regulated the illegal operations of Chinese fishing boats during this period, but this year, foreign fishing boats are also subject to “suppression” in a campaign called “Liang Jian (Flashing Sword) 2020.” To date, there have been no reports of actual crackdowns on foreign fishing boats, but the CCG pursued the Japanese fishing boat near the Senkaku Islands under this stricter control of foreign fishing boats.

相比之下，最新的案例並沒有什麼不同尋常。要理解它，我們需要從更廣闊的領域中研究CCG活動。中共國當局於5月初至8月中旬在東海和南海以及黃海實行年度捕撈禁令，以“保護漁業資源和海洋環境”。此前，CCG僅在此期間對中共國漁船的非法活動進行管制，但今年，在名為“亮劍2020”的運動中，外國漁船也受到“壓制”。迄今為止，尚無關於對外國漁船進行實際鎮壓的報導，但CCG在對外國漁船的更嚴格控制情況下，在釣魚台列島附近追捕了這艘日本漁船。

Chinese maritime law enforcement ships began intruding into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands in December 2008. A former top Chinese coast guard officer has explained that the aim was to “break down” Japan’s effective control. However, challenging Japanese administrative In other words, as long as the fishing ban persists, the CCG will likely try to crack down on foreign fishing boats, not only in the East China Sea but in East Asian waters more broadly. It is likewise possible that CCG ships will pursue Japanese fishing boats near the Senkaku Islands more frequently. It is worth bearing in mind that it was unusual for the CCG ships, in their pursuit of Japanese fishing boats, to remain in the territorial waters for three days, and that it was the first time Beijing had claimed Japanese fishing activity as “illegal.” However, the incident itself was hardly unprecedented.

中共國海上執法船於2008年12月開始入侵釣魚台列島的領海。一位前中共國海岸警衛隊高級官員曾解釋說，其目的是“破壞”日本的有效控制權，換句話說，在挑戰日本的行政管理；但是，只要(中共)繼續執行捕魚禁令，CCG可能不僅會在東中國海，且在更廣泛的東亞海域試圖打擊外國漁船。 CCG船也有可能更頻繁地在釣魚台列島附近追捕日本漁船。值得記住的是，CCG船隻在追逐日本漁船時在領海停留三天是不尋常的，這是北京首次宣稱日本的捕魚活動為“非法”。 但是，事件本身並非史無前例。

We should also assume that the CCG crackdown on Japanese fishing boats will continue even after the fishing ban ends. The activities of CCG ships around the Senkaku Islands had already evolved markedly, even before the COVID-19 outbreak. It was always routine for CCG ships to remain in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands for three weeks every month, intruding into the territorial waters three times, while seeking refuge in stormy weather. Since May 2019, however, although the frequency of incursions remains the same, the vessels are now stationed in the contiguous zone more or less every day, regardless of the weather. This is probably because the CCG ships have become larger, the crew’s handling has improved, and following an organizational restructuring in July 2018, the CCG is now led by active-duty naval flag officers trained in blue water operations. That is, CCG ships are now able to “target” Japanese fishing boats at any time.

我們還應該假設，即使在捕撈禁令結束之後，CCG對日本漁船的鎮壓仍將繼續。 CCG船在釣魚台列島周圍的活動已經顯著發展，甚至在COVID-19疫情爆發之前。 CCG船通常每月要在釣魚台列島附近的毗連區停留三個星期，同暴風雨中尋求庇護時三次闖入領海。然而，自2019年5月以來，儘管入侵頻率保持不變，但無論天氣如何，船隻現在每天或多或少地停泊在毗連區。這可能是因為CCG船變得更大，船員的處理得到了改善，並且在2018年7月進行了組織改組之後，CCG現在由接受過正式”藍色”海域(深水)操作培訓的現役海軍旗官領導。也就是說，CCG船現在能夠隨時“瞄準”日本漁船。

How should Tokyo react if CCG ships go after Japanese fishing boats again? The activities of CCG ships in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands had already prompted the JCG to develop a posture dedicated to the Senkaku Islands by increase the number of patrol ships and aircraft, while reinforcing its ability to react to incursions into territorial waters, prevent disembarkations and keep a check on Chinese fishing boats. However, the JCG had not really anticipated a mission of protecting Japanese fishing boats from CCG ships, so we need to consider whether the current posture is sufficient should the CCG actually start to board Japanese fishing boats inside the territorial waters.

如果CCG船再次追趕日本漁船，東京應該如何反應？ CCG船在釣魚台列島周圍水域中的活動已經促使日本海岸警衛隊通過增加巡邏艦和飛機的數量，同時增強其對入侵領海的反應能力，防止下船並檢查中共國漁船。但是，JCG並未真正預期到保護日本漁船免受CCG船隻襲擊的任務，因此如果CCG真的開始在領海內登上日本漁船，我們(日本)需要考慮目前的應對姿勢是否足夠。

Chinese maritime law enforcement ships began intruding into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands in December 2008. A former top Chinese coast guard officer has explained that the aim was to “break down” Japan’s effective control. However, challenging Japanese administrative control by employing force is in violation of the United Nations Charter, so law enforcement within the territorial waters does not in fact bolster China’s territorial claims. Likewise, the Chinese unilateral imposition of fishing bans around the Senkaku Islands lacks any basis in international law.

中共國海上執法船於2008年12月開始入侵釣魚台列島的領海。一名前中共國海岸警衛隊高級軍官解釋說，其目的是“破壞”日本的有效管制。但是，用武力挑戰日本的行政控制權違反了《聯合國憲章》，因此在領海內的執法實際上並不能支持中國的領土主張。同樣地，中共國在釣魚台列島周圍單方面實行捕魚禁令在國際法上也沒有任何依據。

Above all, CCG activities are a threat to foreign fishing boats. Chinese President Xi’s planned visit to Japan as state guest was postponed because of the pandemic, but in future negotiations Tokyo should urge Beijing to cease actions in the East China Sea that have no basis in international law. At the same time, Japan needs to cooperate with the Philippines, Vietnam and other friendly nations facing the same challenges in the South China Sea, resolutely facing China within multilateral frameworks.

最重要的是，CCG活動對外國漁船構成威脅。由於大瘟疫，中共國國家主席習近平原計劃作為國賓訪問日本的計劃被推遲，但在未來的談判中，東京應敦促北京停止在東海沒有國際法依據的行動。同時，日本需要與在南海面臨同樣挑戰的菲律賓，越南和其他友好國家合作，在多邊框架內堅決面對中共國。

Tetsuo Kotani is an associate professor at Meikai University and a senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

小谷哲男是明開大學的副教授，日本國際事務研究所的高級研究員。

编辑 【喜马拉雅战鹰团】