新闻来源：The Wire China；作者：ORVILLE SCHELL
The Death of Engagement / 中美接触终止
Part VI / 第六部
The dream that through greater interaction with the outside world, China would slowly emerge from its revolutionary Maoist chrysalis until it fledged as a reborn constructive participant — if not a more open and democratic society — in the existing liberal democratic world order had taken such deep root in America’s policy circles that, by the time George W. Bush began campaigning for the presidency in 1999, he quite naturally took up where Clinton left off: touting the positive effects of more bilateral trade.
U.S. President George W. Bush (L) meets with China’s Premier Wen Jiabao at the Zhongnanhai Compound in Beijing August 10, 2008. Credit: REUTERS/Jason Lee/Pool (CHINA) 2008年8月10日，美国总统乔治·沃克·布什（左）在北京中南海会见中共国总理温家宝 图片来源：路透社/Jason Lee/Pool (中国)
“The case for trade is not just monetary, but moral,” he preached. “Economic freedom creates the habits of liberty, and habits of liberty create expectations of democracy…Trade freely with China and time is on our side.”
By 2005, Bush was propounding an even more roseate vision. At a press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koichi, he explained, “As China reforms its economy, its leaders are finding that once the door to freedom is opened even a crack, it cannot be closed.”
A new U.S.-China compact was being forged not around fears of Soviet adventurism or just the economic benefits of more trade, but around the promise that more interaction would bring salutary political change. As columnist Nick Kristof, a former New York Times Beijing bureau chief, optimistically wrote, “After the Chinese could watch Eddie Murphy wear tight pink dresses, and struggle over what to order at Starbucks, the revolution was finished” because “no middle class is content with more choices of coffee than candidates on a ballot.”4
To help reassure the world that its growing “wealth and power” (富强) was not a threat, a Chinese White Paper promised that “a prosperous and developing China, a democratic, harmonious and stable country under the rule of law, will make more contribution to the world.” And, by 2005, Party General Secretary Hu Jintao was incanting the notion of a “Peaceful rise” (和平崛起), a rhetorical inspiration confected by the former head of the Central Communist Party School, Zheng Bijian, who vectored this slogan to the world via Foreign Affairs.
“After the Chinese…struggle over what to order at Starbucks,” Nick Kristof wrote, “the revolution was finished” because “no middle class is content with more choices of coffee than candidates on a ballot.” Credit: REUTERS 纪思道写道“当中国人在星巴克不知道要买什么的时候”，“改革就完成了”，因为“没有中产阶级会满足于咖啡的选择多于候选人的选择。” 图片来源：《路透社》
But such sloganeering masked as much as it revealed. As a leading Chinese propagandist, the head of the State Council’s Information Office, Zhao Qizheng, cynically explained, “The ‘peaceful’ is for the foreigners, and the ‘rise’ is for us.”
Such soothing rhetoric was calculated, wrote Kissinger, “to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge, one that can be achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of international relations.” Such nostrums gave Americans hope that it was only a matter of time before China not only became a more capitalist, more responsible global actor, but also a more open society. “Just stay the course,” this logic implied. Keep trading and continue interacting and the tonic effects of engagement will slowly make China more convergent with the existing liberal democratic order.
This was an optimism best limned by Francis Fukuyama in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, in which he wrote that with “the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism,” the world was experiencing a “triumph of the Western ideal.” The counter-scenario — namely that China’s Leninist, one-party state did not see itself as part of this grand global metamorphosis — hardly seemed credible to engagement proponents who viewed “the West” as possessing the magic keys to history’s very intention and direction.
法兰西斯·福山在他的1992年的书《历史的终结及最后之人》中对这种乐观态度做了最好的描述，他在书中他写到 “在穷尽了所有的可能的替代西方自由主义的其他系统时”世界就会经历一个“西方理想的胜利。”反过来的情况 --就是中共国的列宁主义，一党专政并没有把自己看成是这种宏大的全球变化的一部分， —对于把“西方”看作是拥有解开历史意图和方向的神奇钥匙的接触政策的支持者来说是几乎不可能的。
Lulled by such rhetoric and a relatively sedate Chinese leadership, Pres. George W. Bush mandated his Secretary of Treasury, Hank Paulson, to establish the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue5, which was designed to resolve disruptive tensions between the U.S. and China while prodding Beijing into becoming a “responsible stakeholder.”
“Closed politics cannot be a permanent feature of Chinese society,” Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick later opined. “It is simply not sustainable. As economic growth continues, better-off Chinese will want a greater say in the future and pressure builds for political reform.”
At Bush’s request, Secretary of Treasury Hank Paulson established the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which inspired optimism about the future of the U.S.-China economic relationship — before the 2008 financial crisis hit. Credit: Chris Greenberg / White House 在布什的要求下，国务卿汉克·保尔森建立了战略与经济对话，这激励了在2008年金融危机袭来之前的对于未来美中经济关系的乐观主义。 图片来源：白宫Chris Greenberg
At an early S.E.D. in Washington that I attended, some opinion makers even believed that a more democratic landfall for China was already on the horizon. John L. Thornton, then Board Chairman of the Brookings Institution, optimistically wrote in 2008, “The debate in China is no longer about whether to have democracy…but about when and how.”
Encouraged by such predictions, the Bush administration continued emphasizing engagement as a way to goad Beijing into acting more responsibly. As it became economically more powerful and globally more important, seeking to guide China’s progress in positive ways did make sense. But there was a problem: as engagement proceeded, Sino-U.S. relations showed a growing deficit of reciprocity and balance, and the concessions necessary to keep the relationship functional kept falling disproportionately on U.S. shoulders even as the playing field grew more and more out of level.
Then came the 2008 U.S. financial crisis. As America’s economy spun into crisis while China’s economic growth rates remained high, a wave of exuberant hubris swept Chinese leadership circles and a new element was injected into the bi-lateral equation: Party leaders in Beijing began imagining that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (有中国特色的社会主义) was possibly equal, if not superior, to the American model. With the U.S. seemingly in decline, Chinese leaders became even less inclined to level the playing field and adopt a more reciprocal approach.
翻译：johnwallis； PR: leftgun；Page：拱卒
The Death of Engagement / 中美接触终止
Part VII / 第七部
Barack Obama assumed office as the “first pacific president” and, like his predecessors, spent his first term frozen in the aspic of engagement.
He became the first president to shelve a visit with the Dalai Lama to mollify Beijing. Then his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, went to Beijing where she declared that U.S. support for contentious issues like human rights would not be allowed to “interfere with the search for solutions to other such important issues as the recent economic crisis and the global climate-change crisis.” Although “some believe that a rising China was by definition an adversary,” she declared, “the United States and China can benefit from and contribute to each other’s successes.”
奥巴马以 "第一任太平洋总统 "的身份上任，和他的前任一样，他的第一任期在接触中的枷锁下虚度过的。
他成为第一位搁置与达赖喇嘛（Dalai Lama）的访问来安抚北京的总统。随后，他的国务卿希拉里-克林顿（Hillary Clinton）前往北京，在那儿她宣称，不允许美国对诸如人权等有争议问题的支持来"干扰对其他诸如最近的经济危机和全球气候变化等更重要问题的解决方案"。尽管 "有些人认为，崛起的中共国顾名思义是一个对手，"但她宣称，"美国和中国可以从对方的成功中获益，并为对方的成功做出贡献"。
Hillary Clinton famously advocated for human rights at the 1995 Beijing Women’s Conference, but as Obama’s Secretary of State, she said human rights would not be allowed to “interfere with the search for solutions.” Credit: William J. Clinton Presidential Library 希拉里-克林顿在1995年北京妇女大会上倡导人权，但作为奥巴马的国务卿，她表示不允许人权 "干扰寻求解决方案"。 资料来源：威廉-J-克林顿总统图书馆。
Despite his administration’s efforts to respectfully signal that the U.S. was looking to establish a more friendly, responsive and reciprocal relationship, when President Obama visited China in April 2009, he was treated with a confusing coolness. As I watched his summit with Hu Jintao unfold, what was striking was that there was no friendly banter at a joint press conference, no university speech with an open question and answers period, and none of the bonhomie or warmth that had animated the Nixon, Carter and Clinton summits. The lack of solicitude shown by Beijing was perhaps a result of the growing conviction that if the U.S. was now in decline, and China was rising, Chinese leaders no longer needed to show deference. As Kissinger observed, they “no longer felt constrained by a sense of apprenticeship to Western technology and institutions.” Instead, they now felt “confident enough to reject, and even on occasion subtly mock, American lectures on reform.”
尽管他的政府努力恭敬地发出信号，表明美国希望建立一种更加友好、顺应民意和互惠的关系，但当奥巴马总统2009年4月访问中国时，他受到了令人困惑的冷遇。当我看到他与胡锦涛的峰会时，引人注目的是，并没有在联合新闻发布会上的友好洽谈，也没有公开的大学演讲，更没有尼克松、卡特和克林顿峰会时的友好和热情。北京方面缺乏关怀，也许是因为他们越来越相信，如果美国正在衰退，而中国正在崛起，那么中国领导人就不再需要表示尊敬。正如基辛格（Kissinger）所观察到的那样，他们 "不再感到受制于对西方技术和制度的学徒感"。"相反，他们现在觉得 "有足够的信心拒绝，甚至有时轻巧地嘲弄美国的改革导论"。
This attitude was manifested by a new arrogance in the South China Sea where China’s Navy, Coast Guard, and even fishing fleet were being deployed to enforce China’s extensive and controversial maritime claims and to provocatively challenge neighbors as well as the U.S. 7th Fleet. One PLA general explained China’s changed demeanor and new muscular posture this way: “We were weak. Now we are strong.”
But while China seemed to see little need, and less dignity, in making concessions, issues such as the North Korean nuclear threat, global pandemics, and the global challenge of climate6 prompted the Obama administration to soldier on in their quest to remain “engaged.”
但是，尽管中共国似乎认为没必要，也会失去体面去做出让步，但朝鲜核威胁、全球流行病以及气候挑战等问题促使奥巴马政府坚持他们的要求以保持 "接触 "。
When Obama met with Hu Jintao, he was shown little of the warmth that had been offered to previous presidents. Credit: Pete Souza/White House 当奥巴马与胡锦涛会面时，他几乎没有受到像前几任总统的热情对待。 资料来源：Pete Souza/白宫
“We welcome China’s rise,” Obama kept insisting “I absolutely believe that China’s peaceful rise is good for the world, and it’s good for America.”
Accepting a “rising” China “as a prosperous and successful power” was also part of his Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg’s hope chest. “Strategic assurances” were, in his view, the best way to convince Chinese leaders that their rise need “not come at the expense of the security and well-being of others.” Despite China’s frosty responses, he remained committed to forging what he described as a new “core, if tacit bargain.”
接受一个 "崛起 "的中国 "成为一个繁荣和成功的大国"，也是他的副国务卿詹姆斯-斯坦伯格（James Steinberg）希望的一部分。在他看来，"战略保证 "是让中国领导人相信他们的崛起 "不需要以牺牲他人的安全和福祉为代价 "的最佳途径。尽管中国反应冷淡，但他仍然致力于打造他所描述的新的 "核心，如果心照不宣的话"。
Even when Obama generously (some say foolishly) finally recognized China’s own “core interests” (核心利益) — including their claim to the entire South China Sea and other non-negotiable territorial claims to Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Macau and Hong Kong — Beijing did not temper its increasingly aggressive nationalism. As Liu Mingfu, author of the 2010 China Dream, bluntly put it, Beijing’s “grand goal” was “to become number one in the world” and displace the U.S.
即使奥巴马慷慨地（有人说是愚蠢地）最终承认了中共国的 "核心利益"--包括他们对整个南中国海的主张，以及对西藏、新疆、台湾、澳门和香港的其他不可谈判的领土要求--北京也没有收敛其日益咄咄逼人的民族主义。正如《2010年中国梦》的作者刘明福直言，北京的 "宏伟目标 "是 "成为世界第一"，取代美国。
Such grand plans were exacerbating imbalances, inequities and anxieties in the bilateral relationship. General Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency and head of U.S. Cyber Command, was soon assessing the theft of U.S. intellectual property as “the greatest transfer of wealth in human history.”
这种宏伟的计划正在加剧双边关系的不平衡、不平等和焦虑。美国国家安全局局长、美国网络司令部负责人基思-亚历山大（Keith Alexander）将军很快评价美国知识产权被盗是 "人类历史上最大的财富转移"。
When Xi Jinping ascended the throne in 2012, he called for the realization of his globally ambitious “China Dream” (中国梦). By 2014, he was also declaring that it was time for some “great power diplomacy” (大国外交) to make “China’s voice heard.”
习近平2012年掌权时，他就要求实现全球宏伟的 "中国梦"。到了2014年，他还宣称，是时候进行一些 "大国外交"，发出 "中国的声音 "了。
At a 2015 meeting at the White House, Xi Jinping promised Obama he would not militarize newly built islands in the South China Sea. Credit: Gary Cameron/Reuters 2015年在白宫的一次会议上，习近平向奥巴马承诺不会将南海新建岛屿军事化。 资料来源：Gary Cameron/《路透社》
With Xi being more assertive and demonstrating less flexibility and collegiality towards American counterparts than even Hu, a critical inter-personal lubricant that had allowed previous leaders to bond went missing. The resulting lack of trust and friction did not go unnoticed. In 2015, for instance, Xi promised Obama in the White House Rose Garden not to militarize newly built islands in the South China Sea — then, right away, did exactly that.
Now that China felt less restrained by economic and military weakness, the bilateral relationship entered a new era. It was hardly surprising that an ever-broadening spectrum of American stakeholders began complaining about a playing field that was more and more unlevel. At one point, even President Obama was reported to have asked two of his senior advisers, Lawrence H. Summers and Jeffrey A. Bader, “Did you guys give away too much?”
现在，中共国感觉到经济和军事上的弱点不再那么受制于人，双边关系进入了一个新时代。越来越多的美国利益相关者开始抱怨竞争环境越来越不公平，这并不奇怪。据报道，有一次，甚至连奥巴马总统都问他的两位高级顾问劳伦斯-H-萨默斯（Lawrence H. Summers）和杰弗里-A-贝德（Jeffrey A. Bader）："你们是不是让步太多？"
Growing American frustration was brought home to me personally one afternoon in 2012 when I received an unexpected call from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. With both exasperation and bewilderment, she asked, “Why can’t I get any traction with my Chinese counterpart, State Councilor Dai Bingguo? I’ve been trying to find the reset button with him, but I keep hitting a wall. What do they want?”
“Opening gave the Chinese leverage over us,” reflected former Secretary of State George Schultz. “Much of the history of Sino-U.S. relations since the normalization in 1978 was “a series of Chinese defined ‘obstacles’… that the U.S. has been tasked to overcome in order to preserve the overall relationship.”
"开放给了中国人对我们的筹码，"前国务卿乔治-舒尔茨（George Schultz）反思道。"自1978年中美关系正常化以来，中美关系的历史大多是 "一系列中国定义的'障碍'......美国的任务是克服这些障碍，以维护整体关系。"
The Obama Administration was increasingly frustrated that they weren’t making sufficient headway with China’s leadership as the years passed. Here, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrives for a meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Beijing February 21, 2009. Credit: REUTERS/Oliver Weiken/Pool (CHINA) 随着时间的推移，奥巴马政府越来越感到沮丧，因为他们没有与中共国领导层取得足够的进展。2009年2月21日，时任美国国务卿希拉里-克林顿抵达北京与中国总理温家宝会面。 资料来源：《路透社》/Oliver Weiken/Pool (中国)
It was hardly surprising when the Obama administration finally began its “pivot to East Asia”7 and called for a redeployment of some 60 percent of the U.S. Navy’s maritime forces to the Asia region. But, lest Chinese officials retaliate and completely capsize the notion of engagement, Obama continued to insist that “a thriving China is good for America.” As late as 2016, he was reiterating, “I’ve been very explicit in saying that we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful, rising China.”
当奥巴马政府最终开始 "向东亚倾斜 "，并要求将美国海军约60%的海上力量重新部署到亚洲地区时，这一点并不奇怪。但是，为了避免中共国官员报复以及彻底打消接触的念头，奥巴马继续坚持 "一个繁荣的中国对美国有利"。直到2016年，他还在重申："我一直非常明确地表示，我们对一个被削弱、受威胁的中国的恐惧，要比一个成功、崛起的中国更甚。"
For such an argument to remain convincing, however, the promise of ongoing Chinese political reform — which implied a certain quotient of liberalization, if not democratization — had to be in the mix. But, with Xi moving in an increasingly autocratic and pugnacious direction and with many of his fellow Party leaders viewing engagement as a covert strategy to engender “peaceful evolution,” even regime change, U.S. engagers found themselves drifting in increasingly compass-less waters.
In Beijing’s defense, it must be said that their reaction was not pure paranoia. For there was an insoluble contradiction at the heart of the vision of engagement: If getting along with America meant making money, the Party was fine. But, if it also meant democratizing, and possibly putting itself out of business, the Party was an unwilling player. Engagement may have been “a good strategy initially,” notes China analyst Tanner Greer, but because Xi came to view the policy as designed to politically change one-party rule in China, it “terrified” the Party and “they took action to defeat it.”
在北京的辩护中，必须说，他们的反应并非纯粹的偏执狂。因为在接触的愿景中，有一个无法解决的矛盾。如果与美国相处意味着赚钱，那么党就会愿意干。但是，如果这也意味着民主化，并可能使把党搞垮，那么党就是一个不愿意的接触者。中国分析人士坦纳-格里尔（Tanner Greer）指出，接触最初可能是 "一个好的策略"，但由于习近平开始将这一政策视为旨在从政治上改变中共国的一党统治，它 "吓坏了 "党，"他们采取了行动来击败它"。
Despite repeated efforts by frustrated Obama administration officials to find the magic key to making relations more balanced and reciprocal8, Beijing failed to respond in a meaningful enough way. It took the victory of Donald Trump and his anti-China Sancho Panzas — Steve “These are two systems that are incompatible” Bannon and Peter “Death by China” Navarro — to call out China.
尽管沮丧的奥巴马政府官员一再努力寻找使关系更加平衡和互惠的神奇钥匙，但北京未能以足够有意义的方式作出回应。直到唐纳德-川普（Donald Trump）的上任和他的反共护卫-史蒂夫-班农（Steve Bannon）"这是两个不兼容的系统 “ 和彼得-纳瓦罗 "中共国之死 “的主张，才对中共国叫板。
“These are two systems that are incompatible,” proclaimed Bannon. “One side is going to win, one side is going to lose.”
Such voices were extreme, but they accurately described an interaction that had become less and less in America’s interest.
编辑：【喜马拉雅战鹰团】Edited by：【Himalaya Hawk Squad】