Loading

分析王立强对中共军方间谍网络的披露 【翻译】

ASPI strategies 澳洲战略政策研究所

Analysing Wang Liqiang’s claims about China’s military networks

分析王立强对中共军方间谍网络的披露

12 Dec 2019|Alex Joske

2019 年12月12日 周安澜

After Wang Liqiang’s request for asylum in Australia, some commentators have cast doubt on his claims. Some of these doubts are rooted in a misunderstanding about Wang’s role, casting him as a professional intelligence officer when he has never claimed to be one.

王立强在澳大利亚寻求庇护后,一些评论人员对他披露的中共内幕提出质疑。其中一些疑问是由于对王身份的误解。有些人认为他是职业情报人员,但是王立强自己从未这样承认过。

China’s intelligence agencies are not like ours; the widespread use of cutouts and non-professional agents, the effect of well-connected princelings in the intelligence apparatus and the integration with business mark Chinese intelligence tradecraft.

中国的情报机构与我们不同。广泛使用替身,非专业情报人员,利用人脉广泛的太子党的影响,以及与商业人士联手是中国情报工作的特色。

But the most valuable part of Wang’s story has eluded attention—his accusation that Xiang Xin, a Hong Kong businessman he claims to have worked for, sits at the centre of a People’s Liberation Army network. Many of Xiang’s reported military links have already been uncovered by Taiwanese media.

但王的故事中最有价值的部分引起了人们的注意 - 他披露他曾经为香港商人向心工作,而向心处于中共军方间谍网络的核心位置。台湾媒体已经发现了向心与军方的许多联系。

The Taiwanese government moved swiftly to stop Xiang and his wife Gong Qing—also alleged by Wang to be an intelligence officer—from leaving the country after Wang’s story aired on Australian television. They are now under investigation. Last week, a senior Taiwanese government official told the New York Times that Xiang’s and Gong’s ‘relationship with China’s People’s Liberation Army was extraordinarily close’.

在澳大利亚电视台播出王立强的故事后,台湾政府迅速采取行动,阻止向心和他的妻子龚青(王称她也是中国的情报官员)离开台湾。他们目前正在接受调查。上周,台湾政府一位高级官员对《纽约时报》表示,向心和龚青“与中国人民解放军的关系异常密切”。

In 2008, Xiang’s main company, China Innovation Investment Limited (then known as Sino Technology Investments Company Limited) posted a notice to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange announcing it was establishing a defence technology investment fund with a remarkable steering committee.

2008年,向心的主要公司中国创新投资有限公司(当时称为中国技术投资有限公司)在香港证券交易所发布了公告,宣布将成立由出色的指导委员会组成的国防技术投资基金。

The head was to be none other than Nie Li—China’s first female lieutenant general and an adviser to and former deputy director of a Chinese military defence technology agency, the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). She is also the daughter of one of the Chinese revolution’s most lauded marshals, Nie Rongzhen. The only other members of China Innovation’s steering committee were two retired major generals from COSTIND.

董事会主席是中国第一位女中将聂力,也是前中国国防科学技术工业委员会的顾问和副主任。她还是中共元帅聂荣臻的女儿。中国创新公司指导委员会的其他成员是来自国防科工委的两名退休将军。

Wang has alleged that Nie Li and her husband, General Ding Henggao, sent Xiang to Hong Kong in 1993 as an intelligence officer. Ding was the director of COSTIND at the time.

王声称,聂力和她的丈夫丁衡高上将于1993年将向心派往香港,担任情报官员。丁衡高当时是国防科工委主任。

A large body of open-source information also points to Xiang’s network. Aside from the steering committee’s three generals, at least six of Xiang’s associates can be linked to COSTIND:

大量公开信息也指向了向心的关系网络。除了指导委员会的三名将军外,至少有六名向心的同伙可以与国防科工委连上关系:

• His wife, Gong, worked in the China Defense Science and Technology Information Center. The centre was described in a US Congressional Research Service report as the public-facing name of COSTIND’s Intelligence Research Institute.

他的妻子龚青在中国国防科技信息中心工作。该中心在美国国会研究服务处的一份报告中被描述为国防科工委情报研究所的对外名称。

• In 2005, Pang Weizhong was a director of SNG Hong Kong Limited, a company partially owned by China Innovation. Pang previously worked as an executive at two of COSTIND’s companies in Shenzhen, border from Hong Kong. Company documents show Pang has listed his address as a location that serves as the Beijing office of Xiang’s companies. He has also worked in a charitable scientific association that had Nie Li as its honorary president.

2005年,庞维忠(音译Pang Weizhong)担任SNG 香港有限公司(中国创新投资有限公司的一部分)的董事。庞以前曾在深圳的两家公司担任执行官。公司文件显示,庞将他的地址列为向心公司在北京的办事处。他还曾在聂力任名誉会长的一家慈善科学协会工作。

• Li Tongyu was an executive director of China Innovation from 2003 to 2005. He has also worked for a state-owned missile manufacturer supervised by COSTIND since 1989. In 1999, he became deputy CEO of three COSTIND-linked companies in Hong Kong, including China Satellite Launch Agents. The company marketed the Chinese military’s satellite launch services to foreign clients and has been described by PLA expert James Mulvenon as ‘one of [COSTIND’s] most important companies’. Li is currently an executive at China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation—China’s state-owned missile and satellite manufacturer—where he heads the Long March 11 rocket program.

李同玉(音译,Li Tongyu)2003年至2005年担任中国创新执行董事。 1989年开始在由国防科工委监督的国有导弹制造厂工作。 1999年,他成为三家与国防科工委相关的香港公司的副首席执行官,其中包括中国卫星发射代理。该公司向外国客户销售中国军方的卫星发射服务,被解放军专家詹姆斯·穆尔文宁(James Mulvenon)称为“ 国防科工委最重要的公司之一”。李先生目前是中国国有的导弹和卫星制造商,中国航天科技集团公司的高管,他领导着长征11号火箭计划。

• Luo Xiuqing worked as a senior executive in two COSTIND-supervised defence companies before joining China Innovation as executive director and chairman from 2003 to 2005.

罗秀卿(音译,Luo Xiuqing)曾在两家受囯防科工委监管的国防公司中担任高级主管,然后于2003年至2005年加入中国创新担任执行董事兼董事长。

• Wang Qingyu was non-executive director and chairman of China Innovation from 2005 to 2009. Before joining the company, he was president of a university administered by COSTIND and an executive in one of China’s largest arms manufacturers.

王庆玉(音譯,Wang Qingyu)从2005年至2009年担任中国创新的非执行董事兼董事长。在加入该公司之前,他曾在由囯防科工委管理的一所大学任校长,也曾任中国兵器装备集团总公司局长。

• Guo Yijun has served alongside Xiang as a director of Takenaka Industry Company Limited in Hong Kong. He is also general manager of a Beijing company that is majority owned by a company set up by Xiang and his wife. A book chapter on China’s defence industry co-authored by Guo in 1987 indicates he worked in COSTIND. In 1994, he emerged as general manager of a company in mainland China established with funds from COSTIND’s best-known front company, New Era Group.

郭亦军(音译,Guo Yijun),与向心一起担任香港Takenaka工业有限公司董事。他还是一家北京公司的总经理,该公司由向心和他的妻子成立並绝大多数拥有。 1987年,在一本有关中国国防工业的书中,郭在他合写的其中一章中提到他曾在国防科工委工作。 1994年,他出任由国防科工委出资成立,旗下最有名的门面企业“新时代集团”公司总经理。

These examples show Xiang’s close ties to China’s defence system. His public biography is vague about his time in mainland China and simply notes that he graduated from Nanjing University of Science and Technology—then subordinate to COSTIND—and ‘has worked in a number of large organisations in the PRC’. But China Innovation’s investment activity—a litany of deals with Chinese defence companies such as Norinco Group—makes it clear that its focus is on technologies with military applications.

这些例子表明,向心与中国的国防系统有着密切的联系。他的公开传记对他在中国大陆的生活介绍很含糊,只是指出他毕业于南京科技大学(当时隶属于国防科工委),并且“曾在中国许多大型企业中工作”。但是,中国创新的投资活动,例如与中国兵器工业集团等一系列与中国国防相关公司的密切合作清楚地表明,它的重点是军事应用技术。

Perhaps the most intriguing part of Xiang’s story comes from his earliest days in Hong Kong. In 1994, just after he moved there, he established an investment fund called New Times First Capital, now called New Times Global Capital. Details about the fund are nearly impossible to find. However, the Panama papers, a massive leak of data on tax-haven companies, reveal that New Times Global Capital is registered to an address in the British Virgin Islands.

向心故事中最有趣的部分也许来自他在香港的最早时期。 1994年,在他搬到那里之后,他建立了一个名为“新时代第一基金”的投资基金,现在称为“新时代环球基金”。有关该基金的详细信息几乎找不到。但是,在巴拿马文件大量披露出的避税公司的信息中,表明新时代全球基金已在英属维尔京群岛有注册地址。

Xiang has primarily owned his companies through opaque firms registered in jurisdictions like Niue, Samoa and the Bahamas.

向心拥有的公司主要是通过在纽埃,萨摩亚和巴哈马等司法管辖区注册的不透明公司。

How were Xiang and Gong able to emerge from mainland China in the early 1990s with the funds to establish and acquire their companies?

在19世紀90年代初期,向心和龚青如何能在中国拥有资金,并且成立和收购他们的公司呢?

New Times Global Capital’s name may offer one clue. In Chinese, it begins with the phrase Xinshidai, the same as COSTIND’s main front company, New Era, or Xinshidai, Group. New Times’ logo, used by most of Xiang’s companies including China Innovation, also has striking similarities to New Era Group’s.

新时代环球基金的名称可能提供一个线索。在中文中,以“新时代”开头,与国防科工委的主要门面公司 “新时代集团”相同。包括中国创新在内的大多数向心的公司使用的新时代徽标,也与新时代集团的公司徽标有着惊人的相似之处。

Is it possible that Xiang Xin is using this iconography and hiring COSTIND veterans to give the impression that he and his companies enjoy COSTIND’s blessing? Maybe, but it’s unlikely that Nie Li, former deputy director of COSTIND, would head the steering committee of an investment fund set up by a company misusing COSTIND’s reputation.

向心是否有可能使用这个公司徽标,并雇用国防科工委的退伍军人,让人觉得他和他的公司享有国防科工委的支持呢?也许是。但是国防科工委的前副主任聂力,不太可能在一家滥用国防科工委声誉的公司的投资基金指导委员会做负责人。

After combining Wang’s allegations with scholarly studies of the Chinese military and Xiang’s publicly reported activities, a startling picture of Chinese military and intelligence activity emerges.

把王立强的指控,与对中国军方和向心的公开活动進行深入的研究之后,出现了令人震惊的中国军事和情报活动图景。

In the 1990s, China’s military was an ‘entrepreneurial army’ that became one of the country’s most important business actors. With COSTIND at the forefront of much of the PLA’s business activity, the military experienced skyrocketing levels of corruption and was prolific in its smuggling of everything from missiles to luxury cars.

在19世纪90年代,中国军队是一支“企业军”,成为该国最重要的商业参与者之一。由于国防科工委处于解放军许多商业活动的最前沿,军方陷入急剧的腐败,并且走私了从导弹到豪华轿车的所有物品。

In one case, military smugglers reportedly even opened fire on Chinese customs officials trying to intercept them. In this world, intelligence officers can be highly autonomous, run violent and messy operations, and have to build up their own networks of loyal adjutants without patrons in Beijing.

在一个案例中,军队走私者甚至向试图拦截他们的中国海关官员开枪。在他们的世界里,情报人员可以高度自治,进行暴力和无节制的行动,并且在没有北京支持的情况下建立自己的忠实联盟。

COSTIND also served as a central agency for intelligence on defence technology. Using the ‘New Era’ business empire as cover, COSTIND officers have even been accused of attempting to steal foreign military technology. Its companies in Hong Kong have been reported to be involved in brazen political interference. Liu Chaoying, the daughter of a PLA general who worked with Chinese military intelligence to funnel donations to the US Democratic National Committee in 1996, was an executive at the Hong Kong subsidiary of the state-owned missile manufacturer supervised by COSTIND.

国防科工委还曾担任国防技术情报的中央机构。利用“新时代”的商业帝国作为掩饰,国防科工委军官甚至被指控企图窃取外国军事技术。据报道,其在香港的公司卷入了明目张胆的政治干预。刘超英(音译,Liu Chaoying)是一位解放军将军的女儿,曾与中国军事情报部门合作,她是一家在国防科工委监督下的,国有导弹制造商在香港的子公司的高管,在1996年向美国民主党全国委员会捐款。

As intelligence agencies pore over Wang Liqiang’s claims, they will likely find many of them difficult or even impossible to verify. But the insights he offers into an alleged Chinese military intelligence network require close and serious analysis of the type that ASIO has publicly said it is conducting.

随着情报机构对王立强披露事实的深入调查,他们可能会发现其中许多事情很难甚至不可能验证。但他对涉嫌的中共军事情报网络的揭露需要进行进一步仔细认真的分析。澳大利亚安全情报组织公开表示正在开展调查。

原文链接

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/analysing-wang-liqiangs-claims-about-chinas-military-networks/

翻译: Percy

【秘密翻译组】