新闻来源：The Daily Mail《每日邮报》；作者：Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg；发布时间：13 July 2020 / 2020年7月13日

翻译/简评：cathy r；校对：孙行者；审核：InAHurry；Page：拱卒

简评：

中共国通过一个个案例告诉人们隐藏在政治、网络、商业里的看不见的黑手在伸向和平环境中生活的人们，人们要想生活得好，没有忧虑，就要灭掉中共，因为它永远不可能成为你的朋友。

原文：

Seduced by China's honeytrap spies: Book that lays bare how deeply the Chinese have infiltrated Britain reveals how they steal intelligence using blackmail, money... and sex

受中共国甜蜜间谍的诱惑：本书揭示了中共在英国渗透的深度，揭示了他们如何通过勒索，金钱...和性贿赂窃取情报

● Ian Clement fell for 'the oldest trick in the book' in Beijing for the 2008 Olympics

● 伊恩·克莱门特在北京为２００８年奥运会跌入”有历史以来最古老的诡计“

● Politicians and businessmen in the West are still laying themselves open to China

● 西方政客和商人仍旧对中共国张开怀抱

● China uses thousands of amateur information collectors for its espionage

● 中共国为间谍活动动用了成千上万的业余信息收集员

Londoner Ian Clement learned the hard way not to trust the Chinese regime. He was in Beijing for the 2008 Olympics, on an official visit as Deputy Mayor of London, Boris Johnson’s number two, when he was approached by a gorgeous girl at a party.

伦敦人伊恩·克莱门特历尽艰难才学到了不要信任中共政权。因为２００８年奥运会，他作为伦敦副市长，鲍尔斯·约翰逊的二号人物对北京进行官方访问。在一个晚会上他遇到了一个曼妙的女郎。

It was a honey trap, ‘the oldest trick in the book,’ as he later recalled, but he threw caution to the wind and followed her lead.

这是一个甜蜜的陷阱，“有历史以来最古老的诡计”, 他后来回忆道，但他把小心抛到脑后，跟随了她的引诱。

After a couple of glasses of wine, he asked her back to his hotel room. He later awoke from what he believes was a drugged sleep to find she was on her way out of the door and his room had been ransacked. ‘My wallet was open. She had plainly gone through it but I knew she wasn’t a simple thief because nothing was missing.’ The contents of his BlackBerry had also been downloaded.

在几杯红酒过后，他把她带到他的宾馆房间。他后来从他相信是被下了催眠药的梦中醒来，发现她正要离开，他的房间已被翻了个遍。“我的钱包被打开。她明显地翻过我的钱包，但我知道她不是一个简单的小偷因为我什么也没有丢。”他的黑莓手机的内容也被下载了。

Clement was heavily involved in London’s Olympic bid and was in the Chinese capital to build contacts with potential investors for the London Games.

克莱门特深入地参与了伦敦申奥，当时在中共国的首都是去与伦敦奥运会的潜在投资者联系。

He said the woman, an agent of the Chinese secret service, must have been hunting for plans and details of who he was meeting. He told newspapers when the story emerged a year later, ‘I wasn’t thinking straight’ — an attitude that neatly sums up the way that, a decade on, too many politicians and businessmen in the West are still laying themselves open to seductive overtures from China.

他说这个女人，中共国情报机关代理人，肯定是在找他和谁会见的计划和细节。他在一年后，故事浮出水面后告诉报纸说，“我没有用脑子想。”——这个恰到好处的态度总结了所有人的做法：十年以来，太多西方的政客和商人仍旧对中共国的诱惑姿态敞开大门。

In the early 1990s Britain’s MI5 wrote a protection manual for business people visiting China. ‘Be especially alert for flattery and over-generous hospitality,’ it advised. ‘Westerners are more likely to be the subject of long-term, low-key cultivation, aimed at making “friends”.

在1990年代早期，英国的安全局为去中共国的商人写过保护手册。它建议“对奉承和过于热情的好客之道要特别警惕。因为西方人更容易成为长期、暗暗的培养对象，目标是和你成为‘朋友’。”

‘The aim of these tactics is to create a debt of obligation on the part of the target, who will eventually find it difficult to refuse inevitable requests for favours in return.’

“这些策略的目的是使目标产生一种亏欠感，最后他会觉得很难拒绝那些无法回避的，回报之前的‘好处’的请求。”

That advice is even more relevant now than it was 30 years ago. But many still ignore it.

这个建议比30年前更有用处，但许多人仍忽视了它。

The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that between 2011 and 2018 China was involved in 90 per cent of economic espionage cases.

美国司法部估计在2011和2018年间，中共国参与了90%的经济间谍案。

Beijing devotes enormous resources to both industrial espionage, aimed at commercial secrets, and state espionage, aimed at government and military secrets. China has a huge appetite for other countries’ technology — whether obtained legally or otherwise, it doesn’t care.

北京为获取商业机密的工业间谍，和为获取政府和军事机密的国家间谍提供了大量的资源。中共国对其他国家的技术有巨大的胃口，对是否合法地取得技术，中共一点也不关心。

Sucking up information like a vacuum cleaner, it not only deploys its diplomatic and intelligence services to facilitate the theft of intellectual property, but also reaches deeply into overseas Chinese communities to recruit both agents of influence as well as informants and spies.

像一个真空吸尘器一样吸取信息，中共不仅安排外交和情报服务促进知识产权盗窃，还深入海外中国人社区招募利益代言人以及线人和间谍。

In the United States, a senior counter-intelligence figure at the FBI observed in late 2018 that the bureau had handled thousands of complaints about, and investigations into, non-traditional espionage activity, mostly concerning China. ‘Every rock we turn over, every time we look for it, it is not only there — it is worse than anticipated,’ he said.

在美国，联邦调查局的高级反情报人员发现在2018年底调查局处理了成千上万次投诉和调查非传统间谍活动，大部分与中共国有关。“每个我们调查的地方，每次我们寻找，它（间谍活动）不仅存在，而且比预期的更糟。”他说。

While traditional forms of espionage rely on specialised training, China has adopted what is known as the ‘thousand grains of sand’ strategy.

传统的间谍形式依靠专门训练，而中共国采取的是一种“千粒沙”战略。

It uses thousands of amateur information collectors. Professionals, business people, students and even tourists are encouraged to provide information to handlers in embassies and consulates.

它使用成千上万的业务信息收集人，鼓励各种专业人士、商人、学生和甚至旅游者为大使馆和领事馆的人员提供信息。

This is no haphazard operation but is directed by professionals in the intelligence services who target particular pieces of intellectual property, often working with factories and research labs in China, and then finding people who can acquire what they seek.

这并不是任意的行为，而是由以某种知识产权为目标的情报机关的专业人士指挥，常常和中共国的工厂和研究实验室合作，再找到能取得他们需要的东西的人。

Beijing is not averse to straightforward theft, of course. In 2018, equipment provided by the Huawei telecoms giant — now controversially embedded in Britain — was implicated in the theft of confidential information from the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa.

北京对于直接盗窃一点也不反感。在2018年，由现在有争议的安插在英国的华为电信巨头提供的设备涉嫌在亚的斯亚贝巴德非洲联盟总部盗窃机密信息。

Every night for five years, masses of data was downloaded and sent to servers in Shanghai. Huawei maintains that these data leaks did not originate from its technology because although it supplied ‘data centre facilities’, those facilities ‘did not have any storage or data transfer functions’.

五年以来的每个晚上，大量的信息被下载后传输到了在上海的服务器。华为坚称这些数据不是从它的技术设备上泄露的，虽然它提供“数据中心设施”，但这些设施“没有存储或数据传输功能”。

Huawei has been accused many times by its suppliers and competitors of stealing their intellectual property. According to criminal charges brought by the U.S., there is said to be an official company policy of paying bonuses to employees who steal confidential information from competitors and even a schedule of payments, calibrated to the value of the stolen information.

华为曾多次被他的供应商和竞争对手许控告偷窃他们的知识产权。根据美国提出的犯罪指控，华为公司有政策为从竞争对手那里盗窃机密的雇员提供奖金，甚至有根据偷窃信息的价值进行奖励的清单。

A U.S. Department of Justice indictment alleges that every six months, the three Huawei regional operations supplying the most valuable stolen information are said to receive company awards. Huawei has denied the allegations and the Chinese government has also rejected the charges.

美国司法部的一份控告表明每六个月，为华为提供最有价值信息的三个地区运行机构会收到公司奖励。华为否认了该指控，中共国政府也拒绝了此控告。

CHINA’S civilian and military intelligence agents are trained in the art of cultivating ‘friends’. Sinophiles, and newcomers with a fascination for the culture, are especially vulnerable. After grooming, they may naively supply intelligence information, believing they are contributing to mutual understanding and harmony.

中共国的民间和军事情报间谍会训练培养“交朋友”的艺术。喜欢中国文化和对文化迷恋的新来者对此特别没有抵抗力。在一番照料之后，他们可能天真的提供情报信息，相信他们在为共同理解和和谐作贡献。

Ego, sex, ideology, patriotism, and especially money are all exploited to recruit spies. The rewards need not be great. In the case of commercial secrets, an engineer at a high-tech U.S. company might be offered a trip with expenses paid, plus a stipend to give a lecture at a university in China. The requests for more valuable information escalate until the target is hopelessly compromised.

自尊心、性、意识形态、爱国主义、特别是金钱都被用来吸收间谍人员。报酬不需很巨大。以商业间谍为例，为在美国高科技公司的工程师提供的可能已付费的旅行，加上在中共国大学讲课的津贴。对更有价值的信息的需求会不断升级，直到被锁定的目标绝望地被拖下水。

An FBI employee, Joey Chun, was convicted of supplying information about the bureau’s operations to Chinese agents in exchange for free international travel and visits to prostitutes.

联邦调查局的雇员乔伊·春被指控把调查局的活动信息提供给中共国代理人，以换取免费的国际旅行和嫖娼活动。

U. S. citizen Glenn Duffie Shriver earned big bucks, however. He fell in love with China on a summer study-programme visit and moved to Shanghai, where he responded to a newspaper advertisement seeking someone to write a paper on trade relations. He was paid $120 for a short report.

美国公民格伦·达菲·施赖弗赚了很多钱。他在因夏季学习活动而访问中共国时喜爱上了中共国，然后搬到了上海。他从刊登在报纸上广告中找到为贸易关系写文章的工作。他写的一个简短的报告能获得120美元。

Over time, ‘friendships’ were built and Shriver was offered more money. Then he was encouraged to seek employment in the U.S. State Department or the CIA and was paid large sums when he applied for positions.

随着时间的发展，施赖弗建立了更多的“友谊”，而且赚了更多的钱。他被鼓励去美国国务院或中央情报局应聘，当他申请职位时，他收到了大量的金钱。

He underwent a week of interviews for a CIA position with the National Clandestine Service but the agency was aware of his connections to Chinese intelligence.

他为中央情报局的国家秘密服务职位进行了一星期的面试，但中央情报局一直知道他和中共情报机关的联系。

At his sentencing hearing after being caught, he said things had spiralled out of control. He admitted being motivated by greed: ‘I mean, you know, large stacks of money in front of me.’

在他被捕后的问讯听证上，他说事情逐渐失去了控制。他承认是被贪婪推动的，“我的意思是，你知道，有大摞金钱放在你面前。”

If the target for recruitment is of Chinese heritage, they may be leant on to help the motherland. Some 50–60 million people of Chinese descent live elsewhere, a population the size of Britain’s.

如果被招募的对象有中国血统，他们可能被灌输要帮助祖国。总计5-6千万中国后裔在国外生活，相等于英国的总人口。

They are very diverse socially, politically, culturally, linguistically, and in their feelings about China. Many emigrated before the Chinese Communist Party came to power.

他们在社会上、政治上、文化上、语言上和对中共国的感觉上都非常不同。许多在中共当政之前就已移居海外。

But over the past two or three decades, Beijing has been propagating a version of ‘Chineseness’ aimed at binding overseas Chinese to the ‘ancestral homeland’.

但在过去的二十或三十年，北京一直在宣传一种“中国性”，意在把海外的中国人联结到“祖国故土”。

Trusted individuals sympathetic to the CCP, assisted by Chinese embassies and consulates, have taken over many of the established Chinese community and professional associations in North America and Western Europe.

同情中共的，被信任的个人，在中共国大使馆和领事馆帮助下，在北美和西欧占领了许多已成立的中国社区和职业联盟。

Among this diaspora, carrots and sticks are deployed to recruit agents. The carrots are promises of good jobs and houses if and when they return to China. The sticks include refusing visas and threats to harm families.

在移民社区里，招募间谍时使用了胡萝卜和大棒。胡萝卜是承诺当他们回到中共国的时候给与好的工作和房子。大棒包括拒绝签证和威胁伤害其家人。

Chinese students studying abroad are a particular focus. Graduate students may become sleeper agents, activated only if they find themselves in jobs with access to desirable information, particularly if it is of scientific, technological or military value.

中国海外留学生是特别的目标。研究生可能成为沉睡代理人，当他们从事有条件取得理想信息的工作时就会被启动，尤其是有科学、技术或军事价值的工作。

A programme called the Thousand Talents Plan aims to recruit highly qualified ethnic Chinese people to ‘return’ to China with the expertise and knowledge they’ve acquired abroad. Alternatively, those loyal to China can ‘remain in place’ to serve.

一项叫做千人计划的项目意在招募高资历的中国人带着在海外取得的专业技术和知识“回到”中共国，或者，这些忠于中共国的人可选择“留在位子上”服务中共。

The U.S. Department of Energy, whose work includes nuclear weapons and advanced R&D on energy, has been heavily targeted to this end. Around 35,000 foreign researchers are employed in the department’s labs, 10,000 of them from China. In Silicon Valley, around one in ten high-tech workers is from mainland China.

美国能源部，其工作包括核武器和先进的能源研发，被作为重点目标。大约3万5000外国研究人员被部门实验室雇佣，其中有1万人从中共国来。在硅谷，大约有十分之一的高科技工作人员从中国大陆来。

According to one report, so many scientists from the science and technology labs of Los Alamos have returned to Chinese universities and research institutes that people have dubbed them the ‘Los Alamos club’.

根据一份报告，许多洛斯阿拉莫斯科学和技术实验室的科学家回到了中共国大学和研究机构，人们把他们叫做“洛斯阿拉莫斯俱乐部”。

Sex, as we have seen already, is a means of entrapment and exploitation. There is seduction that leads to the direct theft of secrets, as in the case of Ian Clement.

性，像我们已经看到的，是一种陷阱和利用的工具。这些诱惑可以直接导致机密失窃，就像在伊恩·克莱门特案件中看到的一样。

Then there is seduction that leads to blackmail, using compromising photographs. In 2017 the former deputy head of MI6, Nigel Inkster, said that China’s agencies were using honey traps — meiren ji, literally ‘beautiful person plan’ — more often. In 2016 reports suggested that the Dutch ambassador to Beijing had been entrapped.

还有一种诱惑使用照片可以导致敲诈。在2017年，前军情六处的副处长奈杰尔·英克斯特说中共国的机构使用甜蜜陷阱——美人计，字面意思是“美人计划”越来越频繁了。2016年的报告显示荷兰驻北京大使曾陷入此圈套。

China’s intelligence agencies also exploit social media to approach potentially useful Westerners. In 2018, French authorities uncovered a Chinese programme to lure thousands of experts using fake accounts on LinkedIn. Posing as think-tank staff, entrepreneurs and consultants, the account operators told individuals that their expertise was of interest to a Chinese company, and offered them free trips to China.

中共国的情报部门也利用社交媒体来接近潜在可利用的西方人。在2018年，法国当局揭示了中共国通过LinkedIn上的假账户吸引成千上万专家的计划。他们装作是智库人员、企业家、顾问，告诉这些个人中共国企业对他们的专业有兴趣，可以为他们提供到中共国的免费旅行。

Those who accepted spent a few days being befriended through social activities and were then asked to provide information. It’s believed that some were photographed in compromising situations, such as accepting payments, making them prone to blackmail.

那些接受邀请的人在中共国呆了几天后，通过社交活动被当作朋友，他们会被要求提供信息。我们相信一些人被拍下可以用作威胁的照片，比如接受报酬。

The French exposé followed a similar one in Germany, where more than 10,000 experts and professionals were approached. Several hundred apparently expressed interest in the offers made to them.

法国的爆料发生在德国相似的爆料之后，在德国有超过1万的专家和专业人士被联络。据说有几百人表达了对邀请感兴趣。

In 2016 a Chinese secret service agent posing as a businessman used LinkedIn to contact a member of the German Bundestag, offering to pay him €30,000 for confidential information on his parliamentary work. The MP, who has not been named, accepted.

在2016年中共国情报部门代理人装作一个商人通过LinkedIn联系一个德国联邦议院成员，提出为他的议会工作的机密信息付他3万欧元。这位没有被指名的议员接受了（这笔交易）。

Chinese intelligence agencies have spent years cultivating relationships in Western universities and think-tanks, partly with the aim of winning friends over to the CCP’s point of view.

中共国情报机关花费了许多年年培养和西方大学以及智库的关系，部分目的在于赢得朋友支持中共的观点。

One of the most important organisations for this work is the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, whose 400 members include Chinese intelligence officers. Its stock-in-trade is academic exchanges and conferences, which are used as a way of gaining entry to the most closed circles of a host country.

这项工作最重要的组织之一是中共国“当代国际关系学院”，它的400个成员中包括了中共国的情报官员。它的惯用伎俩是学术交流和会议，将它们作为用来进入东道主国家最私密的圈子的途径。

It holds an annual dialogue with the EU’s Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and has met regularly with influential Washington think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, to discuss cyber security.

它每年举办与在巴黎的欧盟“安全研究机构”的对话，并定期和华盛顿有影响力的智库“战略和国际研究中心”会面，讨论网络安全。

These dialogues provide opportunities not only to create networks for intelligence gathering, but also shape the thinking of American and European experts, by, for example, presenting China as the victim of cyber intrusions and casting doubt on the U.S.’s ability to attribute hacking to China.

这些对话不仅为创造情报会面网络提供机会，也帮助塑造美国和欧洲专家的思想，比如把中共国作为网络入侵的受害者，为美国能够把中共国认定为黑客制造疑点。

Not surprisingly, universities in the West are the target of intensive influence efforts by the CCP. Since 2007, China’s People’s Liberation Army has sent more than 2,500 military scientists and engineers to study abroad, in the process developing research relationships with hundreds of top scientists across the globe.

毫不奇怪，西方的大学是中共重点影响的目标。自从2007年，中共国的解放军派出超过2500个军事科学家和工程师到外国学习，计划和全球的顶尖科学家发展研究合作关系。

They claim to be from the Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute, which, judging by the number of publications in which it’s cited, is one of the world’s leading centres of computer science and communications engineering.

他们声称来自郑州信息科学和技术学院，从它引用的出版物数量可以看出是世界领先的计算机科学和通信工程中心之一。

Yet the Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute does not actually exist. It has no website, no phone number and no buildings. It does have a Post Office Box in Henan province’s capital city, Zhengzhou, but that’s about it.

但是郑州信息科学和技术学院并不实际存在。它没有网址，没有电话号码，没有建筑物。它仅在河南省省会郑州有邮政信箱，仅此而已。

The name is, in fact, a cover for the university that trains China’s military hackers and signals intelligence officers, the People’s Liberation Army Information Engineering University.

学院的名字，实际上，是对训练中共国军事黑客和信号情报官员的大学——人民解放军信息工程大学的掩护。

What they are anxious to acquire from researchers in the West are things like the stream-processing technology, vital to the new-generation supercomputers that are used by the military for advanced aircraft design, combat simulation and testing nuclear missiles.

他们急于从西方研究者窃取的是信息流处理技术，新一代超级计算机的核心技术，被军方用来从事先进的飞机设计，战斗模拟和测试核导弹。

Western universities have displayed extraordinary naivety in their dealings with Chinese companies and universities, and are often unwilling to admit the risks, even when confronted with the evidence.

西方大学在与中共国企业和大学交往时显出非同寻常的天真，甚至在面对证据的时候，都不愿意承认风险。

The universities often have a strong financial incentive to keep themselves in the dark while defending the traditional scientific culture of openness and transparency, even though this is being systematically exploited by Beijing.

这些大学常常因为强烈的财务诱因，让自己在捍卫传统的开放和透明的科学文化时对中共国的间谍行为视而不见，这显然被北京系统性地利用了。

In Australia, in a massive and highly sophisticated hacking operation in 2018, large amounts of information on staff and students at the prestigious Australian National University were stolen, including names, addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, tax file numbers and student academic records.

在澳大利亚，一场大规模的，极为成熟的黑客攻击使备受尊敬的澳大利亚国家大学的大量工作人员和学生的信息被窃取，这里包括了姓名、地址、电话号码、护照号码、税务档案号和学生学业记录。

Many of this university’s students go on to senior positions in the civil service, security agencies and politics.

这所大学的许多学生会在今后从事行政事务、安全机构和政治的高级职位。

Security agencies around the world have noticed an alarming spike in cyber attacks on medical records. In August 2018 it was reported that 1.5 million medical records had been stolen from the Singapore government’s health database, in an attack experts believe came from state-based hackers in China.

世界各地的安全机构注意到了对医疗记录的令人吃惊的网络攻击。在2018年8月，150万医疗记录从新加坡政府的健康数据库中被窃取，专家认为此次攻击是由中共国的国家黑客发动。

Former UK consulate worker warns China will send spies to quash protests overseas

前英国领事馆工作人员曾警告中共国将派出间谍打压海外的抗议活动。

Simon Cheng, a former employee at the British consulate in Hong Kong, has expressed his concerns over Beijing's next crackdown move on pro-democracy activities overseas.

英国在香港领事馆的前雇员郑文杰表达了他对北京下一步镇压海外支持民主运动活动的担忧。

Mr Cheng, who has received asylum from the UK, worries that Beijing 'will take my family members as hostage and send more agents to crush down the pro-democracy cause and activities outside of Hong Kong.'

已取得英国庇护的郑先生担心北京“会把我的家人作为人质，派更多的代理人镇压在香港以外，支持民主的事业和活动。”

The pro-democracy supporter, who alleges that he was detained and tortured in China last year, has been granted political asylum in what he believes is the first successful case from the former British colony.

这个宣称在去年被中共国拘留和折磨的民主的支持者，已被授予政治庇护。他认为这是前英国殖民地第一个成功的案例。

Simon Cheng, a former employee at the British consulate in Hong Kong, has expressed his concerns over Beijing's next crackdown move on pro-democracy activities overseas

英国在香港领事馆的前雇员郑文杰表达了他对北京下一步镇压海外支持民主运动活动的担忧

Mr Cheng, 29, told The Associated Press that he hopes his successful application encourages other democracy activists from the semi-autonomous Chinese territory to seek protection in the UK as Beijing clamps down on the city´s protest movement.

29岁的郑先生告诉《联合报纸》，当北京开始镇压香港这个城市的抗议运动时，他希望他的成功申请庇护能鼓励这个半自治的中国领土上的其他民主活动者到英国寻求保护。

'My case is about political persecution intrinsically,' Mr Cheng said Thursday in London.

“我的案子本质上是政治迫害。”程先生星期四在伦敦说。

'I hope my case could be a precedent for other Hong Kongers who are not protected by the British National Overseas lifeboat scheme. They can quote my case to apply for asylum and seek protection.'

“我希望我的例子能成为其他不被英国国家海外生命之舟计划保护的香港人的先例。他们可以引用我的案例申请庇护寻求保护。”

Several other asylum cases involving people from Hong Kong are pending, he said.

他说，还有其他涉及香港人的庇护案件也正在等待处理中 。

The Singapore theft followed a massive hack in the U.S. in 2014 that sucked up the records of 4.5 million patients across 206 hospitals, and another in which a state-sponsored Chinese agency known as Deep Panda stole the records of some 80 million patients from a U.S. health care provider — data that could then be used to blackmail persons of interest.

新加坡的网络窃取案前，美国在2014年发生了一起大规模黑客攻击事件，黑客窃取了206家医院的450万病人的记录；而在另一起案件中，一个国家资助的，名为深沉大熊猫的中共国机构从一家美国卫生保健提供商那里窃取了8千万患者病例——这些数据可以被用来敲诈相关人员。

The medical records of current and future political, military and public service leaders are likely now in the hands of China’s intelligence services and could be used to identify their weaknesses to be exploited for influence or for blackmail.

现任和未来的政治、军事和公共服务领导人的医疗记录现在很可能已经掌握在中共国的情报部门的手中，这些可以被用来找出他们的弱点，以便影响或被敲诈的这些领导人。

Some may have medical conditions they don’t want to become public. Publication of such sensitive information could wreck careers and make those who have been compromised open to coercion.

有些人可能有他们不想让公众知道的医疗状况。公布这些敏感信息可以毁掉他们的事业，使那些已受到折磨的的人再次受到胁迫。

The harsh and undeniable reality we in the West have to face up to is that Beijing wields its economic power like a great weapon.

我们西方国家必须面对的，严峻和不可否认的现实是，北京像使用强大的武器一样运用着自己的经济实力。

Its economic blackmail has proved highly effective, distorting decisions made by elected governments, frightening bureaucrats, silencing critics, and making countless companies beholden to it.

它的敲诈被证明高度有效，扭曲了民选政府的决定，恐吓了官僚主义者，消声了批评者，使无数企业被它绑架。

That power is only amplified when Chinese companies, answerable to Beijing, own critical infrastructure in other countries.

当中共企业，听命于北京，在其他国家拥有关键的基础设施时，这个力量变得更加大了。

The West needs to inoculate itself against these pressures where it can, but where it can’t, it needs to make some hard choices and walk away.

西方需要在可能的情况下应对这些压力，但在无法做到的情况下，则需要做出一些艰难的选择并离开。

All industries, including the education and tourism sectors, must understand the political risks of becoming heavily reliant on revenue flows from China. Short-term profit-making exposes them to long-term damage.

所有的工业界，以及教育界和旅游界必须明白严重依赖中共国利润流的政治风险。短期的获利使他们暴露出长期的损害。

When considering partnerships with Chinese organisations, much better due diligence is required, by people who understand how the CCP system works.

当考虑到与中共国组织的合作伙伴关系，让那些了解中共系统怎样运作的人进行更完备的商业调查是必要的。

Companies should not expect their governments to compromise human rights and civil freedoms to appease Beijing. As long as the current CCP regime rules China, prudent corporate management requires diversification of markets.

企业不应该期望他们的政府在人权和公民自由上妥协以取悦北京。只要现在的中共政权统治中国，那么审慎的公司管理就会需要市场的多元化。

Above all, the West needs to wake up to the fact that a CCP-led China is not, and never will be, its friend.

最后，西方需要清醒过来面对现实，即中共领导下的中共国不是，也永不会是它的朋友。

Adapted from Hidden Hand: Exposing How The Chinese Communist Party Is Reshaping The World by Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg, to be published by Oneworld on July 16 at £20. © 2020 Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg.

从《隐藏的手：中共怎样重塑世界》改编。

编辑：【喜马拉雅战鹰团】Edited by：【Himalaya Hawk Squad】