新闻来源：《BBC News》; 作者：Frank Gardner
翻译/简评：万人往 ； 校对：leftgun； Page: 面面
简评：
中共几十年前就开始布局“蓝金黄”计划，利用人性的弱点，以国家的力量渗透，达到自己不可告人的目的。被“蓝金黄”的人往往在不知不觉中坠入陷阱：也许是突然遇见异性搭讪，两人感情迅速升温；也许是赌博不断赢钱，感觉自己像赌神附体。殊不知这些小秘密被中共掌控，变成威胁的筹码，只要和中共勾兑了一次，接下来会面对无穷无尽的威逼利诱。想摆脱中共的威胁，只有坦然面对自己曾经犯下的错，勇敢站出来，加入灭共阵营。否则，只能在中共的泥沼中越陷越深，不能自拔。
原文：
The spying game: China's global network
间谍游戏：中共国的全球网络
The latest controversy to swirl around the Chinese telecoms company Huawei has shone a spotlight on the murky world of Chinese espionage, agent-recruitment and an ambitious programme of extending its influence across the globe.
围绕中共国电信公司华为的最新争议，将中共国的间谍活动、代理招募和野心勃勃的扩大全球影响力的黑暗世界暴露在聚光灯下。
So how extensive is it, how does it work and who runs it?
那么它的范围有多广，是如何运作的，由谁来管理?
A dossier reportedly compiled with the help of a former MI6 spy has accused China of trying to manipulate key UK figures, including politicians, to back the telecom giant's business in Britain.
一份据说是在一名前军情六处间谍帮助下编织的档案，指控中共国试图操纵包括政客在内的英国关键人物，以支持电信巨头在英国的业务。
Every major Chinese enterprise anywhere in the world allegedly has an internal "cell" answerable to the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to drive the political agenda and ensure that the company is compliant with political directives.
据称，世界各地的每一家大型中共国企业都有一个对中共负责的内部“组织”，以推动政治议程，并确保公司服从政治指示。
This is why China experts assert that the CCP does operate here in Britain, often under the natural cover of business. "The Party machine is everywhere", says one, adding: "For China, business is inseparable from politics."
这就是中国专家断言中共的确有在英国运作的原因，通常是在商业的自然掩护下。“政党机器无处不在，”一位专家表示，并补充道:“对中共国来说，商业与政治密不可分。”
The CCP has 93 million members, with many of them placed or hidden in organisations abroad. This allows them to be tasked with gathering secrets, especially in the technology sphere, including telecoms.
中共有9300万党员，其中许多人被安插或隐藏在国外的组织中。这使得他们能够承担起收集秘密的任务，特别是在包括电信在内的技术领域。
Experts say these "agents", as well as targeted individuals in important positions in foreign companies, can be recruited or persuaded using a number of different methods.
专家表示，这些“特工”以及在外国公司担任重要职位的目标人员，可以通过多种不同的方法来招募或被说服。
Setting Honey Traps
设置甜蜜的陷阱
The first approach is usually what is known as "a positive incentive", especially if the targeted individual is a non-Chinese national.
第一种方法通常被称为“积极激励”，尤其当目标人员是非中国公民。
In the West this can take the form of a tempting invitation to an important business meeting in China, an offer of financial help for a company facing difficulties, or the offer of a (sometimes meaningless) seat on a board as a non-executive director or even in some cases a life-changing sum of money.
在西方，这可以是一个诱人的邀请：去中共国参加一个重要的商务会议, 为面临困难的公司提供金融帮助，或者以非执行董事的身份获得（有时候是毫无意义的）董事会席位, 甚至在某些情况下得到一笔能改变生活的钱。
In the last 10 to 15 years there has been an increasing readiness to target well-placed foreigners with positive incentives.
在过去的10到15年里，（中共国）越来越多的愿意用积极激励的方法来锁定有地位的外国人。
Inside China though, recruitment methods can, according to people familiar with them, take on a far more sinister form. This can include putting pressure on Chinese family members - essentially blackmail - to honeytraps set for unwary western businessmen.
但据知情人士透露，在中共国内，招募方式可能会采用一种更为险恶的形式。这包括向中国裔的家庭成员施加压力——本质上是胁迫——或给粗心的西方商人设下甜蜜陷阱。
This usually entails a "chance" encounter with an attractive woman which is then covertly recorded and used as "kompromat" - compromising material to be used as a lever.
这通常需要一次与一个有魅力的女人的“偶遇”，然后被秘密地记录了下来，用作“污点材料”——即不宜泄露的材料，被用作操控杆。
"The Chinese state is very good at setting honeytraps on their own territory," says a British businessman who has worked in China. These are normally run by China's Ministry of State Security.
一位曾在中共国工作过的英国商人表示:“中共国政府非常擅长在自己的领土上设置甜蜜陷阱。”这些行动通常由中共国家安全部操控。
Rather than being run centrally, these targeting operations tend to be run out of provincial State Security bureau, each of which deals with a different geographic area of the world. So the Shanghai bureau, for example, covers the US, Beijing covers Russia and the former Soviet republics, Tianjin covers Japan and Korea, and so on.
这些目标行动不是集中管理的，而是由省级国家安全局负责运作，每个省级国家安全局处理世界上不同的地理区域。例如，上海局负责美国，北京局负责俄罗斯和前苏联共和国，天津局负责日本和韩国，等等。
"The Chinese state uses the full spectrum of government levers to acquire information," says someone very familiar with its operations. "This ranges from targeted and large-scale cyber espionage and theft to co-opting industry experts, both knowingly and unknowingly."
一位非常熟悉中共国政府运作的人士表示:“中共国政府利用各种各样的政府手段来获取信息。从有针对性的大规模网络间谍和盗窃，到拉拢行业专家，故意的和不知不觉的情况都有。”
"Along with Russia," he adds, "China is the biggest espionage threat to the UK".
他还补充说：“中共国和俄罗斯是英国最大的间谍威胁。”
编辑：【喜马拉雅战鹰团】