新闻来源：The Diplomat

作者：Sarah Cook

翻译/简评：小明

校对：Julia Win

简评：

本文对中共利用间谍、网军、AI机器人等低级手段渗透和影响世界各国的行为进行了剖析，戳破了中共“和平崛起”、“不干涉别国内政”等谎言，把一个“假”字牢牢钉在中共的焦头烂额之上，条理清晰，就事论事，也阐述了作者对中共虚假信息战威胁的担忧。文中对中共的揭露，与文贵先生三年来所爆料的中共“蓝金黄”全世界的策略相契合。应该说，爆料革命史无前例的将中共的罪恶深刻揭露出来，也唤醒了西方自由世界，成为全世界正义力量的中流砥柱。三年前，西方没有任何媒体或电视台报道中共的阴谋诡计，而正是因为爆料革命的存在，让全世界如梦初醒，没想到中共已经把邪恶的触角伸向全世界每一个角落，再不加以抵制，西方几百年孕育的文明成果、法治自由民主的体系都将土崩瓦解，为专制邪魔所吞噬。然而天网恢恢，疏而不漏，这一次中共不会再逃脱覆亡的命运。因为它已经不满足于奴役中华儿女，而是要制霸全球，把它“优越”的制度通过下三滥的手段——虚假信息战推广到全球，这些虚假信息不仅误导西方世界的舆论，更会害人性命，正如在此次疫情中，中共的谎言和欺骗让CCP病毒在全球大流行，让全世界付出了惨痛的代价，这累累血债都是记在中共头上的，其必然招致最严厉的制裁。从三年前中共的张牙舞爪、气焰嚣张，到如今困兽犹斗、人人喊打，消灭中共已成为全球共识。我们何其有幸，能身处这样一个伟大的时代。

这篇文章放映的正是西方世界缓慢但却无可阻挡的觉醒。虽然中共很邪恶，但作者毕竟身在自由法治的国度，凡事要讲证据、讲逻辑，客观理性，不能像CCAV大裤衩的央妓们一样泼皮无赖、上纲上线，在评判中共方面未免有些谨小慎微。值得一提的是，文中特别提到了2017年四月间推特上的大量中文帐号曾发动信息战，而之后交战双方的形势被逆转过来，而中共则面临挑战。这是为什么呢？这和419的美国之音断播有何关联呢？是何方天兵天将力挽狂澜，并形成挑战中共的力量呢？答案不言自明。

原文：

Welcome to the New Era of Chinese Government Disinformation

欢迎来到中共政府的虚假信息新时代

The coronavirus fallout is hastening Beijing’s shift toward covert, Russian-style tactics.

中共病毒的后果迫使北京转向隐秘的，俄罗斯式的战术。

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long sought to influence the media and information space in other countries, and the effort has intensified over the past decade. Much of the activity is overt — diplomats publishing op-eds or state-run news outlets generating propaganda. While some covert tactics were also documented, for many years there was no significant evidence that Chinese actors were engaging in aggressive disinformation campaigns like the one pursued by Russia on global social media platforms ahead of the 2016 U.S. elections. That has now changed.

长期以来，中国共产党试图影响其它国家的媒体和信息领域，尤其在过去十年间越发猖獗。这其中的大部分活动已经明面化——外交官发表社论或者在党国控制的媒体上散布政治宣传。虽然有些隐秘的宣传战术已被记录在案，然而多年以来没有明显的证据表明，中共国的这些喉舌有发起一场侵略性的虚假信息战，而在2016年美国大选前俄罗斯曾经在全球社交媒体平台上掀起过这种信息战。不过现在，情况有所变化。

Over the past month alone, a series of exposés demonstrated that pro-Beijing actors are carrying out a whole range of covert activities in multiple countries and languages. The campaigns aim to spread proven falsehoods, sow societal discord and panic, manipulate perceptions of public opinion, or undermine the democratic process.

仅在过去的一个月里，一系列揭露证明亲共分子正在多个国家和不同语言的地区发动一场全面的阴谋。这些活动旨在散布被“证实”的虚假信息，挑起社会上的分歧，煽动恐慌，操纵公众意见的风向，或者破坏民主的进程。

Evidence revealed last year indicated that some Chinese-language campaigns had begun on platforms like Twitter as early as April 2017, but the latest round of incidents and investigations points to a more definitive shift in Chinese influence operations. It remains to be seen how foreign governments, technology companies, global internet users, and even the CCP’s own propaganda apparatus will adapt to the challenges presented by this change. Whatever their response, it is clear that a new era of disinformation has dawned.

这些被披露的证据表明，早在2017年四月，一些用中文发起的信息战就已经在诸如推特这样的平台上展开，但最新的一轮事件和调查显示，这些中文世界里有影响力的活动已经发生了决定性的转向。而外国政府、科技公司、国际网络用户甚至中共自己的宣传机器要如何面对这一风向转变带来的挑战，让我们拭目以待。而不论他们如何应对，毋庸置疑的是，一波新的虚假信息散播已拉开帷幕。

Sowing Local Divisions on a Global Scale 在全球各地方制造分裂

Since March, coordinated and covert attempts by China-linked actors to manipulate information — particularly regarding COVID-19 — have been detected in countries including the United States, Argentina, Serbia, Italy, and Taiwan, with the relevant content often delivered in local languages.

自三月起，与中共国有关系的人士就开始有组织的、隐秘的试图操纵信息传播——尤其是关于中共病毒的信息——这些企图已经被包括美国、阿根廷、塞尔维亚、意大利和台湾在内的国家所察觉，他们还发现相关的信息内容都是用当地的语言被流传的。

Moreover, in a departure from Beijing’s more traditional censorship and propaganda campaigns, the narratives being promoted are not necessarily focused on advancing positive views and suppressing negative views of China.

另外，与北京一贯的审查和政治宣传不同的是，新一波被推广的言论并非都是传播利于中共的正面观点或是打压批评中共国的负面言论。

For example, in an analysis of China-related Twitter posts disseminated in Serbia between March 9 and April 9 by automated “bot” accounts, the Digital Forensics Center found that the messages praised China for supplying aid during the coronavirus pandemic (much like a similar effort in Italy). But the posts also amplified criticism of the European Union for supposedly failing to do the same, despite the fact that the bloc actually provided millions of euros in assistance.

比如，在一次对与中共国相关联的推文分析中，数字取证中心发现，这些在塞尔维亚散播的推文是由自动发推的机器人账号在3月9日至4月9日间发出，它们散布的信息称赞中共国在病毒疫情中提供援助的行为（非常像在意大利实施的类似信息散播）。这些推文还夸大对欧盟的批评，称她没有像中共国一样做，尽管事实俱在——欧盟已经提供了数百万欧元的援助。

Elsewhere, disinformation attempts have tried to sow discord within other countries. In Argentina, a Chinese agent hired a local intermediary to approach editors from at least three news outlets in early April, according to the Falun Dafa Information Center. The broker allegedly offered to pay approximately $300 if they published a prewritten article in Spanish that smeared the Falun Gong spiritual group, which is persecuted in China, including by suggesting local citizens who practice Falun Gong could pose a threat to public health in Argentina. All of the approached outlets reportedly rejected the offer.

在其它地区，散布虚假信息的努力旨在煽动各国内部的分歧。据法轮大法信息中心表示，在阿根廷，一位中共国间谍在四月初雇佣了一位当地的中介来接近至少三家媒体。据称，这位中间人提出，要为发表一篇用西班牙语提前写好的文章支付大概300美金，这篇文章旨在污蔑法轮功团体，而这一团体遭受着中共国的迫害，文章还告诫当地居民修炼法轮功会威胁阿根廷的公众健康。据报道，所有这位中共国间谍试图接近的媒体都拒绝了这笔买卖。

In other cases, the manipulated content shared had no connection to China at all. In a campaign in the United States reported by the New York Times, text and social media messages amplified by China-linked accounts in mid-March carried false warnings about a nationwide lockdown and troop deployments to prevent looting and rioting. The campaign was an apparent attempt to incite public panic and increase distrust in the U.S. government.

在其它的事件中，被操纵的信息内容与中共国自身没有任何关联。纽约时报报道了一场在美国发动的信息战，与中共国相关联的账号在三月中旬大肆散播文章和社交媒体信息，这些信息携带虚假警告，宣称美国将在全境下达封锁零并部署军队来防止抢劫和动乱。这一次的信息战明显是一场要制造大众恐慌、增加民众对美国政府不信任感的阴谋。

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute documented another recent example in which coordinated campaigns by nationalistic Chinese netizens — whose precise links to the Chinese state remain uncertain — attempted to harm Taiwan’s international reputation and its relationship with the United States. A network of 65 Twitter accounts that had previously posted in mainland-style Simplified Chinese abruptly switched to Traditional Chinese characters, thereby impersonating Taiwanese citizens. They then posted messages expressing apologies to the Ethiopian-born director general of the World Health Organization, lending false credence to allegations he voiced that racist slurs were directed against him from Taiwan. In April, some of the accounts also jumped on an existing Iranian-linked Twitter campaign calling for California’s secession from the United States, trying to give the impression that Taiwanese users supported California’s independence. (This effort was likely undermined by their referring to the island as “Taiwan (CHN).”)

澳大利亚战略政策研究所记录了另一场由中共国的民族主义网民发动的有组织的信息战，这一运动旨在损害台湾的国际声誉以及台美之间的关系，但目前还无法确定这些网民是否与中共国有关联。由65个推特账号组成的网络突然从使用简体字转为使用繁体字发布信息，他们借此假扮成台湾公民。在四月份，有些帐号还参与到一场与伊朗相关的推特信息战中，这场运动呼吁加利福尼亚州从美国独立，这些中共国网民企图给人造成一种印象：台湾用户支持加利福尼亚的独立。（这一企图后来遭到挫败，很可能是因为那些网民称呼台湾岛为“中国台湾”。）

Evolving Tactics and New Platforms 战术演变和新的平台

The March campaign in the United States underscored some of the evolving tactics of China-linked disinformation campaigns. While platforms like Facebook and Twitter remain important battlegrounds, recent investigations indicate a shift toward text messages and encrypted messaging applications. Due to their more atomized structures, monitoring and countering disinformation on these channels is more difficult than on Facebook and Twitter.

三月份在美国掀起的那场信息战显示出，中共国控制的虚假信息散播演化出了新的战术。而诸如脸书和推特这样的平台依然是其重要战场，近期的调查指出，他们正转向运用手机短信和加密消息来发动信息战。由于短信发送系统分散的结构，监控和抵制这类虚假信息的难度相较于在脸书和推特上更高。

A recent report by Recorded Future found that, ahead of the January 2020 general elections in Taiwan, Chinese content farms used artificial intelligence “to generate massive volumes of content” that was then spread to Taiwanese users in an attempt to undermine the electoral prospects of incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party. The research group also cited evidence that China-based actors had deployed a tool developed by a Chinese company that enables batch posting and sharing of content across multiple platforms. Analysts believe the tool was deployed in Taiwan “because these technologies can ease the spread of weaponized content at scale, especially on closed messaging platforms such as LINE, where Taiwanese users frequently reshare content.”

“记录未来”近期的一份报告发现，在2020年台湾大选之前，中共国的假信息制造工厂利用人工智能“生成了大量的信息”并将其散播到台湾用户中，企图借此破坏现任总统蔡英文和她的民进党的选举前景。研究小组引述的证据表明，处于中国地区的信息战参与者还采用了一种工具，这一由某家中共国公司开发的工具可以在多个平台上批量发布或分享信息。分析者相信，之所以要在台湾运用这一工具，是因为这项技术能大幅提升散播武器化的假消息的效率，尤其是在例如LINE这种封闭的消息发送平台上效果显著，因为台湾用户会频繁的分享里面的内容。

But low-tech tactics are also being used. Over the past year, numerous reports have emerged of China-linked actors seeking out Chinese-speaking social media influencers with international followings, offering to purchase their accounts or pay them to post certain information. Other reports indicate that this practice is not limited to Chinese speakers, but also extends to individuals like an English-speaking Canadian YouTuber.

不过，低科技含量的战术也在被运用。在过去的一年中有海量的报道显示，与中共国关联的一些人在社交媒体上寻找说中文的有影响力的主播，这些主播有来自国际的关注者。中共的人提出购买他们的账号或者付钱让他们发布一些特定的内容。其它一些报道则显示，此种收买并非仅限于说中文的主播，而是扩展到其他人，比如一位说英文的加拿大油管主播。

Prospects for Growth and Potential Risks 信息战扩张的预期和潜在威胁

Much about China-linked overseas disinformation campaigns remains unknown. Indeed, the examples above are likely just the tip of the iceberg. Given the visible efforts by Chinese diplomats and state media to shore up the government’s reputation and downplay its responsibility for repressive measures in Wuhan that contributed to the global coronavirus outbreak, it seems reasonable to assume that covert Twitter bot campaigns have occurred in additional countries, particularly in Europe. There also appears to be some evidence of cross-fertilization among Russian, Iranian, and Chinese disinformation networks, although the degree of actual premeditated coordination is unclear.

很多由中共操纵在海外发起的信息战目前并不为人所知。事实上，上述的几个案例不过是冰山一角。仅从明面上就能看到中共的外交官和党媒如何维护中共政府的声誉，并且淡化其在武汉实施打压政策而导致中共病毒在全球爆发的责任。隐秘的由机器人发起的推特信息战将继续在其它国家扩散，尤其在欧洲——这种推测应该是合理的。另外似乎有证据显示，俄罗斯、伊朗和中共国的虚假信息网络有在狼狈为奸，尽管这种蓄谋的配合程度仍未可知。

The WeChat social media platform, owned by the Chinese company Tencent, is a potentially influential channel for political disinformation and content manipulation, with more than 100 million users outside China. A study published this week by Toronto’s Citizen Lab found systematic surveillance of posts by users registered abroad, with evidence of scanning for politically sensitive terms. The researchers found no evidence of systematic deletions, but the monitoring and collection of such data opens the door to manipulation, including on topics of electoral consequence in democracies.

中共国公司腾讯旗下的微信社交媒体平台就是一个潜在的发布虚假政治信息并且操纵舆论的渠道，这一平台在中国以外有超过1亿的用户。加拿大公民实验室本周发布的一篇研究报告显示，微信在海外注册的用户受到了系统性的监控，监控者用政治敏感词汇筛查其信息。研究者没有发现有大量信息受到删除的证据，但这种监控和收集数据的做法为日后操纵舆论铺平了道路，包括操纵民主国家选举结果等。

The Chinese government is not the only actor currently experimenting with Russian-style disinformation campaigns. The latest edition of Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net report found evidence of malign digital electoral interference by various government, nongovernmental, and partisan forces in 26 countries, though most acted within their borders rather than trying to influence other countries. But the CCP presides over one of the world’s most repressive regimes and an economy second only to that of the United States. If it invests heavily in this new approach to international influence, it will pose enormous challenges to democratic governments, technology firms, and internet users.

发动俄罗斯式虚假信息战的，目前并非只有中共政府一家。自由之家旗下的《网络自由》发布的最新一期报告表明，有证据显示，来自26个国家的不同政府、非政府组织以及党派团体利用数字平台制造诽谤言论、干预选举，尽管这其中大部分的组织都只在境内活动，而并非试图影响其它国家。但中国共产党是全世界最专制的政权之一，而且是仅次于美国的第二大经济体。如果它砸下巨资，用信息战这种新的手段获取全球影响力，它将对民主国家的政府、科技公司和网络用户构成巨大的挑战。

This sphere of activity also poses a challenge for the CCP itself. Once exposed, disinformation campaigns that spread falsehoods and sow divisions in other societies undermine a key dimension of Beijing’s foreign propaganda narrative, one that it has invested heavily in promoting over the past three decades: that China’s rise is peaceful; that the regime is benign and shuns any interference in other countries; and that political, economic, and media engagement with a CCP-led China is a win-win prospect for all involved. It is difficult to predict whether and how the Party will try to reconcile this contradiction. For the time being, the CCP’s global disinformation campaigns show no sign of abating.

这种全球化的信息战活动对中共自身也是一种挑战。一旦它的阴谋败露，它用于散布虚假信息、在其它国家的社会上煽动分歧的做法将打破北京外交宣传上的冠冕之词，而中共为了推广这种宣传在过去三十年内耗费了巨资：所谓中共国是和平崛起的，所谓这个政权是友善的、反对干涉别国内政的，所谓在政治上、经济上、媒体领域和中共国合作对各参与方都是双赢局面。我们很难预知，中共会如何解释其实际行为与所宣传的形象之间存在的矛盾。就目前而言，没有迹象表明中共的全球性虚假信息战有缓和的趋势。

Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan at Freedom House and director of its China Media Bulletin.

Sarah Cook是一位资深的中国、香港和台湾研究分析员，他来自自由之家，并且是《中国媒体新闻快报》的负责人。

编辑【喜马拉雅战鹰团】