Loading

為新的軍備競賽做好準備:為什麼核戰略穩定的限制對中共國不管用 【中英對照翻譯】

新聞來源:The National Interest

作者:Bradley A. Thayer

翻譯/簡評:TCC

校對:Julia Win

Page: 椰子哦耶

引言:

這篇文章被當委會推薦,意義非凡。 文章中主要提到是美國本期望中共這個日益擴張的”大國”能遵守軍備限制公約以維持繼美俄之後所追求戰略穩定;卻發現中共不安於現狀,從核武器及其他軍備的擴張,非核化秘密形式的擴張(網絡,一帶一路,供應鏈及經濟),到從不遵從限武的約束,其與美國相抗衡甚至超越美國的野心是欲蓋彌彰。有鑑於此,美國必須從”戰略穩定”的美夢中清醒,快步以現代化的能力來應對,以阻止中共進而威脅美國本土,美國軍方及其對盟國的承諾。

該醒了,這隻披著羊毛的狼已經露出兇相了。香港現在發生的事只是中共在試水深,如果仍然以為這是中共家務事,正如文貴先生所言,在不久的將來,這些慘劇,就像這大瘟疫一樣,發生在美國本土了!

原文:

Get Ready For a New Arms Race: Why Nuclear Strategic Stability Won’t Work With China

為新的軍備競賽做好準備:為什麼核戰略穩定的限制對中共國不管用

By entering an arms control regime, China could show that it accepts the value of arms control and seeks confidence-building measures, which aids stability while demonstrating that China is a status quo power. The fact that China rejects arms control is troubling and suggests, first, it is a revisionist power, and second, that it wants to be unfettered as it expands its arsenal.

經由加入”軍備控制制度”,中共國大可以表明它接受軍備控制的價值觀並尋求建立信任的舉措,這有助於穩定,同時表明中共國是一個安於現狀的大國。中共國拒絕軍備控制的事實令人不安,這表明1.它是支持修正主義的大國(而不安於現狀),以及2.它希望在擴大軍備庫時不受束縛。

China’s expansion of nuclear weapons has not received the attention it deserves due to its threat to U.S. interests and for strategic stability. China’s actions undermine the ability of the United States to deter attacks against the United States, to extend deterrence to its allies, and to protect its interests. Strategic stability results when both or all sides in a deterrence relationship have little incentive to race for superiority. During the dénouement of the Cold War, strategic stability obtained for the United States and Russia. However, strategic stability will not obtain with respect to China for three reasons.

由於它對美國利益及實現戰略穩定的威脅,中共國的核武器擴張應該要被重視了。中共國的行動破壞了美國反擊的能力,擴大對其盟友的威懾以及維護其自身利益的能力。當處於緊張關係中的雙方覺得爭奪優勢並沒有好處時,就會形成戰略穩定。在冷戰停頓期間,美國和俄羅斯達成了戰略穩定。但是,中共國基於以下三個原因,戰略穩定是無法達成的。

First, while the common estimate of China’s nuclear weapons is approximately three hundred, due to China’s lack of transparency, it is possible that China has significantly more than this estimate. This month, there have been calls within China for expanding its nuclear arsenal to one thousand strategic warheads, to say nothing of nuclear weapons on intermediate-range or other forces. While the United States has taken a “strategic holiday,” the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has used the opportunity to expand their arsenals, as well as cyber and conventional capabilities. When one reflects upon the considerable effort to create strategic systems, as well as cyber and conventional capabilities, inescapable conclusions are, first, that the causes of their expansion is rooted in their own grand strategic objectives of achieving hegemony and, second, the decision to expand their forces was sown long ago. China has used our strategic passivity to expand. What Reagan’s Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger said in the Soviet context remains true today: "When we build, they build, when we stop, they build.”

首先,中共國核武器的一般估計約有300個,但由於中共國缺乏透明度,而其核估計可能遠遠超過此數目。本月,中共國內部曾呼籲將其核武器庫擴大到一千個戰略彈頭,更不用說中程或其他部隊的核武器了。在美國度過“戰略(穩定)假期”的同時,中共國也趁機擴大了軍火庫以及網絡和常規戰力。當人們反思中共創建其戰略系統以及網絡和常規戰力的巨大努力下,不可避免的結論是,首先,其擴張的根源在於實現霸權本身的宏偉戰略目標,其次,它決定擴大自己的部隊是很久以前就開始的。中共國利用我們的戰略被動性來擴張。雷根的國防部長卡斯珀·溫伯格在蘇聯的背景下所說的話至今依然正確:“當我們建造時,他們在建造,當我們停止時,它們還在建造。”

The growth of Chinese arsenals cannot be divorced from other evidence of China’s expansion. They are expanding their bases, for example, in Djibouti and Gwadar, and alliance networks including through the Belt and Road Initiative and “debt diplomacy,” the creation of new international institutions to supplant extant ones, and aggressive intelligence operations. These measures indicate that China is a non-status quo great power but is a revisionist—and one that seeks change immediately. This bodes ill for strategic stability.

中國軍火庫的增長不能不與中共國擴張的其他證據相並論。他們正在擴大自己的基地,例如在吉布提和瓜達爾,並通過“一帶一路”計畫和“債務外交”,建立新的國際機構以取代現存機構和積極的情報行動。這些舉動表明,中共國不是一個安於現狀的大國,而是個修正主義者,並且是一個尋求立即改變的國家。這對戰略穩定造成不良效應。

Most concerning is that China’s build-up might allow it to race to parity or superiority with the United States, which would result in an intense arms race. China’s actions make it a threat to strategic stability. To maintain strategic stability requires modernizing U.S. strategic systems, including missile defenses, and conventional capabilities. Not to do so invites a direct and existential strategic challenge to the security of our allies and ourselves.

最令人擔憂的是,中國的發展可能使其達到與美國同等或超越美國的地位,這將導致一場激烈的軍備競賽。中共國的行為對戰略穩定構成威脅。為了維持戰略穩定,需要將美國的戰略系統現代化,包括導彈防禦系統和常規作戰能力。不這樣做會給我們的盟國和我們自己的安全帶來直接和存在性的戰略挑戰。

Second, the form of China’s build-up is notable. Always secretive, the Chinese have occluded their nuclear expansion as they do not want to provoke a premature reaction from the United States or its allies. More damning is that the Chinese are secretly “preparing the battlefield” to ensure that they have the ability to damage the United States through other, nonnuclear, means. These nonnuclear avenues of attack include cyber, control of space, supply chain dominance, economic influence, technological mastery of 5G and increasingly artificial intelligence, soft power, and the continued legal and illegal access to America’s knowledge, intellectual property, finance, and technology to facilitate Beijing’s growth. This would ensure the United States could be damaged sufficiently—in effect, a near equivalent of a major nuclear attack—to cause U.S. political leaders to yield in a crisis or limited war without the employment of nuclear weapons. China might launch one or more cyber attacks on the electrical grid and on the ability of the United States to recover and rebuild its electrical grid after a significant cyber attack. This is likely to be a direct attack in the cyber realm but the damage might also be inadvertent due to the unintended consequences of an attack against another target. Moreover, the risks of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to the U.S. electrical grid is also a possibility. The vulnerability of America electricity to EMP—whether from deliberate EMP attack, cyber attack, or solar activity—and the ability to recover the electrical grid in the wake of an event is an issue that must be solved now.

其次,中共國發展的形式是值得注意的。總是神祕地,不想激起美國或其盟國的過早反應,因此中共國一向密秘地一直在進行核擴張。更可惡的是,中共國正在秘密地“準備戰場”,以確保他們有能力通過其他非核手段破壞美國。這些非核攻擊途徑包括網絡,控制太空,供應鏈優勢,經濟影響,對5G的技術掌控以及越來越多的人工智能,軟實力以及對美國的知識,知識產權,在金融和技術上持續的合法與非法”取用”,來促進北京的發展。這將讓美國受到足夠的破壞-實際上相當於一次重大核襲擊-導致美國政治領導人在危機或有限戰爭中屈服,而無需使用核武器。中共國可能會對電網以及美國在重大網絡攻擊後恢復和重建電網的能力進行一次或多次網絡攻擊。這可能是網絡領域的直接攻擊,但由於攻擊另一個目標的意外後果,造成的損害也可能是無意的。此外,電磁脈衝(EMP)對美國電網的風險也是可能的。美國電力對EMP的脆弱性(無論是蓄意的EMP攻擊,網絡攻擊還是太陽活動)以及事件發生後恢復電網的能力是現在必須解決的問題。

Third, China rejects arms control in practice and in principle. Thus far, Beijing will not unilaterally reduce or limit its arsenal or enter into arms control talks. That is a worrisome sign and suggests that U.S. assumptions about the causes of stability in a great power relationship are only its own, and not shared by China. A major objective of arms control is that it can promote stability in the relations between states. The state willingly abandons or limits a class of weapons to demonstrate to other actors that its ambitions are limited and it supports strategic stability. By entering an arms control regime, China could show that it accepts the value of arms control and seeks confidence-building measures, which aids stability while demonstrating that China is a status quo power. Fundamentally, it would allow China to signal its peaceful intentions, and, in turn, have an important stabilizing effect on states concerned with China’s increasing power. The fact that China rejects arms control is troubling and suggests, first, it is a revisionist power, and second, that it wants to be unfettered as it expands its arsenal.

第三,中共國在實踐上和原則上都拒絕軍備控制。迄今為止,北京不會單方面減少或限制其軍備庫或進行軍備控制談判。這是一個令人擔憂的信號,表明美國對大國關係穩定原因的假設只是一廂情願,中共國不願接受。軍備控制的一個主要目標是,它可以促進國與國之間關係的穩定。國家願意放棄或限制一類武器,以向其他行為者表明其野心是有限的,並支持戰略穩定。通過加入軍備控制制度,中共國可以表明它接受軍備控制的價值並尋求建立信任的措施,這有助於穩定,進而證明中共國是一個安於現狀的大國。從根本上說,這將使中共國能夠表達其和平意圖,進而對中共國實力增強有顧慮的國家產生重要的穩定作用。中共國拒絕軍備控制的事實令人不安,首先表明它是一個修正主義大國,其次表明它希望在擴大軍備庫時不受束縛。

These developments mean that strategic stability is unlikely to obtain. China is likely to race for superiority, and that is destabilizing, and the United States must ensure this never occurs and must prepare itself for the return of an arms race. Given the PRC’s unprecedented expansion, the United States must respond by modernizing its capabilities to deter them from threatening the homeland, U.S. military, and its alliance commitments. These are critical steps to deter them from the temptation to race to parity or superiority, which could result in the collapse of U.S. credibility and alliances. Lastly, the United States must ensure that its vulnerability to non-nuclear forms of major economic and societal damage to the U.S. homeland is addressed.

這些事態發展意味著不可能獲得戰略穩定。中共國很可能在爭奪優勢,也就是破壞穩定,美國必須確保這種情況永遠不會發生,並且必須為回歸軍備競賽做好準備。鑑於中共國的空前擴張,美國必須以現代化的能力來應對,以阻止他們威脅美國本土,美國軍方及其盟國承諾。這些關鍵步驟是阻止他們擺脫爭取平等或優越地位的誘惑,這可能導致美國的信譽和聯盟瓦解。最後,美國必須確保解決其對美國本土造成的非核形式的重大經濟和社會損害的脆弱性。

Bradley A. Thayer is a professor of political science at the University of Texas at San Antonio and is the co-author of How China Sees the World: Han-Centrism and the Balance of Power in International Politics.

原作者:布拉德利·泰耶(Bradley A. Thayer)是德克薩斯大學聖安東尼奧分校政治學教授,並且是《中國如何看待世界:漢中主義與國際政治中的力量平衡》一書的合著者。

編輯【喜馬拉雅戰鷹團】