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Ukrainian Doctrine of Security and Peace This document is the basis for the elaboration of other position papers, strategies and action plans on issues of priority importance for strengthening the independent statehood of Ukraine.

Adopted at the meeting of the strategic council of the "Capitulation Resistance Movement"

Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine: Positioning of the parties

It is self-evident that, the greatest immediate threat to Ukraine's national security is the armed aggression of Russia, which has been ongoing since February 20, 2014. Its consequences have included the unlawful annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, the temporary occupation of certain regions of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, tens of thousands killed and maimed among the civilian population and servicemen of Ukraine, the humiliation of more than 1.5 million internally displaced persons, destruction of state property and property of citizens and legal entities, criminal destruction of infrastructure and environment in the annexed and occupied territories of Ukraine, and war crimes and crimes against humanity against civilians and servicemen of Ukraine, commited by Russian Federation's Armed Forces and occupation administration [1].

In terms of international law, the armed aggression of the Russian Federation will continue as long as the territory of Ukraine is under the jurisdiction of the aggressor state and until the territorial integrity of Ukraine is restored.

Having committed armed aggression against Ukraine, the Russian Federation has committed a grave international crime, that made it international legal responsible, for and therefore obliged to restore Ukraine’s violated law and order, to cease hostilities, to return all annexed and occupied territories to Ukraine without any conditions, to compensate for the damage caused to the Ukrainian state, Ukrainian citizens and legal entities and the damage caused to them, and to punish those under its command who are guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The armed Ukrainian-Russian confrontation is an international rather than an internal conflict. In its settlement, Russia, as an aggressor state, cannot claim the role of either a peacemaker, a mediator, or a guarantor.

In an effort to avoid international legal liability, the leadership of the Russian Federation unreasonably considers the annexation of Crimea a legitimate act and cynically denies the participation of its Armed Forces in the continuation of armed aggression in the east of Ukraine. At the same time, representatives of the Russian Federation have signed the Minsk agreements, which Russian leadership is trying to use as an instrument to impose upon Ukraine the terms of settlement which are contrary to universally recognized norms of international law, are not compatible with the Constitution of Ukraine, and are destructive to the unity and independence of the state of Ukraine and its chosen course of civilizational development.

In September 2014, the Ukrainian leadership was forced to sign the first round of Minsk agreements, trying to stop the expansion of Russian aggression. However, Russia did not comply with the first round of Minsk agreements, and not only did not withdraw its armed forces from the territory of Ukraine, but continued the war and imposed by force even more onerous conditions on Ukraine in February 2015. Russia negotiated the Minsk Arrangements in bad faith, hoping to lift or at least weaken the sanctions of the international community, and relying on a selective, advantageous only to them, application of the Minsk Agreement’s provisions.

For more than 5 years, Russia has not only failed to fulfill any of its obligations under the Minsk Agreements, but has repeatedly violated them. Instead, the leadership of the Russian Federation demanded that Ukraine hold elections in the occupied territories and introduce special status for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In terms of international law, the Minsk Agreements have been void since their signature, because they were imposed by Ukraine on force. They are not valid according to the Ukrainian Constitution, since they have not been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and have not been ratified.

Ukraine is also legally and morally entitled to withdraw from the Minsk Agreements in connection with their constant violations by Russia and based on the fact that their executions was supposed to end on December 31, 2015.

In pursuit of peace, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on September 16, 2014 adopted the Law of Ukraine № 1680-VIII “On the special order of local self-government in certain regions of Donetsk and Luhansk regions”. The final provisions of the law stipulated that it would be applied after the withdrawal of all Russian armed forces and the election of a new local government in free elections by OSCE standards. Due to Russia's refusal to withdraw units of its armed forces from the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk, the law continued to be enforced every year. As of today, it is effective until December 31, 2019, but it does not apply.

Therefore, because of the position of the Russian Federation, the Minsk Agreements were stillborn as a political instrument of settlement.

Since the conclusion of the Minsk Agreements and in spite of their constant violation by the Russian Federation, Ukraine has been successfully implementing a decentralization reform and adopted a number of relevant legislative acts that make it irrelevant to implement paragraph 11 of the Comprehensive Measures for Implementation of the Minsk Agreements of February 12, 2015, which provided for the introduction of special status for some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Taking into account the changes of the Ukrainian legislation on decentralization of power and political reformatting in the power structures of Ukraine, the Minsk agreements can only be used to achieve peace, if they are interpreted and applied according to the requirements of modern international law, the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. Their security provisions must be an instrument of regulation in their compliance with the generally recognized principles of international law and justice, and not the aggressor's prejudices.

Ukrainian Plan for a Just Peace

Based on the above, in any peace settlement negotiations in any format, at whatever level and according to whatever formula they take place, Ukraine should propose and uphold such a phased plan for establishing a just peace:

1. Immediate release by the Russian side of all Ukrainian hostages from the civilian population and rapid exchange of prisoners of war on a "all for all" principle.

2. Complete and unimpeded withdrawal of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including all types of heavy weapons, military equipment and staffing material and technical resources, to the Russian side of the Ukrainian-Russian state border, under the control of independent peacekeeping forces, within 90 days after the officially fixed date of completion.

The withdrawal of all Russian Armed Forces onto the Russian side of the state Ukrainian-Russian border in Donetsk and Luhansk regions should be accompanied by the dismantling of all Russian occupation structures - especially the structures of the self-proclaimed "DPR" and "LPR".

The schedule of the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Russia should be agreed between the representatives of Ukraine and Russia through the mediation of representatives of the independent peacekeeping forces.

The completion of the complete removal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions should be recorded in a special Protocol signed by the representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and independent peacekeeping forces.

3. Immediate deployment of Ukrainian border troops along the Ukrainian-Russian border line three days after the full withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and unimpeded deployment of the Ukrainian border by the Ukrainian side, including the establishment of border signs and checkpoints, the introduction of prohibited zones, and the precise boundaries of and rationale for border-line location disputes, etc.

4. Deployment of observation points of independent peacekeeping forces along the specified line of the Ukrainian-Russian state border in accordance with the agreement concluded by representatives of Ukraine the representatives of peacekeeping forces.

5. Adoption of free elections in the occupied territories of the special law of Ukraine on exemption from criminal and administrative prosecution and punishment of persons-participants of events in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, except for persons suspected of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.

6. Holding free elections in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions within the time limits set by the laws of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, in accordance with OSCE standards (Copenhagen Document 1990) and under the control of independent international observers.

7. Introduce local self-government in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts under the overall reform of decentralization of power in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine after confirming the legitimacy of the elections held there and their compliance with OSCE standards in the OSCE ODIHR Final Report.

8. At the same time as the de-occupation of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation shall be withdrawn from the territory of the annexed Crimean Peninsula and the activity of the Ukrainian authorities shall peacefully resume in occupied Crimea according to a schedule agreed by the Budapest signatories.

9. Initiation of negotiations on compensation for losses suffered by Ukraine as a result of the damage caused to it by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and on the punishment of persons guilty of crimes against humanity.

10. Until the moment of settlement of the situation between Russia and Ukraine, according to international law and Ukrainian law, full responsibility for providing life activity in the occupied territories of Ukraine lies with Russia as the state exercising overall control there.

Demanding a just peace, the representatives of Ukraine should strongly oppose any attempt to impose a shameful peace on the conditions of the aggressor state, should be guided by the Law of Ukraine of January 18, 2018 No. 2268-VIII "On the peculiarities of the state policy on ensuring the state sovereignty of Ukraine over temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions", and in no case shall the representatives of Ukraine cross the red lines defined in the open address to the President of Ukraine "We will not allow surrender" of September 17, 2019, approved Kyiv Popular Assembly September 19, 2019.

Consolidated claim

In the face of formal denial by the leadership of the Russian Federation of the participation of its Armed Forces in aggression against Ukraine, and the refusal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to use the capabilities of the International Court of Justice to establish the facts related to the armed attack on Ukraine, the formation of Ukraine's legal position on the issue of repression is extremely important. The armed aggression of the Russian Federation and its consequences must be eliminated at the national level.

In this regard, there is a need to create a central authority with a special status, which is to be responsible for preparing the consolidated claims of Ukraine as an aggressed-upon state, to the Russian Federation as an aggressor state, with a view to practical implementation of international legal liability for armed aggression against Ukraine. The creation of such authority is envisaged by the Law of Ukraine of January 18, 2018 № 2268-VIII “On the Features of State Policy for Ensuring State Sovereignty of Ukraine over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions”.

The consolidated claim should be an official document outlining Ukraine's legal position on Russia's responsibility for armed aggression. Preparation for such a claim requires systematic collection and ordering of documents, factual materials, legally drawn up protocols, interrogations of prisoners of war, testimonies of civilians, and rulings and sentences of Ukrainian courts. In other words, it is a centralized creation of a unified evidence base, which should become a solid factual basis for substantiating Ukraine's legal position and its claims on the Russian Federation as an aggressor state.

It is extremely important this the consolidated claim systematically summarizes the facts that testify to the direct involvement in the armed aggression against Ukraine not only by the regular units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but also by their irregularly formed mercenaries, which are created, armed, controlled, and controlled by the Russian Federation, whose actions meet the definition of armed aggression, as set out in paragraph g of Art. 3 of UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, "Determination of Aggression", paragraph g. 8 bis (2) of the Rome Statute of the IСС and paragraph 8 of Art. 1 of the Law of Ukraine of December 6, 1991 № 1932-XII “On Defense”.

Equally important in the consolidated claim is the systematic and thorough presentation of the facts, which show that in the annexed Crimea the Russian civilian administration and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are the occupation administration and occupation troops, and in the temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, the occupation administration functions through the so-called "DPR" and "LPR ", which were created and operated by the Russian special services, and the occupying troops in Ukraine are regular and irregular units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

A key part of the consolidated claim should be to determine the extent of the damage caused by the Russian Federation's armed aggression to the Ukrainian state, society and citizens, and to justify the claims on the extent and forms of compensation for the losses suffered by Ukraine as a result of the aggression. Particular attention in this document should be paid to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by senior political leadership, military command and personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The consolidated claim should be forwarded to the Russian Federation as an official document with a diplomatic note accompanying Ukraine's view of peaceful procedural ways of discussing it (direct negotiations, third party negotiations, international arbitration, the UN International Court of Justice, etc.).

The consolidated claim will be a powerful tool to refute claims by Russian authorities and propaganda that the events in eastern Ukraine are an internal conflict, not a continuation of the Russian armed aggression that began with the seizure of Crimea. Such a claim will be an official document that unambiguously fixes Ukraine's legal position and clearly outlines its claims on the Russian Federation as an aggressor state that has no statute of limitations.

The refusal of the Russian Federation to consider the consolidated claim will create an additional legal basis for the continuation and strengthening of international sanctions against it by the Western democracies.

Sanctions

Until the complete de-occupation of all Ukrainian territories, the use of sanctioned coercive measures taken by Ukraine and members of the international community at national and international levels should continue against Russia. Ukrainian leadership should ensure the development and implementation of a systematic and consistent policy of sanctions against Russia.

Only with such consistent clarity will Ukraine's requests for maintaining and extending sanctions against Russia addressed to our Western partners be clear, legitimate and convincing.

Ukraine's application of sanctions against Russia must be synchronized with those of the international community.

The sanctions policy of Ukraine against the Russian Federation materializes today mainly in personal restrictive measures against a relatively small number of Russian citizens and Russian companies and in the delayed introduction of certain restrictions on trade, but only with temporarily occupied territories. Sectoral sanctions, which mainly related to air travel and refusal of Russian gas supply, also remain limited. The situation is clearly abnormal, since in 2016 the Russian Federation abolished the free trade regime with our country, completely banned transit from Ukraine through the Russian territory to third countries, imposed an embargo on the import of many Ukrainian goods. As a result, according to the sales representative of Ukraine, direct financial losses of Ukraine in the short period since 2016 reached about $1 billion.

Due to the lack of a systematic sanction policy in Ukraine, a considerable amount of Ukrainian-Russian trade is maintained, which conflicts with the sanctions of Ukraine's major trading partners, and thus poses a serious threat to our national security.

The top political leadership of Ukraine should abandon situational tactical decisions that are advantageous primarily to one or another oligarchic clans. Instead, develop a nationwide strategy to protect the interests of the country and society in the face of Russian aggression and begin to apply systematic and large-scale sanctions against the aggressor state.

This is a complex task that requires a lot of effort and time, but it needs to be tackled as quickly as possible. An analysis of the practice of Russia's attitude to Ukraine shows that the mechanisms of cooperation created between the two states, in particular in the economic, military and humanitarian spheres, have always been used by Russia against Ukraine.

The proof of this is the numerous “agreement wars“: Over gas, trade, food, information, etc., which from time to time the Russian Federation has led against Ukraine, and in which Russian leadership does not consider economic losses to achieve its geopolitical goals.

Therefore, the leadership of Ukraine should strive for maximum diversification of bilateral relations with the countries of the world in order to reduce dependence on Russia in all spheres. Relations with the Russian Federation should remain frozen and sanctioned for as long as its armed aggression against Ukraine continues.

One of the priority tasks of Ukrainian diplomacy should be to promote and maintain sanctions against Russia by the international community.

National security

Concerning the national security of Ukraine, it is self-evident that the ruling elite of Russia, supported by the majority of the chauvinistic propaganda of the Russian society, considers Ukraine its existential enemy, and the ultimate goal of the Ukrainian policy of Russia is the total destruction of the Ukrainian nation and its independent statehood of Ukraine. This is an unfortunate reality.

Whatever the outcome of the negotiations with Russia, in contrast to Russia's plans for its destruction and destruction, Ukraine needs to develop and implement a set of Ukrainian strategies in key areas such as:

Ensuring the irreversibility of Ukraine's civilizational choice by building a strong national security sector synchronized with the pursuit of Ukraine's full-scale NATO membership;

The development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in accordance with NATO standards, adapted to Ukrainian needs, realities and experience;

  • Implementation of systemic Ukrainian-centric humanitarian policy;
  • Achieving energy independence of Ukraine;
  • Creation of a modern echelon of territorial defense, first of all and in particular at the borders with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus;
  • Modernization of the defense-industrial complex;
  • Development of new weapons with a focus on the creation of high-precision missile weapons, including missile and air defense;
  • Reform of the Ukrainian special services;
  • Expanding and strengthening military and military-technical cooperation with NATO and its Member States in order to accelerate Ukraine's full membership in the Alliance;
  • Improving the regulatory framework of national security policy, taking into account the current security challenges.

These strategies should complement each other and be applied in systemic unity. Their goal is to create a reliable and effective mechanism for ensuring Ukraine's national security.

[1] - Under the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Occupation Administration of the Russian Federation should be understood its military formations and occupation structures, as defined by the Law of Ukraine of January 18, 2018. № 2268-VIII "On the peculiarities of the state policy on securing the state sovereignty of Ukraine over the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. "

Thank @JohnnOwl and our friends at the @PropOrNot propaganda identification service for translating this text into English.