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中美关系之死(8-9) 【中英对照翻译】

新闻来源:The Wire China;作者:ORVILLE SCHELL

翻译:草根文人;校对:Julia Win;Page: 拱卒

The Death of Engagement / 中美接触终止

Part VIII / 第八部

第三次改革:唐纳德·川普,习,和不破不立

To find myself standing under Mao’s gaze on the steps of the Great Hall of the People once again, this time waiting with President Xi for President Trump to arrive, was surreal.

当我自己在毛的注视下再一次站在人民大会堂的台阶上时,这次跟习主席一起等川普总统的到来,感觉非常的不真实。

When Trump moved into the White House in 2017, he and his “base” were strangely reminiscent of Mao Zedong himself and his populist peasant movement occupying the imperial Zhongnanhai complex near the Forbidden City in 1949. Indeed, if Trump was a reader, he might have found some of Mao’s writings agreeable, especially his famous dictum, “Without destruction there can be no construction” (不破不立). For like Mao, Trump had an innate predilection for wanting to “overturn” (翻身) established structures.

当川普2017年入驻白宫时,他和他的“后援团”很奇怪的会让人联想到毛泽东本人,以及1949年他的群众农民运动占领了故宫附近的皇家中南海建筑群。的确,如果川普是一个读书的人,他也许已经发现毛的一些文章他会赞同,尤其是他非常有名的格言,“不破不立”。像毛一样,川普有一股内在的偏好想要推翻已有的政治格局。

A banquet in the Forbidden City, an honor guard, and a 21-gun salute in the Square promised all the pageantry of a big-budget film. But if the sets were grand, the performances were surprisingly flat. When he finally arrived, Trump was predictably preening and vain while Xi was characteristically supercilious and undemonstrative. Even though Trump had boasted after their Mar-a-Lago meeting that he and Xi were “great friends,” neither now evinced any more genuine sentiment than Mao’s dour Mona Lisa-like portrait hanging on Tiananmen Gate.

故宫的晚宴,仪仗队,广场上的21响礼炮确保了一部大片的所有排场。但是如果布景太宏大,表演就会显得出奇的平淡。当他最终到来时,川普是如预期一样的整洁和自负,而习则是有个性的高傲和面无表情。即使川普吹嘘他们的马拉阿哥会议之后他和习成为了“非常要好的朋友”,到现在也还是不能展现比天安门上悬挂的毛那张阴郁的蒙娜丽莎似的像更加真诚的情感。

Trump and Xi Jinping pose for a photo ahead of their bilateral meeting during the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan, June 29, 2019. Credit: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters 2019年6月29日,川普和习近平在日本大坂的G20领导人峰会上,在他们的双边会谈前合影。 图片来源:路透社Kevin Lamarque

While Xi had been propagandizing for his “China Dream” and a “China rejuvenation” (中国复兴), Trump had been extolling his “Make America Great Again” fantasy in which one key element was “leveling the U.S.-China playing field.” Alas, Xi’s roadmap for rebirth, meanwhile, had no place for China to submissively integrate itself into the pre-existing liberal, American-led global order. Instead, he saw a muscular China now prosperous and powerful enough to act out unapologetically and unilaterally on the world stage. The more benign part of Xi’s dream envisioned Chinese influence expanding globally through an ambitious master plan of interlocking global projects such as the BRICs Bank, The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

当习大肆宣传他的“中共国梦”和“中国复兴”时,川普在颂扬他的“让美国再次伟大”的幻想,其中的一个关键元素就是“平衡美中的竞争环境”。唉,习的重生之路,与此同时,并没有地方让中共国顺从的将自己融合进已有的自由,美国领导的国际秩序中去。相反,他看到的是一个强健的中共国现在足够的繁荣与强大,并可以在世界舞台上毫无疑问的、单边的行动了。习的中共国梦温和一些的部分预见了中共国通过一种涵盖了各种相互关联的全球项目的雄心勃勃的总体规划,来全球性的扩张它的影响,这些项目就包括了金砖国家银行,一带一路,亚洲基础设施投资银行和区域全面经济伙伴关系协定。

But there was also a darker side to Xi’s grand ambitions that grew out of his paranoid fixation on the idea of “hostile foreign forces” (外国敌对势力) perennially and covertly arrayed against China. Xi’s vision was one that seemed bent on fomenting a latter-day “clash of civilizations.” He insisted that “history and reality have told us that only with socialism can we save China,” and that “the eventual demise of capitalism and the ultimate victory of socialism would be a long historical process, a struggle between our two social systems.” China, he’d begun proclaiming, was “blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization.”

但是也存在一个习的宏图大略的黑暗面,这源自于他偏执的聚焦在外国敌对势力常年暗中反对中共国的这个想法上。习的愿景是一个看上去死心踏地的在酝酿今后有一天会有“文明的冲突。”他坚持 “历史和现实告诉我们只有社会主义才能救中共国,”和“资本主义必亡以及社会主义的最终胜利会是一个漫长的历史过程,一个在我们的两种社会系统中挣扎的结果。”他开始宣布,中共国“为其他发展中国家开辟了新的道路来完成现代化。”

“The U.S. needs to recognize that Xi Jinping’s Third Revolution presents a new model of Chinese behavior at home and adjust its expectations and policies accordingly,” warned the Council on Foreign Relation’s Elizabeth Economy.

美国对外关系委员会的易明(亚洲研究中心主任:Elizabeth Economy)警告说“美国需要认清习近平的第三次革命所呈现的中共国在本土行为的一个新模式,和相应的调节我们的期望和政策。”

“Not only has China become wealthier and more powerful, but less willing to hide its disdain for its critic’s views,” observed the Australian Lowy Institute China specialist Richard McGregor. “Xi has articulated a willingness to leverage Beijing’s elevated power to press the ruling communist party’s ambitions with a force and coherence that his predecessors lacked.”

澳大利亚洛伊研究所中共国问题专家马利德(Richard McGregor)观察到“不仅中共国变得更加富有和更有力量,而且更加不愿意去隐藏它对于批评家观点的蔑视,”“习清楚的表达了一个意愿,就是借助北京已经提升的实力和他前任们所欠缺的力量,以及一致性去推进统治阶级共产党的意志。”

But, he concluded, “Beijing cannot bully its way to superpower status without engendering a strong pushback from other countries, which is exactly what is happening.”

但是他总结到,“北京不可能依靠恃强凌弱成为超级大国而不引发其他国家强烈的抵制,这也是目前正在发生的事情。”

A relationship between China and the United States rooted in “engagement” crumbled under Trump and Xi Jinping. Credit: Shealah Craighead 植根于“接触战略”的中美关系在川普和习近平下分崩离析 图片来源:Shealah Craighead

While Trump may be a proverbial bull in a China shop, it was not him who initially and unilaterally abrogated engagement’s tacit compact. Nor was it China’s economic rise that voided it in a neo-Thucydides trap. Instead, it was Hu Jintao’s inattention to the growing imbalances in the relationship and Xi Jinping’s increasingly belligerent refusal to make any concessionary adjustments and be more reciprocal that finally over-burdened it. With Xi’s abandonment of the notion of a “peaceful rise,” his accelerated military modernization, eschewal of market reforms, and his increasingly unyielding posture in the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Straits, and Hong Kong, the Trump administration finally acknowledged that engagement was no longer working in U.S. interests and instead declared China a “strategic competitor” and a “rival power.”

川普也许笨手笨脚,但并不是他最开始单方面的背弃接触的默许合约。也不是中共国的经济崛起在新的修昔底德陷阱中让它失效的。而是,胡锦涛对关系累积不平衡的视而不见,和习近平对于作出让步的调整以及更加的互惠不断增强的好战的抵制,最终让这个关系负载过重。随着习放弃了“和平崛起”的想法,他加速了军事现代化,规避市场改革,他在南中国海、东中国海、台湾海峡和香港问题上日益增长的强硬的姿态,川普政府最终承认接触战略不再适用于美国利益,而且宣布中共国是一个“战略对手”和一个“敌对政权”。

Chinese forces lined up as Trump boarded Air Force One to depart from China after his 2017 trip. After a lackluster meeting, the relationship between the United States and China continued to deteriorate. Shealah Craighead/White House 2017年访问后,中共国军队列队欢送川普登上空军一号离开中共国。在乏味的会议后,美国和中共国的关系继续恶化。 图片来源:白宫 Shealah Craighead

Then, in 2018, Vice President Mike Pence delivered a major policy speech that dramatically reset the terms of the new game: “Previous administrations made this choice [to engage China] in the hope that freedom in China would expand in all of its forms — not just economically, but politically, with a newfound respect for classical liberal principles, private property, personal liberty, religious freedom — the entire family of human rights,” said Pence. “That hope has gone unfulfilled.”

然后,在2018年,副总统迈克·彭斯发表了一次至关重要的政策演讲,这个演讲很明显的重新定义了新的游戏规则,彭斯说:“以前的政府做这个选择(接触中共国)是希望中共国的自由能拓展到它的方方面面-并不只是在经济上,而是要在政治上,对经典的自由的原则、私有财产、个人自由、宗教自由-人权的全部家族有一个新发现的尊重,”“这个希望完全的落空了。”

His talk led to a debate on the need to “decouple” aspects of our now intimately intertwined economies, even the close relationships that our universities and civil society organizations have forged with Chinese counterparts.

他的讲话导致了要不要“脱钩”我们现在已经紧密交织在一起的经济的辩论,甚至我们的大学和公民社会组织也与中共国的对等组织形成了非常亲密的关系。

翻译:海阔天空;PR:Julia Win;Page: 拱卒

The Death of Engagement / 中美接触终止

Part IX / 第九部

If a mourner was to erect a tombstone to engagement, the epitaph might read:

如果悼念者要立一个接触的墓碑,墓志铭可以这样写:

Engagement: Born 1972, Died Tragically of Neglect, 2020.

接触: 生于1972年,不幸于2020年因被忽视而去世。

In making my own genuflection before such a monument to the policy that had been the North Star of my life as a China watcher, I’d rue engagement’s loss as a completely unnecessary tragedy. I also wonder: What possessed Chinese Party leaders, and then Trump, to so recklessly kill a policy that had not only kept the peace for five decades, but allowed China to undergo just the kind of economic development and national rejuvenation that its people have dreamed of for decades? Xi’s muscular approach may be propitiating certain ultra-nationalists at home, but it was also pulling down the keystone of the global archway that upheld China’s integration into the world and antagonizing so many once collaborative foreign partners. Was this really in China’s future interest? In short, what compelling Chinese national interest was served by undermining engagement?

作为一名中共国观察家,这项政策曾是我人生的北极星。在我向它的纪念碑屈膝时,我会为失去“接触”而感到遗憾,认为这是一场完全不必要的悲剧。我还想知道:是什么让中国的政党领导人,然后是川普,如此鲁莽地扼杀了一项不仅维持了50年的和平,而且让中共国实现了人民几十年来梦想的经济发展和民族复兴的政策?习的强硬做法或许是在安抚国内的某些极端民族主义者,但它也在破坏支撑中共国融入世界的全球拱门的基石,并激怒了许多曾经合作的外国伙伴。这真的符合中共国未来的利益吗?简而言之,破坏接触对中共国的国家利益有什么好处?

In the end, engagement’s end could not be blamed on any lack of American commitment or effort. It seems to me that the U.S. has shown unprecedented creativity, first by entertaining a vision of peaceful transformation of a once militant, Marxists-Leninist state and then by showing remarkable diplomatic leadership — and patience — in shepherding that vision through so many presidential administrations. As Kissinger recently put it, “our hope was that the values of the two sides would come closer together.”

最终,接触的结束不能归咎于美国缺乏承诺或努力。在我看来,美国展现出了前所未有的创造力,首先是戏剧化地构建了一个对曾经好战的马列主义国家和平转型的设想,然后是通过展示卓越的外交领导力——以及耐心——在众多总统任期内引导这一设想。正如基辛格最近所言,“我们希望双方的价值观能够更加接近。”

To many, it had become evident that the relationship between the United States and China was unbalanced. Credit: Pete Souza/White House 对许多人来说,中美关系的不平衡已经很明显。(来源:Pete Souza/White House)

Such a hope may now seem almost naïve. However, the alternative in 1972 was an on-going Cold War, perhaps even a hot war. Engagement was a chance worth taking and there were many inflection points during its twisted progress when things might have worked out very differently. (One thinks of 1989.) That they didn’t was not due to a lack of U.S. strategic thinking, diplomatic effort, or willingness to be flexible. Engagement failed because of the CCP’s deep ambivalence about the way engaging in a truly meaningful way might lead to demands for more reform and change and its ultimate demise.

这样的希望现在看来几乎是天真的。然而,1972年的替代方案是一场持续的冷战,甚至可能是一场热战。接触是一个值得把握的机会,在曲折的进程中有许多转折点,事情可能会有截然不同的结果。(这让人想起1989年)。他们之所以没有这么做,并不是因为缺乏美国的战略思维、外交努力或灵活变通的意愿。接触之所以失败,是因为中国共产党对于以一种真正有意义的方式进行接触可能会导致更多改革和变革的要求,有一种深层的矛盾心理,并导致了以及接触的寿终正寝。

Without political reform and the promise of China transitioning to become more soluble in the existing world order, engagement no longer has a logic for the U.S. Beijing’s inability to reform, evolve, and make the bilateral relationship more reciprocal, open and level finally rendered the policy inoperable. Because Xi Jinping viewed just such changes threatening his one-party rule, there came to be an irreconcilable contradiction at the heart of engagement that killed it.

如果没有政治改革和中共国转型的承诺,中共国在现有世界秩序中变得更容易解决问题,美国就不再有参与的逻辑。北京无力改革、无法进化和无法使双边关系更加互惠、开放和平等,最终导致政策无法操作。正是因为习近平认为这些变化对他的一党统治构成了威胁,在接触的核心出现了一种不可调和的矛盾,从而扼杀了这种关系。

So, what happens now? Is it too late to arrest our slide and devise a new post-engagement policy of engagement to guide ourselves out of the present downward spiral that Kissinger has described as putting us in “the foothills” of a new Cold War, with consequences that are potentially more disastrous than World War I?”

那么,现在会发生什么呢? 停止我们不断陷入的接触陷阱,设计一种新的后接触政策,将我们带出螺旋式下降的现状会不会太晚了?基辛格认为这种螺旋式下降会把我们置于新冷战的“山麓”,其后果可能比第一次世界大战更具灾难性?

The two presidents should declare a state of urgency, appoint trusted high-level plenipotentiaries and mandate them to form teams of specialists from business, policy, and academia to formulate a set of possible scenarios for lowering the temperature in each of the most important realms of the bi-lateral relationship. Once both national teams have designed their own roadmaps for getting out of our present impasse, they should convene jointly to hammer out several mutually acceptable possibilities, and present them to their respective presidents. The presidents should then convene an emergency special summit dedicated to finding an off-ramp.

两国元首应宣布紧急状态,任命可信赖的高级全权代表,并授权他们由商业、政策和学术界专家组成的团队,以制定一系列可能的方案,在双边关系的每个最重要领域降温。一旦两国团队为摆脱目前的僵局设计好了各自的路线图,他们就应该共同召集会议,敲定几个双方都能接受的可能性,并将它们提交给各自的总统。然后,两国元首应该召开紧急特别峰会,专门寻找出口。

Whether the two current presidents are up to such a challenge is far from certain, because the leadership skills required — creativity, flexibility, reciprocity, openness, transparency, and boldness — are precisely those they lack. The CCP’s rigid commitment to a one-party system and fear that flexibility will be perceived as weakness makes it allergic to exactly the kind of give-and-take necessary to bridge such a wide divide. And even though Trump has not misjudged China’s intentions, he is so erratic, uninformed and thin-skinned it is hard to imagine him being able to bring about a breakthrough between our two countries that are no longer divided just by trade issues, but by a far wider set of discontinuities and contradictions that are made more irreconcilable by our two opposing political systems and value sets.

这两位现任总统能否胜任这样的挑战还远不能确定,因为妥善处理两国关系所需的领导能力——创造力、灵活性、互惠性、公开性、透明度和胆识——正是他们所缺乏的。中国共产党对一党制的严格承诺,以及担心灵活性会被视为软弱,使得它对为弥合如此巨大的分歧而采取的那种妥协非常敏感。尽管川普没有误判中共国的意图,川普是如此古怪、无知、脸皮薄,很难想象他能带给我们除了贸易问题之外两国关系的突破,这种突破要调和一套更广泛的不连续性和不可调和的政治制度和价值观系统的矛盾。

But for those tempted to wait for a new administration, it is worth pointing out that neither Trump nor Xi have yet attacked the other in an ad hominem way, thus leaving the door still ajar for a one-on-one interaction. But because antagonisms are escalating rapidly, time is very short. For such a plan to be successful, Washington would have to be ready to acknowledge it will not be able to resolve the most fundamental systemic issues dividing Beijing from Washington and forgo regime change as an end game. Beijing would have to be willing to set its paranoia and victimization narrative aside and then temper its global belligerence to focus on areas where common interest still prevails. Right now, the kind of grand hopes of convergence that once animated earlier iterations of engagement are unrealistic. We must settle instead for a far more minimalist agenda, one that would allow us to pragmatically work together on those issues — public health, trade, climate change, and nuclear proliferation — where the mutual interest is obvious and urgent.

但是对于那些想等待新一届政府的人,值得指出的是,无论是川普还是习都没有对另一个人进行人身攻击,这样一来,他们就会把一对一互动的大门半开着。但由于对抗正在迅速升级,时间非常紧迫。要想让这一计划取得成功,美国政府必须准备好承认,它无法解决导致中美两国分歧的最根本的系统性问题,也无法放弃将政权更迭作为一种终极游戏。北京必须愿意放下偏执和受害者的叙述,然后收敛其全球好战性,将注意力集中在仍然存在共同利益的领域。现在,那种曾经激发早期合作融合的宏伟希望是不现实的。相反,我们必须解决一个更简单的议程,使我们能够务实地在公共卫生、贸易、气候变化和核扩散等问题上共同努力,在这些问题上,双方的共同利益是明显而紧迫的。

Nixon told the world that his trip to China “demonstrated that nations with deep and fundamental differences can learn to discuss those differences calmly, rationally and frankly without compromising their principles.” Credit: Oliver F. Atkins 尼克松告诉全世界,他的中共国之行表明,“有深刻和根本分歧的国家可以学会冷静、理性和坦率地讨论这些分歧,而不妥协自己的原则。” 来源:奥利弗·f·阿特金斯

Finally, both sides would have to recognize that even in times of deep division there are still issues of critical common interest that can be jointly addressed. It is helpful to remind ourselves that the U.S. and China have squared this circle before, and it is here that the Nixon-Kissinger breakthrough in 1972 is worth re-studying. As Nixon then observed to Premier Zhou, “we have common interests that transcend those differences” and “while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try and bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it.”

最后,双方必须认识到,即使在分歧严重的时候,仍然有一些具有重大共同利益的问题可以共同解决。我们需要提醒自己,美国和中共国以前也曾解决过这个问题,因此1972年尼克松-基辛格的突破值得重新研究。尼克松后来对周总理说,“我们有超越这些分歧的共同利益”,“虽然我们不能弥合我们之间的鸿沟,但我们可以试着架起一座桥梁,以便我们能够跨越鸿沟进行对话”。

Such a meager vision is enough to make one nostalgic for the grandness of scale and optimism, if naiveté, of our old engagement dream. But perhaps the best we can now hope for, is to find enough common ground to keep tension in “the foothills” rather than allowing them to escalate and ascend into the alpine peaks of a new cold war.

如此微薄的视野足以让人怀念规模之宏大,以及对我们的旧约定之梦的乐观(尽管有些天真)。但也许我们现在所能期望的最好结果,就是找到足够的共同点,将紧张局势保持在“山脚下”,而不是让它们升级,登上新冷战的高山之巅。

编辑:【喜马拉雅战鹰团】Edited by:【Himalaya Hawk Squad】