作者：凯西·吉尔西南（KATHY GILSINAN） 发表于：2020年5月6日

文章来源：《大西洋杂志》

翻译: Bobby H

简评：Bobby H/TCC

校对：TCC

这篇文章主旨在探讨为什么美国向各个国际组织所提供的经费比中共国的多得多，但这些组织都帮中共?主要原因归咎于美国长期对国际组织的忽视，这造成了美国在重要国际组织渐渐失去了决定权，也使中共趁虚而入，以(空头)支票外交，收买国际组织，或靠霸凌与蓝金黄来收买推举其同路人，蝉食鲸吞国际组织。目前中共国主导了联合国的15个专业机构中的4个重要的组织。世卫组织的谭德塞，以及世贸组织就是很好的例子。这次WHO与中共配合得天衣无缝，才造成今日的大瘟疫。

其中，有个数字对比最能说明问题：

去年，美国为联合国运营预算提供了超过6.7亿美元。同期，中共国提供了3.7亿美元。然而，中共国主导了联合国15个专业机构中的4个，相比之下，没有一个其它国家能主导超过一个专业机构。

本文阐述了这一事实对世界造成的深刻影响，即全球自由体系规则被改写，国际标准淡化，从而为独裁创造了“操纵空间”。新疆维吾尔族穆斯林集中营和台湾失去世卫组织代表资格深刻说明了这一点。

川普总统宣布停止美国向世界卫生组织提供的赞助金，就是一个很重要的讯号，告诉这些联合国的世界组织，美国不再做冤大头了。中共的空头支票外交早晚因无法兑现而被拆穿。文中也提及，中共这些霸凌作法已开始产生反效果了，尤其是在这次中共武汉病毒疫情爆发后，各个国家逐渐意识到中共邪恶本质。值得一提的是，文章结尾指出，由于这次全球中共疫情大流行，中共国用金钱购买影响力的手段必将功亏一篑。

China‘s Bargain on Global Influence Is Paying Off

中共国在全球影响力上的交易正获得回报

The U.S. gives more money than China to many international organizations. So why do they seem more sympathetic to Beijing?

美国向许多国际组织提供的资金比中共国给的多。那么为什么人们似乎更同情北京呢？

This spring, President Donald Trump declared that he would halt U.S. funding for the World Health Organization, previously more than $400 million annually—and he announced this right in the midst of a global pandemic. A week later, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged another $30 million—which would nowhere near make up for the shortfall (not to mention that China still owes the organization $60 million in membership dues, an amount the WHO expects to get later this year). But the moment was a clear case in point for China‘s success at checkbook diplomacy, in which the amount matters less than the message: You can’t count on the U.S., but you can count on us.

今年春天，唐纳德·川普总统宣布他将停止美国向世界卫生组织提供的赞助金，此前美国每年向世界卫生组织提供的赞助金超过4亿美元，而他在全球大流行中宣布了这项消息。一周后，中共国国家主席习近平又承诺提供3000万美元-不足以弥补这一缺口（更不用说中国仍欠该组织6,000万美元的会费，这是WHO希望在今年晚些时候得到的）。但是目前，这显然是中共国在“支票”外交上取得成功的一个明显例子，这个例子传递的信息比金额重要：您不能指望美国，但可以指望我们(中共)。

America was, until Trump ordered a review of the contributions, the single largest state funder of the WHO—China was contributing just over a 10th of what the U.S. was. Yet for years now, even before Trump accused the WHO of being too “China-centric,” American officials worried that China kept somehow buying more influence, with less money, around the world.

在川普下令审核捐款之前，美国曾是世卫组织最大的捐助国，捐助金额相当于中共国的10倍。然而近些年，甚至在川普指责世卫组织过于“亲共”之前，美国官员已经在担心中共国正在廉价购买全球范围内的影响力。

“The Chinese give as little money as they can get away with,” Rear Admiral Kenneth Bernard, who previously served as a political adviser to the director-general of the World Health Organization, and as a special assistant for biodefense to President George W. Bush, told me. “They give as little money as will buy influence.”

“This isn‘t about being fair,” he added. “This is about winning.”

曾担任世界卫生组织(World Health Organization)总干事的政治顾问，以及乔治w布什(George W. Bush)总统的生物防御特别助理的海军少将肯尼斯伯纳德(Kenneth Bernard)说，“中共国人总是设法想少付钱。” “在购买影响力方面，他们能少给就少给。”

他补充道，“这无关公平， 只关胜负。”

The WHO isn‘t the only example. Last year, the United States gave more than $670 million to the United Nations’ operating budget, while China gave almost $370 million—yet Chinese nationals currently head four of the body‘s 15 specialized agencies. “No other nation leads more than one,” Melanie Hart, a senior fellow and the director of China policy at the Center for American Progress, told me. “Making contributions is one thing, but [Chinese personnel] show up big, and they push.”

WHO并不是唯一的例子。去年，美国为联合国运营预算提供了超过6.7亿美元。同期，中共国提供了3.7亿美元。然而，目前中共国主导了联合国15个专业机构中的4个。美国进步中心中共国政策主任，资深研究员梅兰妮·哈特（Melanie Hart）对我说，“没有一个其它国家能主导超过一个专业机构。” “做出贡献是一回事，但是（中方人员）雷声大，而且他们施压。”

China‘s muscle-flexing is also occurring at a time in which the U.S. president has expressed disinterest in, or outright contempt for, international organizations, canceling or suspending funding for some, and calling it into question for others. The most powerful country in the world is perhaps entitled to take this posture—after all, U.S. presidents have ignored or sidestepped international organizations for decades, not least in launching bombing campaigns over Kosovo in the 1990s and Iraq in the 2000s. But China clearly sees such organizations not as irrelevant hindrances but as convenient vehicles for expanding its global influence. The Trump administration, meanwhile—though the U.S. appointed a special envoy to counter “malign influences” of China and others at the UN toward the beginning of the year, and finally announced a nomination for America’s years-vacant seat on the WHO‘s executive board—has largely ceded the field.

在美国总统表示对国际组织不感兴趣或蔑视、取消或暂停对某些组织的资助并对其它组织提出质疑之际，中共国正在大秀肌肉。世界上最强大的国家也许有权采取这种姿态-毕竟，数十年来，美国总统无视或避开了国际组织，尤其是在1990年代对科索沃和2000年代对伊拉克发动的轰炸运动。但是中共国显然认为这些组织并非无关紧要，而是能帮助其快速扩展全球影响力的工具。与此同时，川普政府（尽管美国在今年年初任命了一名特使，以对抗中国和其他国家在联合国的“负面影响”，并最终宣布提名美国担任世卫组织执行委员会的空缺席位）在很大程度上割让了该领域。

Chinese leaders also present their own country as a voice for the developing world against the dominant Western global powers. “They were the big players” in trying to get the World Health Organization to focus on developing countries‘ issues, David Hohman, who formerly served as Deputy Director of the Office of Global Affairs at the Department of Health and Human Services, told me. “Fortunately in WHO you don’t vote on things, but if you ever did, [China has] the votes … It was a big advantage to them.”

中共国领导人还以发展中国家的名义代表发声，来对抗主要的西方全球势力。在推动世界卫生组织专注于发展中国家的事宜中，中共是主要的参与者。曾担任卫生和人类服务部全球事务办公室副主任的戴维·霍曼（David Hohman）告诉我：“幸运的是，在世卫组织中，您不须对任何事情投票，但是，如果您曾经投过，[中共国拥有]选票…这对他们来说是一个很大的优势。”

Through its seat on the United Nations Security Council, China‘s Communist government has had the ability to thwart other members’ ambitions for decades. But only recently has it begun to flex this muscle. In the past 15 years, China has vetoed 11 Security Council resolutions, more than five times as many as in the preceding 15 years. (It still has not caught up to the United States, which vetoed 18 resolutions over the same 30-year period.)

数十年以来，中共政府通过其在联合国安理会（常任理事国）的席位，有能力阻止其它成员国的抱负。但直到现在，它才开始秀肌肉。过去15年，中共国否决了11项安理会决议，是之前15年中的五倍多。（该数量仍赶不上美国，后者在过去30年里一共否决了18项决议）

Meanwhile, Beijing is working to rewrite the rules of the liberal system America once prided itself on having built. China has gotten two resolutions through the UN‘s Human Rights Council, Hart explained in written testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission this spring, one “suggesting that human rights must be balanced with economic development needs,” and another asking that cultural contexts be taken into account when considering human rights standards. Hart told me that “the U.S. currently doesn’t care about the UN Human Rights Council. China does.” (The U.S. withdrew from that body in 2018 when then–UN Ambassador Nikki Haley accused it of being biased against Israel.) And the watering-down of international standards, Hart says, creates “maneuvering room” for authoritarians around the world.

同时，北京正在努力改写美国曾经建立并引以为傲的自由体系规则。哈特今年春天在美中经济与安全审查委员会的证词中解释说：中共国已经通过联合国人权理事会获得两项决议，其中一项“建议人权必须与经济发展需求相平衡”，另一项则要求在设立人权标准时要考虑到文化环境因素。哈特告诉我：“美国目前不在乎联合国人权理事会，而中共国则在乎。”（2018年，美国驻联合国大使尼基·海利（Nikki Haley）指责联合国人权理事会对以色列持有偏见，美国因此退出了该机构。）哈特说，国际标准的淡化为全球的独裁者创造了“操纵空间”。

“It is not a good idea to let dictators run UN agencies,” said Bernard, who retired from the U.S. Public Health Service. “Not because it‘s particularly China or not China. It’s because the constituencies for those issues get hurt.” China is currently holding up to 1 million Uighur Muslims in what it calls “re-education” camps in conditions that rights groups and other governments have condemned.

“让独裁者管理联合国机构可不是一个好主意。”从美国公共卫生服务局退休的伯纳德说，“这与它是中共，或不是中共无关，而是因为关注这些问题的选民受到了伤害。”尽管受到人权组织和其他政府的谴责，中共国仍然在所谓的“再教育营”中拘禁了多达100万维吾尔族穆斯林。

“If any government other than China was holding a million Muslims arbitrarily, I think we can reasonably assume we would already be well under way in a discussion, not just about investigation, but about accountability,” Sophie Richardson, the China director at Human Rights Watch, told me. But the UN hasn‘t even launched an investigation. At one point in April 2017, according to a Human Rights Watch report, UN security escorted a Uighur activist out of UN headquarters, where he was participating in a forum. A Chinese diplomat later bragged about it on state media, Hart noted in her testimony.

人权观察组织中共国事务主任索菲·理查森（Sophie Richardson）告诉我，“如果中共以外的任何政府任意拘禁一百万穆斯林，我认为我们会理所当然地讨论该如何就此进行问责，而不仅仅是调查。”但是联合国甚至还没有展开调查。根据《人权观察》的一份报告，2017年4月的某个时刻，联合国安全人员将当时正在参加一个论坛的维吾尔激进分子“护送”出联合国总部，他正在那里参加一个论坛。哈特在证词中指出，一名中共国外交官后来在官方媒体上对此吹嘘。

In another instance that Human Rights Watch highlighted, the Chinese government detained an activist who tried to go to Geneva for a session at the Human Rights Council. After the activist, Cao Shunli, died following a six-month detention, Chinese diplomats in Geneva blocked efforts to hold a moment of silence in her memory. China‘s “human-rights agenda is not about human rights,” Bernard said. “It’s about Chinese politics.”

在《人权观察》强调的另一起事件中，中共国政府拘留了一名试图前往日内瓦参加人权理事会会议的激进分子。该激进分子曹顺利在被拘留六个月后去世，中共国驻日内瓦外交官阻止了为纪念她举行默哀的提议。中共国的“人权议程与人权无关”，伯纳德说， “这只与中共国政治有关。”

The same is true of any other mechanism China uses to build its influence around the world. If China has pushed to install its diplomats at the helm of the UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization and Food and Agriculture Organization, it‘s not necessarily because the Chinese Communist Party cares a great deal about the issues at the core of those agencies. It’s about gaining political and economic influence over member states. Case in point: Cameroon put forward a candidate to lead the Food and Agriculture Organization, who withdrew after Beijing forgave Cameroonian debt. China also reportedly threatened to cut off important exports to other countries if they refused to back Beijing’s candidate. The Chinese candidate won.

中共国在世界范围内建立影响力的任何其他机制也是如此。如果中共国推动外交官接任联合国国际民航组织和粮食与农业组织的职务，那不一定是因为中共非常关心这些机构的核心问题，而是因为这有助于在成员国中获得政治和经济影响力。一个很好的例子：喀麦隆推荐了一个领导粮食和农业组织的候选人，在北京免除喀麦隆的债务后该候选人退出了该组织。据报道，如果其他国家拒绝支持北京的候选人，中共也威胁要切断对他们的重要出口。中共国候选人获胜。

The clearest example of how China uses this influence involves Taiwan, the democratically governed island that the Chinese Communist Party claims as part of its own territory. Hart noted that after Taiwan, in 2016, elected President Tsai-Ing Wen, who ran as an advocate for Taiwanese sovereignty from Beijing, the WHO stopped inviting Taiwan to its global summit—though Taiwan‘s attendance hadn’t been cause for concern the prior year, when a pro-Beijing president was in charge of the island. “As soon as the people of Taiwan elected a candidate that Beijing didn‘t like, ‘Oops,’” Hart said. “You cannot convince me that it no longer made sense for the WHO to have those people represented there because the presidency changed.” More recently, a senior WHO official dodged questions about Taiwan’s success in responding to the pandemic, saying instead: “When you look across different areas of China, they‘ve actually done quite a good job.”

中共国使用其影响力最显着的例子是中国共产党宣称民主岛屿台湾是其领土的一部分。哈特指出，在倡导台湾主权的蔡英文（Tsai-Ing Wen）在2016年当选为台湾总统之后，世卫组织停止邀请台湾参加其全球峰会，尽管台湾的前一年出席并未引起关注，因为当时台湾有一位亲北京的总统。“台湾人民一选出北京不喜欢的候选人，‘糟糕’。”哈特说，“这是难以让我信服的，就因为轮换总统，在世卫组织派驻代表就不再有意义了。”最近，世卫组织的一位高级官员回避了关于台湾成功应对大瘟疫的问题，却说：“当您查看整个中共国不同的地区时，他们实际上做得很好。”

Still, all this maneuvering might have its limits. A Pew Research Center survey from December, before the coronavirus crisis engulfed the entire world, found negative views of China in much of the United States, Western Europe, and Asia. China has economic clout and is savvy about using it, but this hasn’t necessarily bought it enduring influence in the world‘s other economic power centers.

尽管如此，所有这些小动作可能有其限度。皮尤研究中心于12月份在冠状病毒危机席卷全球之前进行的一项问卷调查发现，美国，西欧和亚洲许多地区都对中共国持负面看法。中共国拥有经济影响力，并且善于利用这一点，但这并不一定使它在世界其他经济权力中心拥有持久的影响力。

Now U.S public opinion toward China is at an all-time low, according to Pew, and though data do not yet exist on how world public opinion has changed since the crisis, Chinese leaders are already clearly worried. They are pumping out propaganda disparaging the U.S. response and touting their help to stricken countries. Reuters reported on an internal Chinese document fretting about the possibility of a global backlash akin to what China saw after the Tiananmen Square massacre. China is a great deal richer and militarily stronger than it was in 1989, but with the world awash in a pandemic and the U.S. trumpeting China‘s culpability, Beijing may soon find that there are some things money can’t fix.

根据皮尤（Pew）研究中心，现在美国对中共国的舆论处于历史最低点，尽管自(大瘟疫)危机以来还没有关于世界舆论如何变化的数据，但中共国领导人已经显然感到担忧。他们轻视美国的反应，正在大肆宣传和吹捧其对受灾国家的帮助。路透社报道了一份中共国内部文件，该文件担心全球反弹的可能性类似于中共国在天安门广场屠杀后所看到的。中共国比1989年富裕，军事实力也强得多，但是随着全球中共病毒大流行，以及美国大肆宣扬中共国的罪责，北京可能很快会发现并非所有事情都能用钱来解决。

编辑：【喜马拉雅战鹰团】Edited by：【Himalaya Hawk Squad】